Research on closed loop supply chain with reference price effect

This paper considers a closed loop supply chain with the manufacturer as the Stackelberg leader. The manufacturer faces three different reverse channels, i.e., (1) manufacturer-managed, (2) retailer-managed, or (3) third party-managed channels. The reference price affects the purchase decision of consumers. Based on game theory, we discuss the reference price effect on the performances across three decentralized reverse channels, and examine the impact of reference price parameter (i.e., reference price coefficient in this paper) on optimal strategies. We conclude that higher reference price coefficient results in lower manufacturer and retailer profits. However, the profit of the third party increases in the reference price coefficient. In addition, some meaningful insights can be derived by comparison without the reference price effect in our models. We found that the scenario without reference price effect is generally superior to that with reference price effect.     

基于回收产品质量水平的闭环供应链渠道选择模型

基于回收努力和回收产品质量水平的考虑,应用Stackelberg博弈模型理论,构建分别由制造商回收、零售 商回收和第三方回收的3种再制造闭环供应链决策模型,考察不同渠道下参与主体最优决策差异和基于回收产品 质量水平的回收渠道选择问题.结果表明,第三方回收为下策均衡,制造商回收或零售商回收取决 于产品再制造成本的节约水平,制造商需衡量其再制造成本,从制造商回收和零售商回收中选择最优的回收渠道.     

考虑质量控制和损失规避的供应链协调研究

研究质量控制和各成员均损失规避背景下的供应链协调问题,应用损失规避效应函数刻画制造商和零售商的损失规避行为,通过分析比较分散决策和集中决策两种模式下的最优策略,引入批发价格-质量成本分担契约构建供应链协调模型,研究表明,该契约能够使质量控制与损失规避背景下的供应链实现协调.通过算例对损失规避程度、产品合格率和销售价格等参数进行灵敏度分析,揭示了损失规避和质量控制等因素与最优产品质量水平、最优订货量以及供应链效用之间的关系.     

Analytical model of adoption of item level RFID in a two-echelon supply chain with shelf-space and price-dependent demand

We investigate whether it is possible for the manufacturer as well as the retailer to derive economic benefits from item-level RFID. We consider two supply chain contracts. In the first instance the manufacturer sets the wholesale price for his product and in response the retailer sets the retail price and allocates the shelf-space. We find that in this setting item-level RFID is adopted in a decentralized supply chain at the same levels of RFID costs as in an integrated supply chain with a single decision maker. The second case that we consider involves a powerful retailer setting product shelf-space prices. In this setting the manufacturer essentially rents shelf-space from the retailer. We find that in this setting, the retailer may force the adoption of RFID even if it does not maximize the chain's total profit.     

考虑消费者参考效应的双渠道乳制品供应链协调机制设计

将消费者对乳制品新鲜度的参考效应引入第三方物流(third party logistics, TPL)服务商参与的双渠道乳制品供应链中,考虑到乳制品新鲜度受到制造商加工水平和TPL服务商物流服务水平的共同影响,构建分散式、集中式以及引入基于二部定价的成本共担契约下的微分博弈模型,求解并比较3种情形下供应链成员的最优均衡策略.研究表明:一定条件下,基于二部定价的成本共担契约能够使制造商加工水平、TPL服务商物流服务水平以及供应链整体收益均达到集中式决策下的情形,而且制造商、零售商和TPL服务商的收益相较于分散式决策都能得到帕累托改善,供应链能够实现完美协调;线上或线下渠道乳制品的零售价与该渠道所占的市场份额及渠道间的价格替代系数正相关;消费者的参考效应能够激励制造商和TPL服务商提高各自的努力水平,使供应链收益增加.     

Pricing and return product collection decisions in a closed-loop supply chain with dual-channel in both forward and reverse logistics

This paper deals a closed-loop supply chain with two dual channels – forward dual-channel where a manufacturer sells a product to customers through traditional retail channel and e-tail (internet) channel, and reverse dual-channel where the used items are collected for remanufacturing through the traditional third party logistics and e-tail channel. We derive analytically the pricing and return product collection decisions for the supply chain under five different scenarios viz. centralized, decentralized (Nash game), and manufacturer-led, retailer-led and third party-led decentralized scenarios. We also demonstrate the proposed model through a series of data sets. It is observed from the numerical study that the retailer-led decentralized scenario provides more profit than other decentralized scenarios.     

