法律原则在法律推理中的地位和作用——一个比较的研究

我国关于法律原则的讨论一般集中在立法过于笼统与立法所规定的法律基本原则这两个方面。这种意义上的法律原则与德沃金所说的法律原则存在重要区别。德沃金关于法律原则的讨论其目的是强调法律的确定性 ,而我们关于法律原则的讨论却在强化法律的模糊性。法律原则的讨论主要涉及法律推理过程中原则与规则之间的关系。基于法治的原因 ,法律推理必须坚持将法律规则作为法律推理的大前提 ;在法律规则含义不明确、模糊或者相互矛盾时 ,可以使用法律原则 ,但是 ,必须经过一定的法律原则的认定程序。     

Social and Justified Legal Normativity: Unlocking the Mystery of the Relationship

Can Hart's non‐cognitivism be reconciled with his rejection of the predictive and sanction‐based explanations of law? This paper analyses Hart's notion of the internal point of view and focuses on the notion of acceptance of a rule along the lines of a non‐cognitivist understanding of intentional actions. It is argued that a non‐cognitivist analysis of acceptance of rules is incomplete and parasitic on a more basic or primary model of acceptance that does not involve mental states. This basic or primary model of acceptance explains actions in terms of other actions and in terms of reasons for actions that are both presented as good‐making characteristics and transparent to the agent. If Hart's internal point of view is able to work as the key argument to reject predictive and sanction‐based explanations of law, it needs to make the outward approach of intentional action basic or primary rather than rely on an inward approach such as the one advanced by non‐cognitivism.     

Judges Taken Too Seriously: Professor Dworkin's Views on Jurisprudence*

Abstract. The author analyses Ronald Dworkin's ideas about legal theory and legal philosophy, with particular regard to metatheoretical and methodological problems. He focuses on the questions of the function and the object of jurisprudence, and on those of the content and method of argumentation of jurisprudence. According to the author, Dworkin's theory is a normative theory, an ideology referred to the judicial practice. Although judges really make law, one can deny that they do. This strategy is the one judges traditionally employ when they say that they are merely applying the law-giver's intentions or fundamental principles that existed long before the case they have to decide. It is that discourse, not rights, that Dworkin takes seriously.     

Legislative Intent in Law's Empire*

This article considers Dworkin's influential argument against legislative intent in chapter 9 of Law's Empire. The argument proves much less than is often assumed for it fails to address the possibility that the institution of the legislature may form and act on intentions. Indeed, analysis of Dworkin's argument lends support to that possibility. Dworkin aims to refute legislative intent in order to elucidate his own theory of statutory interpretation. That theory fails to explain plausibly legislative action. Dworkin's argument does not refute legislative intent but instead suggests there is reason to think that the legislature is capable of intentional action.     

Remarks on the Normativity of International Legal Rules and Global Constitutionalism

The article reflects on the possibility of conceptualising the complex problem of the normativity of international legal rules, including in particular the phenomenon of “relative normativity.” The author utilises the critical potential of Ronald Dworkin's proposal for a new philosophy of international law to reflect on the classical accounts explaining normativity of international law. By building on Dworkin's argument, the author argues for a constitutional account of international law. The far‐reaching constitutional proposals may provide a more complex and coherent set of possible rationalisations of international legal rules. International law is in great need of a comprehensive theory that could better explain its normative character as well as its sources, and it is argued that international constitutionalism has the potential to serve this purpose.     

从法律原则到个案规范——阿列克西原则理论的民法应用

司法中针对某具体个案适用法律原则的通常情形是,没有既有规则可以适用(即"穷尽规则"),或者尽管有规则,但因其与原则相冲突而被排除适用。这两种情形的规范表现在实质上均可理解为原则之间的冲突。在相冲突的原则中确定何者最终适用于该具体个案,恰是阿列克西原则理论(尤其是其"竞争法则")所要解决的问题。适用"竞争法则"的核心在于找寻与确立优先条件或变量,相较于阿列克西的比重公式,参照生活常情或"事物本质"能为其找寻与确立提供更为具体的实践操作路径,因为优先条件或变量的确立由此转变为找寻连接基本案件事实与优先原则的中点(此即"裁判案件要确定的核心要素")。以"竞争法则"为理论根基,再辅之以确立优先条件或变量的具体路径,原则的规则化便水到渠成:即通过具体的优先条件或变量确立相冲突原则中优先适用的原则(即优先原则),适用优先原则的结果便是创设一个规则(即个案规范),优先条件或变量进而成为该个案规范的构成要件。个案规范才是裁判该具体个案的直接依据。     

Legislative Intentions and Counterfactu-als: Or,What One Can Still Learn from Dworkin's Critique of Legal Positivism

