博弈论模型在解决水资源冲突上的运用

水资源短缺和水质恶化是当今众多发展中国家所面临的两个严重问题。而水质和水量的管理通常涉及众多的利益相关者。在缺乏完善的水资源市场和产权制度时，水资源开发利用上的冲突不可避免。博弈论是解决这类冲突的一种有效方法。本文以南水北调中线工程所涉及的不同利益相关者的水冲突为例，采用非合作与合作博弈分别对水资源的冲突进行了模拟。统计学和经济计量学的回归分析法用来构建博弈各方的效益函数，成本效益分析法用来比较不同战略下的博弈结果。研究结果显示, 非合作虽然使局中人2、3和4分别获利约0.15-0.32亿元、0.59-0.36亿元、0.08-0.29亿元的收益，但却使整体受损约662.01-1218.33亿元，而合作的结果恰恰相反。因此，如果能够把合作所带来的部分净收益从赢利方转向损失方，以补足损失方的损失，博弈各方均能受益。此模拟方法及结果不仅有利于博弈各方，而且在水资源的合理分配﹑水价的制定﹑生态补偿等方面也为水资源管理部门提供决策支持。     

博弈论模型在解决水资源管理中利益冲突的运用

本文运用非合作与合作博弈的方法,对南水北调中线工程水资源管理中的有关利益冲突进行模拟和分析。其中,以统计学和经济计量学的回归分析法构建博弈各方的效益函数,以经济价值评估法折算水资源的价值和水污染的损失,用成本效益分析法比较不同战略下的博弈结果。模拟结果显示,若以北京为博弈的甲方,则非合作结果使局中的乙方、丙方和丁方分别获得0.15～0.32亿元、0.59～0.364亿元和0.08～0.29亿元的利益,但整体却遭受662.01～1218.33亿元的损失,而合作的结果恰恰相反。因此,如果能够把合作所带来的部分净收益从赢利方转向损失方,以补足损失方的损失,博弈各方均能受益。此模拟方法及结果不仅有利于博弈各方,而且也为水资源管理部门提供决策支持。     

水资源配置PPP项目运营期风险管理行为博弈分析

在水资源配置PPP项目运营过程中,核心利益相关方积极的风险管理行为能够降低项目的风险发生概率。从风险管理角度,通过分析水资源配置PPP项目利益相关者的关系,构建了水资源配置PPP项目运营期风险管理过程中政府主体和社会资本方（项目公司）的行为决策演化博弈模型,运用MATLAB分析动态演化过程。结果表明：影响演化稳定行为选择策略的因素包括政府主体和社会资本方双方积极管理的成本、水污染等风险事件造成的损失与损失分配系数、可行性缺口补助和奖励。为促进水资源配置工程运营过程风险的有效管理,建议加强政府主体和社会资本方双方的风险管理能力建设,落实责任分担机制、完善监督机制、优化奖惩机制等。     

利益均衡下的蓄滞洪区运用机制构建

蓄滞洪区运用中利益相关者利益冲突的根源,一是付出者与受益者的不一致性,二是付出成本与回报的偏差。利益均衡机制下的蓄滞洪区设计机理就是要建立效益分享与损失共担机制、确定效益共享与损失分担原则、保障效益分享与损失共担的实施;应充分认识利益相关者希望从蓄滞洪区的运用中获得的利益和权利、强调责任意识和义务、对不同的利益相关者采取不同的管理策略。提出了完善我国蓄滞洪区补偿机制的途径:加强蓄滞洪区经济补偿政策的研究;合理界定补偿对象和补偿范围;实行在损失评估基础上的补偿制度;拓宽补偿资金筹措渠道;加强蓄滞洪区管理;严格执行蓄滞洪区补偿政策等。     

跨界河流合作中的囚徒困境与合作进化的实现途径

伴随人口增长和气候变化,水资源的稀缺性日益突出,跨界河流的水资源开发与利用越来越成为国家和地区之间既敏感又棘手的难题。跨界河流水资源的激烈争夺符合"囚徒困境"的博弈情势,本文探讨了将互惠策略应用于解决跨界河流囚徒困境问题的思路,论证水资源互惠合作的可行性和必要条件。以非洲尼罗河为例,分析了跨界河流水资源合作存在的挑战和实现互惠合作的途径;以北美哥伦比亚河为例,分析了跨界河流水资源开发利用中实现合作进化的可行性。案例分析表明,跨界河流水资源的合理开发不仅使上下游国家共同受益,而且是促进流域内利益相关方在政治和经济等领域实现合作进化的重要媒介。互惠策略的成功实践对于制定我国与跨界河流利益相关国家水资源领域的合作政策具有借鉴意义。     