Manufacturer warranty service outsourcing strategies in a dual‐channel supply chain

Warranty management for durable products has received increasing attention in recent years. In addition to conventionally keeping warranty in‐house, more manufacturers choose to outsource warranty service to agents. This paper explores outsourcing strategies for manufacturer warranty services in a dual‐channel supply chain by which the demand‐enhancing service can be undertaken by different supply chain parties. We show the results of three alternative outsourcing strategies for manufacturers whereby (a) the retailer undertakes the service, (b) a third party undertakes the service, and (c) both the retailer and a third party undertake the service simultaneously. According to Stackelberg game theory, we build a two‐echelon supply chain model and discuss the corresponding expressions for supply chain members' equilibrium decisions. Additionally, we compare the profits of each supply chain member and derive interesting managerial insights. When the base market size is relatively large, Scenario R helps the manufacturer and the retailer reach a “win‐win” situation.     

Optimal dual-channel supply chain configuration for product categories with different customer preference of online channel

This study addresses the supply chain configuration problem of manufacturer faced with multiple channel choices. We investigate the optimal combination of traditional and online sales channels for different product categories with differing customer preference of the online channel. We have considered three distinct dual-channel supply chain configurations comprising of a manufacturer, a traditional channel and an online channel viz. retailer–e-tailer; company store–e-tailer; and retailer–e-marketplace. As the manufacturer will face a quantity allocation decision between traditional and online channels, the competition is modeled using Cournot model with the manufacturer as the Stackelberg leader. Values of optimal order quantity and price for the different entities have been established. Influence of variation in customer preference of online channel on the optimal policies is also examined. We find that the manufacturer prefers retailer–e-marketplace configuration for products with high customer preference of online channel and company store–e-tailer configuration for products with low customer preference of online channel. In addition, we find that the retailer–e-tailer configuration is dominated by company store–e-tailer and retailer–e-marketplace configuration irrespective of the product’s customer preference of online channel.     

第三方再制造外包模式选择与协调研究

研究第三方再制造外包选择与协调问题,将制造商外包和零售商外包两种模式进行对比分析.研究结果表明:制造商外包模式下新产品的数量、原始设备制造商的利润以及系统总利润更高,新产品的价格更低;零售商外包模式下再制品的数量、外包价格以及再制造商的利润更高.制造商外包模式具有较高的消费者剩余和较差的环境绩效.当再制造优势明显时,零售商外包模式的社会福利水平高于制造商外包模式.采用合作博弈方法对零售商外包模式下多主体闭环供应链进行协调,可为供应链管理决策提供理论依据与决策方法.     

Quality disclosure strategy in a decentralized supply chain with consumer returns

We study the quality disclosure strategy of a manufacturer/retailer in a supply chain with consumer returns for new products. In particular, we explicitly model the effect of quality disclosure on the reduction of the returns rate. We identify the condition in which the manufacturer/retailer should reveal product quality in the presence of consumer returns. We find that (1) the manufacturer/retailer has an incentive to choose quality disclosure strategy when the disclosure quality is above a lower bound; (2) if the returns rate of new products is low, the retailer‐disclosure scenario leads to reveal more quality information than that of the manufacturer‐disclosure scenario; otherwise, the manufacturer‐disclosure scenario leads to reveal more quality information; and (3) the manufacturer prefers to reveal a higher level of product quality in the supply chain with a higher refund amount or a lower salvage value per unit of returned product.     

A modal interval based method for dynamic decision model considering uncertain quality of used products in remanufacturing

In this paper, a modal interval based method is proposed to characterize the uncertainty in the quality of collected used products for a closed-loop supply chain. Triggered by an actual case in the construction machinery remanufacturing field, we establish a decent model of a remanufacturer-driven closed-loop supply chain with multi-dimensional reverse channel within the framework of game theory, which includes the supplier, the manufacturer, the retailer with authorization to remanufacture, and the third party collector. In this special remanufacturer-driven supply chain, both the retailer and the third party collector collect the used products for the remanufacturer. Considering the influence of uncertainty in the quality of used products on the buyback price and the cost of remanufacturing process, we utilize modal interval arithmetic to analyze the dynamic pricing and collection strategy of the remanufacturer. Moreover, to validate the effectiveness of the proposed modal interval based method, we compare it with the analysis under the traditional scenario based method. We confirm that the modal interval method can obtain more robust results, and the proposed model and method of our research can give guidance to the construction machinery remanufacturing firms when facing with the quality uncertainty of the collected used products in remanufacturing activities.     