Riggs v. Palmer has become famous since Dworkin used it to show that legal positivism is defective. The debate over the merits of Dworkin's claims is still very lively. Yet not enough attention has been paid to the fact that the content of the statute at issue in Riggs was given by the counterfactual intention of the legislature. According to arguments from legislative intent, a judicial decision is justified if it is based on the lawmaker's intention. But can legislative intentions be determined counterfactually? More generally, what are the discursive commitments undertaken by a lawyer or a judge, in an exchange of legal reasons, when using this interpretive methodology? This paper addresses these issues considering, in particular, David Lewis's “resemblance” condition and “relevant similarity” between possible worlds in the evaluation of counterfactual statements. The analysis sheds some new light on the debate on theoretical disagreements and shows that Dworkin's conception of law as an argumentative practice is not necessarily at odds with legal positivism. It rather allows us to look at it under a better light.     

Dworkin and Phenomenology of the “Pre‐Legal”?

Ronald Dworkin states in his preface to “Law's Empire” (1986) that he is doing a phenomenology of law. In regards to a phenomenology of law, I wish to investigate Dworkin's theory of law, and subsequently, what is left out in order for it to be considered a phenomenological account. In doing so, I will compare Dworkin's phenomenology of law to Schütz's phenomenology of the social world. The comparison between the two will illuminate what I believe is necessary for law, and that is a Phenomenology of the Pre‐Legal.     

The Legality of Law

Abstract. In this paper I outline various different objects of investigation that may be picked out by word “law” (or its cognates). All of these objects must be investigated in an integrated way before one can provide a complete philosophical explanation of the nature of law. I begin with the distinction between laws (artefacts) and law (the genre to which the artefacts belong). This leads me to the distinction between the law (of a particular legal system) and law (the genre of artefacts). Then I discuss the contrast between law (the genre of artefacts) and law (the practice). Finally I comment on legality as the name of an ideal for laws and legal systems to live up to. I commend H. L. A. Hart's explanation of the nature of law for investigating these various objects in an integraed way, while nevertheless respecting the distinctions among them. I also criticise some of R. M. Dworkin's work for failing to respect the same distinctions.     

Hart's and Kelsen's Concepts of Normativity Contrasted*

Abstract. Hart's and Kelsen's respective outlooks on the concept of normativity not only differ by the way they explain this concept but also, more importantly, in what they seek to achieve when endeavouring to account for the normative dimension of law. By examining Hart's and Kelsen's models in the light of Korsgaard's understanding of the “normativity problem,” my aim is to emphasise not only their contrasted perspectives, but also the common limit they impose on their theories by dismissing as inappropriate any question regarding the emergence of legal normativity. On the basis of my previous arguments, I shall explain why I deem Raz's analysis of the contrast between Hart's and Kelsen's conceptions of normativity to be misleading.     

Radbruch and Hart on the Grudge Informer: A Reconsideration

Hart's defense of the separation of law and morality is partly based on his refusal to accept Radbruch's solution of the well‐known grudge informer case, in his famous article “Statutory Injustice and Suprastatutory Law.” In this paper, I present a detailed reconstruction of the “debate” between Radbruch and Hart on this case. I reach the conclusion that Hart fails to address the issue that was Radbruch's primary concern, namely the legal position of the judiciary when dealing with criminal statutes. I suggest that Hart's separation thesis cannot be upheld in the face of this concern. In my argument, Hart's mistaken understanding of the verdict of the Oberlandesgericht Bamberg that he refers to plays a crucial role.     

Lost in the System or Lost in Translation? The Exchanges between Hart and Ross*

According to the received opinion there is a theoretical incompatibility between Herbert Hart's The Concept of Law and Alf Ross's On Law and Justice, and, according to the received opinion, it stems above all from Hart's emphasis on the internal point of view. The present paper argues that this reading is mistaken. The Concept of Law does not go beyond On Law and Justice in so far as both present arguments to the effect that law is based on a shared understanding between participants in a project perceived by every participant to be a project in common. The paper demonstrates that there are substantive parallels between Hart's combination of “acceptance” or “acknowledgement” and a “critical reflective attitude” and Ross's combination of “motivation” or “feeling” and a “coherent whole of meaning and motivation.” The main conclusion is that the views of norms and normativity put forward in The Concept of Law and On Law and Justice are very close in essential respects, and, more specifically, that the two works are at root identical in their representation of the basis of normativity in reality.     

H. L. A. Hart on Legal Obligation*

Abstract. The author discusses Hart's concept of legal obligation, especially his contention that there is an obligation to obey the law which is peculiarly legal, i.e., non-moral. This view is held to be mistaken. What is denied is that legal rules, merely by their being issued, offer a justification for the use of coercion to ensure compliance with them. Although moral and other social (customary) rules are considered self-justifying, that is not the case of legal rules. Any analogy between these two types of rules in justifying their implementation by force is deemed wrong.**     

When Trumps Clash: Dworkin and the Doctrine of Proportionality

If there is one point on which defenders and critics of the doctrine of proportionality agree, it is that Dworkin's rights as trumps model stands as a radical alternative to the doctrine. Those who are sympathetic to proportionality reject the rights as trumps model for failing to acknowledge that there are conditions under which a right may be justifiably infringed. In turn, those who regard rights as trumps reject the doctrine of proportionality for failing to take rights seriously. This paper argues that each of these views is mistaken. On the one hand, Dworkin's rights as trumps model elides with a prominent version of the proportionality doctrine. On the other, this version takes rights seriously.     