多利益方参与的漳河流域管理委员会研究

随着社会经济的发展,漳河流域水资源冲突又呈现出新的特征,从利益主体行为的角度去分析、研究漳河流域跨界水资源冲突是丰富流域水资源管理实践不可或缺的一部分。通过对漳河流域跨界水资源冲突事件的分析,提出建立政府主导的跨界区域合作治理机制——漳河流域管理委员会,可以有效理顺各利益方关系,实现多利益方共赢和"和谐流域、美丽漳河"的愿景。     

约旦扎卡河流域水资源管理的参与性优化方案

针对约旦扎卡河全流域水资源管理中存在的问题,将其作为地中海半干旱地区的典型案例展开研究。针对制度框架的性质、与水相关的严重问题、流域人口密度等现状,在对水资源管理方案的优化过程中,需要利益相关者的共同参与。介绍了一种水资源模型,模型由不同级别的模块构成,在水资源管理措施的优化框架下,可形成一种参与式的研究系统,该系统包括基准情景、约束条件识别和方法选择、优化方案及结果分析。所谓参与式方法就是由利益相关者来确定优化准则(约束条件)和管理干预(管理手段)。对项目背景、水资源模型的建立及其功能与运用、模拟结果与分析以及利益相关者在优化过程中发挥的作用等作了介绍。     

"情景共享模型"在淮河干流水量分配中的应用

为适应水资源管理理念和管理方法的转变,提出情景共享模型及其建模思想和方法,对淮河干流及其主要支流2010规划水平年的水资源分配情景进行了模拟。结果证明该模型性能良好,效率较高,可为不同利益相关者共同参与水资源管理决策提供理想的分析工具。     

利益相关者的水资源配置博弈

水资源的准公共产品属性及其在开发利用中存在的外部性使河流自然流态受到严重的扰动,本文基于非合作博弈博弈论,建立主从关系的用户博弈模型分析河流水资源分配,基于个体效益不能达到帕累托最优状态,采用合作博弈方法,建立水资源用户合作博弈模型。合作博弈增加了总效益,但使得上游用户的效益比非合作时减少,有必要对上游用户进行效益补偿:引入微观经济学的无差异曲线与合作联盟形成的条件构建合作效益分配的可行解集,并提出基于边际贡献的效益分配方法在可行解集中挑选唯一的效益分配解。研究结果表明,合作博弈总效益大于非合作博弈的总效益,达到帕累托最优状态;通过合作效益分配,处于先动优势的上游用户的分配效益大于非合作的效益,有利于行动占先者加入合作联盟。     

利益相关者的水资源配置博弈

水资源的准公共产品属性及其在开发利用中存在的外部性使河流自然流态受到严重的扰动,本文基于非合作博弈博弈论,建立主从关系的用户博弈模型分析河流水资源分配,基于个体效益不能达到帕累托最优状态,采用合作博弈方法,建立水资源用户合作博弈模型。合作博弈增加了总效益,但使得上游用户的效益比非合作时减少,有必要对上游用户进行效益补偿:引入微观经济学的无差异曲线与合作联盟形成的条件构建合作效益分配的可行解集,并提出基于边际贡献的效益分配方法在可行解集中挑选唯一的效益分配解。研究结果表明,合作博弈总效益大于非合作博弈的总效益,达到帕累托最优状态;通过合作效益分配,处于先动优势的上游用户的分配效益大于非合作的效益,有利于行动占先者加入合作联盟。     

Common pool water resources management considering a regulator interference: A game theory approach to derive managerial policies for Urmia lake,Iran

An increased need for water, combined with a scarcity of water resources, has resulted in serious challenges regarding water resource management. Those issues have always been a major concern of most research regarding the management and operation of water resources. Various qualitative and quantitative methods, Game Theory (GT) being an example, have been proposed for managing common pool water resources. This study adopts GT to address a case of common pool water resource management, including consideration of the interference of a regulator. Urmia lake in north‐western Iran was chosen as an illustration of a common source of water shared between two provinces acting as littoral stakeholders to the lake. Due to a non‐cooperative behaviour of the stakeholders, the lake is most likely to dry up. To change the game situation, a regulator was inserted into the game as a third player. The game among players is investigated in terms of two static and dynamic game methods. Two strategies are defined for each player. The equilibrium point will be achieved according to the strategies adopted by the players. For static games, a low‐level equilibrium under non‐cooperation conditions is obtained. Dynamic games among players are more likely to occur, rather than static games. The equilibrium of high‐level productivity will be obtained under cooperative conditions among the players.     

