The Right to be Presumed Innocent

The presumption of innocence has often been understood as a doctrine that can be explained primarily by instrumental concerns relating to accurate fact-finding in the criminal trial and that has few if any implications outside the trial itself. In this paper, I argue, in contrast, that in a liberal legal order everyone has a right to be presumed innocent simply in virtue of being a person. Every person has a right not to be subjected to criminal punishment unless and until he or she has done something that is criminally wrong. Since disagreements about allegations of criminal wrongdoing are inevitable, the liberal legal order requires a process for determining whether wrongdoing has occurred. In order to preserve the right not to be punished without wrongdoing, the accused person must be presumed innocent throughout this process. The presumption of innocence is therefore as much a basic human right as, for example, the right to bodily integrity or the right to freedom of expression. Specifications of and limitations on the right should therefore be justified not primarily in terms of their instrumental effectiveness in fact-finding or crime control but in terms of the role of the criminal process in a liberal legal order. I consider some implications of this view of the presumption of innocence for the pre-trial process and for substantive criminal law. I argue that the presumption of innocence, understood as a basic human right, should condition the entire pre-trial process; it has, however, minimal implications for the definition of offences.     

The Juror,the Citizen,and the Human Being: The Presumption of Innocence and the Burden of Judgment

In this essay, I suggest that the criminal trial is not only about the guilt or innocence of the defendant, but also about the character and growth of the jurors and the communities they represent. In earlier work, I have considered the potential impact of law and politics on the character of citizens, and thus on the capacity of citizens to thrive—to live full and rich human lives. Regarding the jury, I have argued that aspects of criminal trial procedure work to fix in jurors a sense of agency in and responsibility for verdicts of conviction. Here, I draw on those ideas with respect to the presumption of innocence. I suggest that the presumption of innocence works not primarily as legal rule, but rather as a moral framing device—a sort of moral discomfort device—encouraging jurors to feel and bear the weight of what they do. I offer an account of character development in which virtues are conceived of not merely as modes of conduct developed through habituation and practice, but also as capacities and ways of being developed in part through understanding and experience. The criminal trial, framed by the presumption of innocence, can be an experience through which jurors and their communities, by learning what it means and feels like to carry a certain sort of moral weight, may engender a certain set of moral strengths—strengths valuable to them not just as jurors, but also as citizens, and as human beings.     

Preventive Justice and the Presumption of Innocence

When the state aims to prevent responsible and dangerous actors from harming its citizens, it must choose between criminal law and other preventive techniques. The state, however, appears to be caught in a Catch-22: using the criminal law raises concerns about whether early inchoate conduct is properly the target of punishment, whereas using the civil law raises concerns that the state is circumventing the procedural protections available to criminal defendants. Andrew Ashworth has levied the most serious charge against civil preventive regimes, arguing that they evade the presumption of innocence. After sketching out a substantive justification for a civil, preventive regime, I ask what Ashworth’s challenge consists in. It seems that there is broad disagreement over the meaning and requirements of the presumption of innocence. I thus survey the myriad possibilities and extract two claims that have potential bearing on preventive regimes. One claim is that of substantive priority—the criminal law comes first when assessing blame. This is the claim at the root of objections to pretrial detention based on consideration of the crime charged. The second strand of argument is one of procedural symmetry. This is the concern that with respect to citizen/state relations, certain procedures are required, including, for example, proof beyond a reasonable doubt as to the offense or defense. Having extracted these claims, I then assess their applicability with respect to the preventive regime defended. I first conclude that the criminal law must share blame and censure with other fora, and thus, the criminal law only has substantive priority when criminal proceedings have been instituted. I then survey whether procedural symmetry is required, specifically assessing whether the preventive regime I defend requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt. My tentative conclusion is that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is warranted.     

Assuming that the Defendant Is Not Guilty: The Presumption of Innocence in the German System of Criminal Justice

The presumption of innocence is not a presumption but an assumption or legal fiction. It requires agents of the state to treat a suspect or defendant in the criminal process as if he were in fact innocent. The presumption of innocence has a limited field of application. It applies only to agents of the state, and only during the criminal process. The presumption of innocence as such does not determine the amount of evidence necessary to find a defendant guilty. In spite of these limits, the presumption of innocence protects suspects and defendants from specific dangers inherent in the criminal process. German procedure law is used to show these areas.     

