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291.
Pierre‐Philippe Combes Laurent Linnemer 《Journal of the European Economic Association》2003,1(6):1250-1308
We measure the past production of research articles by current members of European economics institutions. All EconLit journals are used, weighted to reflect differences in quality. Both a long (1971–2000) and a short (1996–2000) time period are considered. We also provide production indices that take into account the authors' career length. The total output of each research center is measured as well as its production per member. The focus is on 600 centers from eighteen European countries (EU 14, Israel, Norway, Switzerland, and Turkey). European centers are compared to the top sixty U.S. economics departments. Statistics regarding the concentration of article production across researchers, institutions, and countries are provided, as well as on publication habits. (JEL: A14, L11, R32) 相似文献
292.
Olivier Compte Philippe Jehiel 《Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society》2002,70(4):1477-1517
The presence of obstinate types in bargaining has been shown to alter dramatically the bargaining equilibrium strategies and outcomes. This paper shows that outside options may cancel out the effect of obstinacy in bargaining. When parties have access to stationary outside options, we show that when opting out is preferable to accepting the inflexible demand of the other party, there is a unique Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in which each party reveals himself as rational as soon as possible. A similar conclusion holds when outside options may only be available at a later date or when only one party has access to an outside option. 相似文献
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295.
Xavier D'Haultfuille Philippe Fvrier 《Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society》2015,83(3):1199-1210
We study the identification through instruments of a nonseparable function that relates a continuous outcome to a continuous endogenous variable. Using group and dynamical systems theories, we show that full identification can be achieved under strong exogeneity of the instrument and a dual monotonicity condition, even if the instrument is discrete. When identified, the model is also testable. Our results therefore highlight the identifying power of strong exogeneity when combined with monotonicity restrictions. 相似文献
296.
Philippe Aghion Philippe Askenazy Nicolas Berman Gilbert Cette Laurent Eymard 《Journal of the European Economic Association》2012,10(5):1001-1024
We use a French firm‐level data set containing 13,000 firms over the period 1994–2004 to analyze the relationship between credit constraints and firms’ R&D behavior over the business cycle. Our main results can be summarized as follows: (i) R&D investment is countercyclical without credit constraints, but it becomes procyclical as firms face tighter credit constraints; (ii) this result is only observed for firms in sectors that depend more heavily upon external finance, or that are characterized by a low degree of asset tangibility; (iii) in more credit‐constrained firms, R&D investment plummets during recessions but does not increase proportionally during upturns. 相似文献
297.
Philippe Aghion Mathias Dewatripont Patrick Rey 《Journal of the European Economic Association》2004,2(1):115-138
In this paper, we introduce the notion of transferable control, defined as a situation where one party (the principal, say) can transfer control to another party (the agent) but cannot commit herself to do so. One theoretical foundation for this notion builds on the distinction between formal and real authority introduced by Aghion and Tirole, in which the actual exercise of authority may require noncontractible information, absent which formal control rights are vacuous. We use this notion to study the extent to which control transfers may allow an agent to reveal information regarding his ability or willingness to cooperate with the principal in the future. We show that the distinction between contractible and transferable control can drastically influence how learning takes place: with contractible control, information about the agent can often be acquired through revelation mechanisms that involve communication and message‐contingent control allocations; in contrast, when control is transferable but not contractible, it can be optimal to transfer control unconditionally and learn instead from the way in which the agent exercises control. (JEL: C70, C72, D23, L2) 相似文献
298.