A Framework for an Agent-Based Model to Manage Water Resources Conflicts

Competition for use of water is increasing and leads to many conflicts among competing interests with complex goals and water management systems. Technical system models are essential to create performance and other decision information, but models to simulate views of the competing parties are also needed to help resolve or mitigate conflicts. Agent-based models (ABMs) offer promise to fill this role, and in this study a new approach to agent-based modeling is introduced to simulate the behavior and interactions of the parties participating in a conflict scenario, which is modeled as a game. To develop this framework, we considered water issues of California’s Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta region as an example of a long-standing situation, with emphasis on the San Joaquin watershed. However, this approach can be used in other watersheds and more complex systems. The ABM explains the interactions among the parties and how they can be encouraged to cooperate in the game to work toward a solution. The model also enables decision-makers to test management scenarios and understand the consequences of their decisions on different stakeholders and their behaviors.     

我国节水灌溉利益相关者关系分析

节水灌溉是一项涉及国家、地方、部门、个人之间利益全面调整的综合系统工程,也是一个涉及政府、主管部门、水管单位、用水户等多个利益主体的复杂多重博弈过程。运用马克思主义历史唯物观,分析了我国节水灌溉过程中机构、团体或个人之间的利益关系,从多元动态博弈的视角对节水灌溉利益相关者的博弈行为与博弈结果进行分析,论证了只有充分考虑各利益相关者的利益诉求,引导、激励和规范节水灌溉行为,用水户实施节水灌溉行为,政府、主管部门、水管单位和用水户才能同时获得最大收益,达到不同利益者共赢多赢的目的。     

Computer Support for Implementation of a Systemic Approach to Water Conflict Resolution

Abstract

Water is an important factor in conflicts among stakeholders at the local, regional, and even international level. Water conflicts have taken many forms, but they almost always arise from the fact that the freshwater resources of the world are not partitioned to match the political borders, nor are they evenly distributed in space and time. Two or more countries share the watersheds of 261 major rivers and nearly half of the land area of the world is in international river basins. Water has been used as a military and political goal. Water has been a weapon of war, and water systems have been targets during the war. A systemic approach has been taken in this research to approach resolution of conflicts over water. By helping stakeholders to explore and resolve the underlying structural causes of conflict our approach offers a significant opportunity for its resolution. We define the five main functional activities for assisting the conflict resolution process as: (i) communication; (ii) problem formulation; (iii) data gathering and information generation; (iv) information sharing; and (v) evaluation of consequences. A computerized technical support is developed in the form of the Conflict Resolution Support System (CRSS) for implementation of a systemic approach to water conflicts. Its principal components include an artificial intelligence-based communication system, a database management system, and a model base management system. At this stage of the development, the model base management system consists of tools for multipurpose reservoir operation, river flow routing, multi-criteria decision-making, spatial data analysis, and other general utilities. A hypothetical river basin with potential conflict between stakeholders with respect to water sharing and flood control is used to demonstrate the utility of the new approach and the computer system developed for its implementation.     

Using Game Theory to Assign Groundwater Pumping Schedules

This paper deals with optimization of extracting groundwater by a number of users (stakeholders) from a common aquifer. The aim is to reduce their pumping cost and the respective energy consumption, taking into account the schedule preferences of the users (e.g. pumping during the day instead of during the night). Moreover, it is postulated that alternate pumping reduces pumping cost. To facilitate the participation of stakeholders in achieving the best alternate pumping schedule, the problem is formulated as an anti-coordination game. Using vertices to represent the players (users) and weighted edges to represent their interactions we have created an algorithm that can be used to get players’ payoffs. Then, assuming that the players are allowed to improve their payoffs by playing consecutive moves, we use our algorithm to find the Nash equilibria of the game. However, not all games converge to the same Nash equilibria, as changing the sequence of the players can result in different solutions. Therefore, we use Genetic Algorithms to find the sequence of the players that minimizes the overall pumping cost or the energy consumption, using the least possible game rounds. The algorithm proposed can be used by researchers and authorities to promote cooperation between well users, leading to financial and environmental benefit.