无罪推定原则的意义解读——一种诉讼法哲学分析

无罪推定已经成为现代国家的一项刑事诉讼法原则乃至宪法原则。无罪推定在各国立法例中虽然有肯定式和否定式两种表述方式 ,但其基本内涵却是相同的 ,即 :任何人在没有充分证据证明并由法院判决确定有罪之前 ,应作为无罪公民对待。作为一种关于正义的规范性命题 ,无罪推定原则具有内在的基本特征和诉讼程序规则 ,具有深厚的社会哲学基础和重要的政治法律意义。在建设社会主义法治国家进程中 ,无罪推定原则的进一步发展与完善 ,成为当代中国刑事诉讼法制现代化的迫切需要和时代课题。     

无罪推定原则的确立与口供制度的完善

无罪推定是被追诉者的一项基本权利,也是被追诉者各项诉讼权利的基础。在刑事诉讼中将无罪推定确立为指导刑事诉讼活动的基本准则,就是无罪推定原则。我国应当在刑事诉讼中彻底确立无罪推定原则。无罪推定及其引申的主要内容应当分为三个层次:证明责任、被追诉者的权利和对被追诉者的权利的保障。由于无罪推定假定被追诉者无罪,对控诉的举证责任应由控方承担,被追诉者不承担无罪的举证责任,所以,被追诉者就没有理由配合控方提供自己犯罪的证据,包括口供。我国刑事诉讼法关于"犯罪嫌疑人对侦查人员的提问,应当如实回答"的规定,违背了无罪推定关于被追诉者不应当承担举证或证明责任的基本精神,使得被追诉者负有帮助侦控方履行举证和证明的义务。这一规定实质上表明我国刑诉法要求被追诉者承担举证或证明责任。因此,从无罪推定的这一层面上说"应当如实回答"是不合理的,应当予以取消。     

论刑事推定的合宪性审查

刑事推定不仅涉及实体法上犯罪构成要件的设置和程序法上证明责任的分配与承担,还涉及司法权力的重新配置,对其合宪性进行审查是亟待引起重视的一个新问题。推定的合宪性审查标准是多元的。无罪推定是现代刑事法的一项基本原则,是被告人应该享有的重要的宪法性权利,探讨推定的合宪性审查,必须审视推定与无罪推定之间的关系。     

A Criminal Injustice System? Sex Offender Suspects and Defendants

The purpose of this paper is to open up a discussion regarding the potential shift from the presumption of innocence to a presumption of guilt regarding those suspected of or charged with sexual offending. It is acknowledged that further investigation is needed and it is hoped that this discussion is one of many. The crux of this paper therefore is that sex offender suspects and defendants potentially find themselves in a criminal injustice system. Whilst the focus is predominantly on ‘victims’ (usually female) and people suspected or charged with sexual offending (usually male) within the criminal justice system in England and Wales the concerns articulated here are not confined to this context. For example such concerns are echoed in relation to the potential injustices occurring on American campuses. This demonstrates that this is a domestic and international situation and a situation that extends beyond the criminal justice system. We argue that what is occurring at home and abroad has to be contextualised with regard to public, media and official attitudes and approaches to ‘victims’, suspects, defendants, sex, sexual consent, sexual offending and a subsequent shift from the presumption of innocence to a presumption of guilt. It is argued that not only is the presumption of innocence undermined by the presumption of guilt regarding suspects and defendants in cases of sexual offending, it is also undermined in England and Wales by the victim personal statement (VPS). The VPS contains and promotes the idea that there is a ‘victim’ and ‘offender’ before this has been legally established in a court of law. These assumptions embodied within the VPS weaken the principle and practice of the presumption of innocence. The safeguard of the presumption of innocence is potentially under threat and the result is an even greater potential for miscarriages of justice and wrongful convictions.     

Rethinking the presumption of innocence

This article is concerned with what constitutes interference with the presumption of innocence and what justifications there might be for such interference. It provides a defence of a theory of the presumption of innocence that suggests that the right is interfered with if the offence warrants conviction of defendants who are not the intended target of the offence. This thesis is defended against two alternative theories. It then considers what might justify interference with the presumption of innocence. It explores the idea that interference is justified if it is necessary in a democratic society and considers the presumption in relation to the aims of the criminal trial. It is concluded that no good grounds have been provided for interference with the right, and that the right should be regarded as inviolable.