Sources,Recognition and the Unity of the Legal System

A critical analysis of Kelsen’s theory leads to a broad concept of custom, which covers diverse types of customary norms, where the always required conviction of legal bindingness depends on different types of factual and normative reasons. In it we should include a strict concept of custom or legal usage, derogating custom, custom of general international law, custom that establishes an unwritten constitution, custom that establishes a new written constitution, judicial custom which creates a rule of precedent and custom newly expressed in the judicial application of customary rules. The basic norm could be formulated as a constitutive norm: ‘If the norms created through the first historical constitution are effective, then the first historical constitution (and all the norms derived from it) are valid.’ It is thus a customary constitutive rule that recognizes the first historical constitution as valid law. Norms which establish sources of law are constitutive rules, they can be customary norms or legislated norms, but if they are legislated, they have their validity recognized by, directly or indirectly, a constitutive customary norm. By using a broad concept of custom as a conventional practice, Hart implies that general recognition of a customary rule, together with the practice that accompanies it, are sufficient conditions of validity. A doctrine of recognition that is arrived at by means of criticism and a rational reconstruction of the doctrines of Kelsen and Hart regains the essential theses of the traditional recognition theory of Bierling and Engisch.

     

Literal Meaning: Semantics and Narrative in Biblical Law and Modern Jurisprudence

The modern conception of the ``Rule of Law'' entails government bylaw not men, and takes law to consist in rules known in advance. Thislatter characteristic assumes that, for the most part, the meaningof such rules is unproblematic (Hart's ``core of settled meaning''), this usually being understood as a function of ``literal meaning''.A quite different model exists in the Bible: the early rules display``oral residue'', and their meaning, I argue, is constructed in``narrative'' rather than ``semantic'' terms: instead of asking:``what situations do the words of this rule cover?'', we shouldinquire: ``what typical situations do the words of this rule evoke?''.Moreover, courtroom adjudication was not the norm, and its originalform was not based upon the application of written rules but ratherupon judicial discretion taken to have been divinely inspired. Isuggest that modern jurisprudence still retains traces of such earlierconceptions, in its account of modern law: despite their differences, both Hart and Fuller make use of narrative constructions of meaning,and Kelsen ultimately prefers the authority of the judge to the correctness of the rule he purports to apply.

     

Legal Entrepreneurship and the Strategic Virtues of Legal Uncertainty

The field of law and strategy (LAS) has advanced our understanding of the law's role in competitive advantage. To date, however, LAS has neglected low rule of law environments—countries characterized by expansive degrees of legal uncertainty. LAS should account for these settings, too, since environmental uncertainty is a strategically significant factor for any company. This article situates the strategic relevance of legal uncertainty in the Chinese context and fills an important gap by illustrating how LAS principles apply in low rule of law jurisdictions. Specifically, this article develops the construct of legal entrepreneurship—the notion that attorneys may apply an entrepreneurial mind-set and skill set to position the client favorably and legitimately within the uncertainties of the legal landscape, thereby creating legal competitive advantages for the client. Drawing upon interviews with expert attorneys and executives, this article presents a typology of legal strategies available to U.S. companies in China, uniquely modeling these approaches along the two fundamental dimensions of legal strategy. Additionally, this article identifies two basic types of legal uncertainty in the cross-border context and offers guidelines for the exercise of legal entrepreneurship. Together, these arguments demonstrate that legal entrepreneurship is an empirically viable construct within the LAS project. In low rule of law jurisdictions that have embraced foreign enterprise, legal entrepreneurship will generally optimize the American company's pursuit of both legal value creation and legal risk management.     

The Middlemen: The Legal Profession,the Rule of Law,and Authoritarian Regimes

Scholars are increasingly interested in exploring ways to strengthen the rule of law in authoritarian states—especially when deeper political reforms are not attainable. The article contributes to this discussion by revisiting the story of the emergence of the so‐called socialist legality in the communist states of Eastern Europe. Using the historical record from Poland, the author demonstrates a previously unnoticed, yet pivotal, role of legal professionals in facilitating socialist legality's rise to prominence. Using the lenses of Pierre Bourdieu's theory of fields, the article chronicles the evolving dynamic between the legal profession, the authoritarian regime, and society. These observations challenge conventional explanations of the emergence of the rule of law in nondemocratic conditions.