A balance-sheet approach to fiscal sustainability

This paper proposes an alternative methodology to assess fiscal sustainability. Our balance-sheet approach (BSA) relies on estimating separately all of a government's assets and liabilities as opposed to focusing only on the burden of explicit liabilities. In our approach, assets are primarily the present discounted value of taxes, and liabilities include explicit liabilities but also the present discounted value of expenditures. Using the value of assets and liabilities, we compute the government's balance sheet, and therefore net worth. We then evaluate the response of net worth to growth, commodity prices or real exchange rate shocks. By computing a value for the government's net worth, our methodology allows an assessment of fiscal sustainability that is less reliant on the analyst's assumptions than traditional debt sustainability analysis (DSA).     

Green technology co-patenting networks: international dynamics

The present study examined how the multi-country green technology co-patenting network structure evolved from 1997 to 2016. For that purpose, we used Social Network Analysis tools, which allowed us to assess the network structure from a visual and quantitative perspective. The results indicate that the network expanded as the number of participating countries and ties increased. In all periods, the network grew significantly centralized around a small group of countries, in which the U.S., Great Britain, Germany, France, and Canada had paramount weight. Emerging countries like India and China also stood out due to their growth over time, as they eventually managed to gain central positions in the network. Other developing countries remained marginal, such as Brazil.

     

Investment–cash flow sensitivity and investor protection

We examine the role of country-level legal investor protection (i.e., shareholder and creditor protection) on firm investment–cash flow sensitivity (ICFS). Using underexplored research data on investor protection across 21 countries and working with a conservative empirical design, we extend prior literature on the relation between investor protection and ICFS and provide new evidence on how these country-level attributes interact to explain a firm's ICFS. We find that either the strong legal protection of minority shareholders or the strong legal protection of creditors reduces the sensitivity of investment to internal cash flow. However, in countries with strong levels of both minority shareholder and creditor protection, ICFS increases. Our results remain robust after controlling for several alternative explanations. The results support the argument that overregulation arises when policymakers increase investor protection at levels that lead firms to avoid external sources of finance, hampering firm investment. Our findings suggest that countries face a regulatory trade-off such that increasing investor protection (either shareholder or creditors protection) enhances financial markets efficiency, but excessive regulation can indeed lead to financial markets inefficiencies.