     

Pricing and Water Resource Allocation Scheme for the South-to-North Water Diversion Project in China

The eastern route of the South-to-North Water Diversion (SNWD-ER) project is a massive-scale interbasin system to transfer water from the Yangtze River to North China. With the infrastructure construction close to completion, the project is now faced with many complicated operations management problem at different levels. The problems are unique in that, on the one hand, the project is expected to be financially self-sustainable by charging water usages, and on the other hand, the water price is regulated for its nature as a social product. One such problem is to achieve a rational water allocation among different users by appropriate pricing schemes. In this paper, we study how to use a two-tier pricing scheme to balance the water allocation by using a Stackelberg game model. From the study, we find that (1) the Stackelberg game always has equilibrium solutions to balance the benefit of every party in the system, which implies that the two-tier pricing scheme can effectively coordinate the water allocation; (2) the two-tier pricing scheme can also result in multiple desirable by-products such as encouraging the implementation of water saving mechanism and giving the local water users certain priority; and (3) the government can adjust the pricing parameters to control and balance the profit of every party. As such we conclude that the two-tier pricing scheme is an effective way that integrates both the government control and market powers to ensure the public interest and the economic benefit, which is suitable for SNWD-ER project.     

Bargaining Model of Synergistic Revenue Allocation for the Joint Operations of a Multi-Stakeholder Cascade Reservoir System

Given the institutional limitations of multi-stakeholders, exploring the synergistic revenue from the joint reservoir operations of a multi-stakeholder multi-reservoir system requires a synergistic revenue allocation mechanism to ensure a beneficial solution for multi stakeholders. This study established a synergistic revenue allocation model using bargaining game theory under the principles of equity, rationality, and efficiency. For the maximization the Nash product of gains in the utility of stakeholders and constraints on the feasibility of allocation plans considering all the possible formations of sub-coalitions, the analytic optimal solution of the bargaining model was derived using the first-order optimality condition. The optimal revenue allocation plan meets the conditions of the equal quasi-marginal utility function among stakeholders. The methodologies were applied to a hypothetical cascade reservoir system operated by multiple stakeholders. Compared with the revenue allocation plans obtained by a proportional rule method and the Shapley value method, the results corroborate that (1) the allocation plan of the bargaining model is jointly determined by the interval of the revenue range of each reservoir and the effectiveness of the sub-coalition constraints, indicating that the allocated synergistic revenue is positively correlated with the singleton contribution and team contribution on the total revenue of the grand coalition; (2) the difference in the plans obtained by the three methods is generally determined by the difference in equity definition; and (3) the synergistic revenue allocation plan obtained from the bargaining model is the highest homogenized among all reservoirs (stakeholders), which demonstrates that the revenue of those dominated stakeholders can be improved compared with other plans. The proposed methodologies provide new insights to guide benefit share decisions in multi-stakeholder reservoirs system.     

博弈论在水资源冲突中应用的研究进展

与传统的定量分析方法和最优化方法相比,博弈论能更好地识别和模拟水资源冲突主体的决策机制,并考察不同冲突间的相互作用机制。通过梳理和归纳有关文献,分别从水资源配置冲突、跨界水污染冲突和水资源冲突协调机制3个方面,对博弈论在解决水资源冲突中的运用进行了综述,并在此基础上提出了研究展望。鼓励运用市场经济宏观调控机制解决流域水资源水量和水质双重利用冲突;流域初始水权分配定量化有待深入研究。     

A Multi-objective Linear Programming Model with Interval Parameters for Water Resources Allocation in Dalian City

Water resources management has been of concern for many researchers since the contradiction between increased water demand and decreased water supply has become obvious. In the real world, water resources systems usually have complexities among social, economic, natural resources and environmental aspects, which leads to multi-objective problems with significant uncertainties in system parameters, objectives, and their interactions. In this paper, a multi-objective linear programming model with interval parameters has been developed wherein an interactive compromising algorithm has been introduced. Through interactive compromising conflicts among multi-objectives, a feasible solution vector can be obtained. The developed model is then applied to allocation of multi-source water resources with different water qualities to multiple users with different water quality requirements for the Dalian city for 2010, 2015 and 2020 planning years. The model pursues the maximum synthesis benefits of economy, society and the environment. The results indicate that the proportion of reused water to the total water amount is gradually increasing, and the proportion of agricultural water consumption to the total water consumption is gradually decreasing. The allocation of multi-source water resources to multiple users is improved due to incorporation of uncertain factors into the model that provide useful decision support to water management authorities.