认真对待刑事推定

对我国刑事立法和司法中44个推定的实证分析表明,刑事推定在放松控方证明要求的同时又将存疑风险转移到被告人身上,背离了排除合理怀疑的证明标准,直接危及无罪推定原则所保护的价值与利益。对排除合理怀疑的证明标准不应作纯程序的解读,有必要将其与实体意义上的惩罚权相联系。对刑事推定的规制,本质上属于对国家刑罚权的限制,只有在满足相应的实体与程序条件时,才允许适用有利于控方的刑事推定。     

证明困难视阈下的事实认定与刑事推定

从法律效果上看,刑事推定实际具有实体与程序的双重功能。以“主观罪责型”推定与“证明责任型”推定为例,前者改变了构成要件中主观罪责的证明方式,后者则在此基础上,将有限的举证责任转由被告人承担,使其成为刑事推定的不利方。为在不违背罪刑法定原则与无罪推定原则的前提下,充分实现刑事推定所预想的制度目标,不但需要对其基础事实之内容予以严格限定,突出其法定性与可证明性,而且需要明确推定事实与裁判事实之间的合理界分,强调事实认定者的心证对推定结果的可能影响,并在适用前提上,仅将刑事推定作为证明困难处境下的末位选择加以使用,在作用范围方面可将其适当扩大至定罪外的部分量刑情节。在立法选择上,考虑到刑事诉讼人权保障的基本立场,刑事立法应当对刑事推定保持最低限度的容忍态度,尽量减少其创设及适用。     

The Presumption of Innocence and its Role in the Criminal Process

Many international instruments proclaim that those who face criminal prosecution ought to be afforded a ‘presumption of innocence’, and the importance and central role of this presumption is recognized by legal systems throughout the world. There is, however, little agreement about its meaning and extent of application. This article considers the purposes of legal presumptions in general and explores various, sometimes contradictory, conceptions of this most famous one. It is equated by many scholars to the requirement that the prosecution prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. As such, it is merely a rule of evidence (albeit an important one), with no application pre- or post-trial. The article advocates adoption of a broader, normative approach, namely that the presumption reflects the relationship which ought to exist between citizen and State when a citizen is suspected of breaching the criminal law. As such, it should be promoted as a practical attitude to be adopted by the key protagonists in the justice system, for the duration of the criminal process.     

The Prosecutor and the Presumption of Innocence

In what ways is the conduct of prosecutors constrained by the presumption of innocence? To address this question, I first develop an account of the presumption in the trial context, according to which it is a vital element in a moral assurance procedure for the justified infliction of legal punishment. Jurors must presume the factual innocence of defendants at the outset of trials and then be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt by the government’s evidence before they convict defendants. Prosecutors’ responsibilities to promote the integrity of this moral assurance procedure are then divided into pre-trial, during-trial, and post-trial phases. Since most charge adjudication is effected through plea bargaining, the ways in which plea procedures must be modified to conform to this moral assurance procedure, and thus honor the presumption of innocence, are also discussed.     

The Dock on Trial: Courtroom Design and the Presumption of Innocence

This article examines the place of the criminal dock in courtroom design. Challenges to the use of the dock have been based upon the inability of the defendants to hear effectively, to communicate with counsel, to maintain their dignity, and to benefit from the presumption of innocence. Increasingly courts are incorporating secure docks, where defendants are partially or completely surrounded by glass (or in some countries, metal bars). To what extent do these changes and modifications undermine the right to the presumption of innocence? We present the results of an experimental mock jury study that was designed to test whether the placement of the accused influences jurors’ perceptions. We find that jurors are more likely to convict defendants when they are located in a traditional dock or a secure dock, compared to sitting next to their counsel at the bar table. We conclude by discussing the implications for trial procedures, counsel communications, and courtroom design.     