考虑风险规避的闭环供应链差别定价协调模型

针对再制造成本不确定条件下考虑制造商风险规避特性的新产品与再制造产品差别定价协调问题, 采用均值—方差方法衡量该问题的最优定价决策。在分散化决策下, 采用Stackelberg博弈理论研究价格差敏感系数和制造商风险规避度对闭环供应链定价策略的影响, 然后以集中化决策作为研究基准, 指出分散化决策存在双重边际效应。为消除利益损失, 提出一种收益共享一风险共担契约来协调闭环供应链, 研究表明, 该协调契约能有效实现风险规避下闭环供应链的协调。最后运用数值分析方法对无协调和有协调时的闭环供应链定价策略进行比较研究, 并进一步探讨价格差敏感系数和制造商风险规避度对闭环供应链定价策略以及协调性能的影响。     

需求价格敏感下具有损失厌恶零售商的闭环供应链定价与协调

基于零售商回收模式,运用前景理论探讨了价格敏感随机需求下具有损失厌恶零售商参与的两级闭环供应链定价与协调问题。首先针对分散式决策,在两种批发价模式下推导和比较制造商和零售商的最优行为,分析损失厌恶程度对零售商定价和订货联合决策的影响;然后通过与集中式决策的对比验证了分散式供应链存在效率损失,进而设计收益共享契约对分散式供应链进行协调;最后通过算例验证了以上结论,并将回收率对最优决策和成员效用的影响进行了灵敏度分析。     

The price of anarchy in closed-loop supply chains

This paper measures the worst-case efficiency of price-only contracts in closed-loop supply chains (CLSCs) with the price of anarchy (PoA). We model a single-period Stackelberg game in which a manufacturer sells new products to a retailer and collects used products with exogenous retail price and collection price via three alternative reverse channels: (a) the manufacturer collects directly from customers, (b) the retailer collects for the manufacturer, and (c) a third party is awarded a collection subcontract from the manufacturer. We carry out a comprehensive investigation under push–pull configurations to observe how reverse channel structures with different gaming sequences of CLSC members influence the worst-case performance when the demand distribution is over the set of increasing generalized failure rate distributions. From our PoA analysis, we find that the pull system does not always outperform the push system, especially when the retailer is the leader, in contrast to the results for forward supply chains. While the PoA of the push system is dramatically sensitive to the quality condition of used products, the pull system has a constant efficiency loss that is independent of the quality condition. Instead, the PoA of the pull system solely changes with the gaming sequence of the manufacturer. We also find that manufacturer's direct collection is a better reverse channel choice compared to retailer's collection. Additional managerial insights are summarized for discussion.     

再制造/制造集成供应链差别定价策略

为了解决集成供应链的定价问题,应用博弈论方法,对单一制造商和零售商构成的R/M(再制造/制造)集成供应链系统中同类产品的三种不同形式进行了差别定价策略研究,得出了斯坦克尔伯格均衡,并对最优定价策略进行数值仿真和分析.研究结果表明:新产品、再造产品、二手产品三种产品形式存在的R/M集成供应链系统更符合实际情况,而且新产品的价格敏感系数与废旧产品的价格弹性指数对制造商的批发价格、利润和零售商的零售价格、利润均有影响,要想使自身利润最大化必须综合考虑二者的影响.     

风险规避制造商市场入侵策略

针对由风险中性的在位制造商、风险规避的外来制造商和风险中性零售商组成的二级供应链系统,基于Stackelberg博弈理论建立不同市场入侵策略下的决策模型,研究风险规避的外来制造商市场入侵策略选择问题,分析市场入侵和风险规避行为对供应链成员均衡决策的影响.研究发现:当外来制造商通过零售商销售产品时,损害在位制造商的利润,但对零售商有利;当外来制造商通过网络渠道直接向消费者销售产品时,不一定损害在位制造商的利润,存在帕累托改进区域;当外来制造商的风险规避程度较大时,价格战愈发激烈,对自身、在位制造商和零售商都是不利的;外来制造商的市场入侵策略受质量差异程度、风险规避程度、生产成本和直销成本的综合影响;外来制造商选择最优的市场入侵策略时,损害在位制造商的利润,而且供应链系统不能实现帕累托改进.     