论刑事被告人宪法权利的保障——从无罪推定角度所做的分析

无罪推定原则是刑事犯罪嫌疑人、被告人宪法基本权利保障的原则之一。随着我国社会主义民主与法治的发展,从立法与司法的双重视角贯彻和推行无罪推定原则,不仅有利于保障犯罪嫌疑人的人权,而且有利于推动我国的法治进程。我国应在《宪法》中明文规定无罪推定原则,立法保障犯罪嫌疑人的沉默权,进一步明确与施行非法证据排除制度。     

Law as a branch of applied psychology

Because the law for the most part consists of a system of rules for the control of human social behaviour, the law may be taken as a branch of applied psychology. However, one may well ask how good lawyers are as applied psychologists. As a partial answer to this question two well-known issues in criminal law are explored; the deterrent effect of punishment and the viability of the presumption of innocence. It is argued that lawyers, although they tend to speak in confusing ways about the deterrent effect of punishment, in practice show themselves to be pretty good applied psychologists. This is different with respect to the viability of the presumption of innocence, as they do not appear to realize that the ways in which criminal trials are commonly conducted cannot but violate this sacred principle of due process.     

The Presumption of Innocence and the Human Rights Act

There has recently been a proliferation of case law dealing with potential inroads into the presumption of innocence in the criminal law of England and Wales, in the light of article 6(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights. This article is concerned with the nature of the presumption of innocence. It considers two central issues. The first is how the courts should address the question of when the presumption of innocence is interfered with. The second is the extent to which interference with the presumption of innocence may be justified on the grounds of proportionality. It is argued that the courts have not developed the appropriate concepts and principles properly to address these questions.     

Who is Presumed Innocent of What by Whom?

The article analyses the components of the presumption of innocence and tries to clarify some of the conceptual and logical difficulties surrounding the notion of ‘innocence’ and the structure of legal presumptions. It is argued that all conceivable literal interpretations of the maxim make little or no sense, and that the presumptions form is, as such, devoid of original content: presumptions do not explain nor justify anything but are auxiliary norms which refer to the legal consequences spelled out in other norms. Therefore, the presumption of innocence can be used to express any kind of requirement and standard for the criminal process and the treatment of suspect citizens only in a tautological, albeit rhetorically forceful, way. This instrumental use of the presumption of innocence is theoretically without merit but can be practically beneficial as long as there is no developed system of fundamental rights and protections of individual freedoms in a given legal order. Finally, a functional understanding of the presumption of innocence is proposed which gives it an original, though limited field of application as a guarantee of the procedure itself, in particular of the openness of the outcome.     

论美国刑事诉讼中的证明责任分配标准

在美国的刑事证明责任分配标准中,犯罪构成要件标准一直占据着正统的地位,而无罪推定标准只是昙花一现。无罪推定标准无法长期在美国刑事证明责任的分配中占据一席之地的原因在于:第一,无罪推定标准与美国的犯罪构成模式格格不入;第二,在美国采用无罪推定标准更不利于保护被告人权利。犯罪构成要件标准的优点在于它既与美国对抗式的刑事诉讼模式相契合,又降低了控方的证明负担,有利于提高起诉的效率;它的缺点在于有时很难区分犯罪构成要素与辩护理由。     

Criminal and Procedural Fairness: Some Challenges to the Presumption of Innocence

The presumption of innocence (POI) requires all judges, juries, and other officials in a trial, to presume and treat any accused of criminal wrongdoing as innocent, until he or she is proven guilty. Although a POI lacks an authoritative definition, this overarching principle of procedural fairness is so robust and vital for the exercise of legal power in matters of criminal law that one rarely finds anyone questioning its standing. In this article I examine the rationale behind the POI from a different perspective. The basic assumption is that this procedural standard captures the tenor of a broader principle which seeks to ensure fairness in criminal proceedings as well as in criminal law doctrine. I argue that honouring a principle of fairness is not exclusively a matter of criminal procedural law but also something that is deeply rooted in other areas of criminal law doctrine. Hence: not maintaining a principle of fairness in criminal law doctrine could lead to the POI being compromised or even undermined. In the article, I draw attention to three areas in which I believe that criminal law policies threaten a principle of fairness: criminalising remote harm, doctrine of ignorance of law and inversed presumptions of guilt. My conclusion is that some solutions to so called doctrinal problems in criminal law, are questionable and their practical consequences (on a general level) are, at least partially, equal to treating an individual (in a trial) as guilty for something for which he or she ought not to be accountable. Hence: gaining the support of a POI could thus work as principle for keeping the use of criminal law moderate and in accordance with a principle of fairness.