混合碳政策下制造商低碳转型的技术选择策略

在碳交易和碳税并行的混合碳政策下,考虑由一个制造商和一个零售商组成的供应链系统,通过Stackelberg博弈方法构建供应链系统分散决策模型,确定制造商和零售商的最优减排与定价决策,并基于此分析制造商低碳转型过程中的技术选择策略,探讨低碳产品最优减排率与碳配额和碳税之间的关系,为政府制订政策提供理论依据.研究表明:制造商低碳转型过程中的技术选择主要取决于普通产品与低碳产品碳排放成本的差额,当差额小于阈值时,两种产品共同生产,否则普通产品将被停产;政府可以通过增加碳配额促进低碳产品最优减排率的提升;碳税对低碳产品最优减排率的影响较为复杂,当减排相对成本较低时,提高碳税可以促进低碳产品减排率的提升,而当减排相对成本较高时,碳税的提高会使减排率呈现先增加后下降的趋势.最后通过算例验证了上述结论.     

绿色供应链背景下互补品定价策略

考虑绿色供应链背景下由两个制造商和一个零售商组成的二级供应链定价策略问题,其中两个制造商生产两种互补品,且制造商1进行绿色制造投入.分别研究集中式、MS-Bertrand、MS-Stackelberg、RS-Bertrand和RS-Stackelberg五种模型.结论表明:1)绿色制造水平随着绿色投入系数的增加而减少,且绿色制造水平在集中式情形最高,分散式决策下产品1和产品2的最优零售价格高于集中决策;2)只有制造商1进行绿色制造时,绿色投入会影响其最终的收益,但是互补品的性质会使采取传统制造的制造商从中获利;3)在分散式决策情形下,产品1(产品2)的零售价格会随着产品1(产品2)的交叉价格敏感程度的增加而降低,而随着产品2(产品1)的交叉价格敏感程度的增加而升高.     

考虑双重低碳宣传补贴的供应链碳减排优化

考虑由一个制造商主导的一个零售商构成的供应链,研究供应链的合作减排及低碳宣传问题,运用斯坦伯格博弈理论分别构建了制造商给予零售商的单一低碳宣传补贴（SS）以及政府给予制造商、制造商给予零售商的双重低碳宣传补贴（DS）的分散决策博弈模型,得到最优的减排水平、低碳宣传努力程度以及低碳宣传成本分摊比例。通过比较分析发现：当政府补贴系数超过一定值时,DS模式下供应链利润、制造商利润、零售商利润、减排水平、低碳宣传努力程度及低碳宣传成本分摊比例均优于SS模式;政府补贴系数的增加、减排难度的降低及零售商的宣传努力成本系数降低会增加制造商、零售商以及供应链利润。最后运用算例验证了模型的有效性。     

Two‐echelon manufacturer–retailer supply chain strategies with price,quality, and promotional effort sensitive demand

This study deals with the two‐layer supply chain model of one manufacturer and one retailer for a single commodity where market demand is assumed to be dependent on selling price, quality of the products, and promotional effort of the retailer. We investigate the behavior of the supply chain under centralized, manufacturer Stackelberg, conditional manufacturer Stackelberg, retailer Stackelberg, conditional retailer Stackelberg, and vertical Nash model structure. The nature of the above models provides great insights to a firm's manager for achieving optimal strategy in a competitive marketing system. Quite often, not all items produced in a firm are of perfect quality; some are perfect (conforming) quality and others are imperfect (nonconforming) quality. The nonconforming products are sold in a secondary shop or by other retailers. The procurement cost of finished products depends on the quality of the products due to more investment in advanced technology, better raw materials, and skilled labor, etc. The warranty policy for the products is also imposed to attract the customers to buy more. Here, both members (manufacturer and retailer) jointly share the cost of the warranty policy. The objective of this paper is to determine the optimal selling price and promotional effort of the retailer, while the optimal wholesale price and quality of the products are determined by the manufacturer so that the above strategies are maximized. Finally, numerical examples with sensitivity analysis of the key parameters are illustrated to investigate the proposed model.