Trade Liberalization,Nature of Mergers and Employment

This paper investigates the roles of comparative advantage and market size in the international location of manufacturing production. Building on the conventional Helpman and Krugman (1985) general equilibrium framework, our analysis extends the present literature by incorporating both effects in the same model, while allowing trade costs to vary almost continuously from autarky to free trade. The main result of our exercise is that market size effects offset comparative advantage if countries have similar factor proportions. A large country with a slight comparative disadvantage in manufacturing production may thus be a net exporter of manufactures. A small country with the same comparative disadvantage would be a net importer of manufactures. When countries are very dissimilar in their relative factor endowments, land-abundant countries specialize in the production of food, irrespective of market size, if manufactures are a labour-intensive sector. Labour-rich countries of any size are manufacture cores. However, land-abundant countries with large markets can sustain a domestic manufacturing industry until trade costs are very low, and in some cases only specialize in agriculture at free trade.     

Trade and the location of industries: Some new results

We study a two-country two-sector model with free entry and monopolistic competition where both industries use labour to produce differentiated goods. The two countries are identical except for size. Labour is freely mobile across industries but it cannot move internationally. Transport costs affect both industries. The location of industries and the pattern of trade are the results of the interaction of two effects: the home market effect and the wage differential effect. The main results are: (i) if the two countries are sufficiently close in size and demand elasticities differ across industries (transport costs being equal), a continuous fall in transport costs from a prohibitive level to zero is associated with a reversal in the pattern of trade at some intermediate level. For large transport costs, the large country is a net exporter of the more differentiated good. For lower transport costs, the large country becomes a net exporter of the less differentiated good; (ii) if the two countries are very different in size and demand elasticities differ across industries (transport costs being equal), the larger country is always a net exporter of the less differentiated good.     

Viability and Equilibrium in Securities Markets with Frictions

In this paper we study some foundational issues in the theory of asset pricing with market frictions. We model market frictions by letting the set of marketed contingent claims (the opportunity set) be a convex set, and the pricing rule at which these claims are available be convex. This is the reduced form of multiperiod securities price models incorporating a large class of market frictions. It is said to be viable as a model of economic equilibrium if there exist price-taking maximizing agents who are happy with their initial endowment, given the opportunity set, and hence for whom supply equals demand. This is equivalent to the existence of a positive lineaar pricing rule on the entirespace of contingent claims—an underlying frictionless linear pricing rule—that lies below the convex pricing rule on the set of marketed claims. This is also equivalent to the absence of asymptotic free lunches—a generalization of opportunities of arbitrage. When a market for a nonmarketed contingent claim opens, a bid-ask price pair for this claim is said to be consistent if it is a bid-ask price pair in at least a viable economy with this extended opportunity set. If the set of marketed contingent claims is a convex cone and the pricing rule is convex and sublinear, we show that the set of consistent prices of a claim is a closed interval and is equal (up to its boundary) to the set of its prices for all the underlying frictionless pricing rules. We also show that there exists a unique extended consistent sublinear pricing rule—the supremum of the underlying frictionless linear pricing rules—for which the original equilibrium does not collapse when a new market opens, regardless of preferences and endowments. If the opportunity set is the reduced form of a multiperiod securities market model, we study the closedness of the interval of prices of a contingent claim for the underlying frictionless pricing rules.     

Book review

The paper develops a general equilibrium model of international production and trade. Technology is carried across borders by multinational producers and the set of technologies being used in a particular country is endogenous. Production locations are chosen based on the costs of production and getting the product to market. A producer may manufacture its product in its home country, target market country, or a third country. Estimated model parameters describe the states of technology in different countries, barriers to international investment, and trade costs. It is found that the barriers to international trade and investment are highly correlated. The model is used to measure the extent of technology diffusion across countries, study the relationship between international production and trade, investigate the effects of free-trade agreements (FTAs) on offshoring, and to quantify the welfare effects of international production and trade.     

Incomplete market participation, endogenous endowment risks and welfare

This paper investigates the equilibrium growth rate of capital stock and social welfare when risk-sharing externalities are incorporated into the infinite-horizon model where endowment risks are endogenized by the degree of incomplete market participation. There exist Nash equilibria depending on the degree of market participation. Under equilibrium with incomplete market participation, the endowment risks cannot be fully diversified as they induce precautionary savings and the over-accumulation of capital stocks while spillover effects on production technologies lead to the under-accumulation of capital stocks. This may have desirable effects on economic growth and improve social welfare.     

Owner as Manager,Extended Horizons and the Family Firm

Previous work on firm ownership structure suggests that organizations in which ownership and control are combined may be undervalued relative to the market investment rule because decision makers have an incentive to forgo investment projects that managers in firms with specialized ownership find profitable. However, the specialization of ownership and decision-making functions may result in substantial agency costs. This paper shows that these tradeoffs may not exist in family firms. The extended horizons characteristic of family businesses may provide the necessary incentives for decision makers to invest according to the market rule while limiting agency costs that arise when ownership and control are separated. Family ties, loyalty, insurance, and stability are expected to be effective in lengthening the horizons of managers and in providing the incentives for family managers to make efficient investments in the family business.     

走向法治：从应然到实然——市场经济如何自我建构法治

法治曾是人类治国的理想诉求,其标志在于法律长期处于不能控束国家权力的应然状态。市场经济成为各文明国家的主要生产方式后,法治则从人们祈盼的应然状态转为实然状态,即法律通过控束国家权力的运行达成法律统治的最终实现。因此,市场经济是一个国家的法治从应然到实然的内在根据：市场经济基于自身固有的经济制约机制,通过将社会的公众自整合为统一、强大的经济力量以控束国家权力的运行。而成为法治产生、形成、确立的经济基础与决定力量。当然,各国的法治从应然走向实然的道路并不纯粹,主要在于因面临各种内外因素的干扰、阻抑、牵制．致使各国市场经济的发展并不顺畅。     

Diversification cones, trade costs and factor market linkages

This paper finds non-uniform differences in the distribution functions of factor usage intensities among 10 rich OECD countries. The 10 countries form three distinct groups such that the between-group differences are more pronounced than within-group differences and capital-abundant countries are in capital-abundant groups. The estimation works even if the same industry codes represent different goods across countries in the data. The finding is consistent with the multiple-cone factor proportions theory with zero trade costs with each group being one cone. An alternative interpretation is non-zero trade costs. Both interpretations imply weak factor market linkages between the countries in different groups.     

Selective Price Cuts and Price Discrimination Bans in Network Industries

In order to encourage competition in network-based industries such as telecommunications, some jurisdictions have adopted regulatory rules which prevent the incumbent service provider from selectively cutting prices in response to market entry. Given such bans on price discrimination, the incumbent cannot react to competition by selectively adjusting prices, based on the competitive situation in a given market, but has to maintain the same price across all markets. This paper analyses the welfare effects of such a rule for both one-way networks (access model) and two-way networks (interconnection model) when consumers have switching costs. We find that, even though bans on price discrimination can induce inefficient entry for a range of parameter constellations, there are also cases where they induce efficient market entry. This is the more likely to be the case the higher the fixed costs of entry.     

Learning to export: Export growth and the destination decision of firms

I find evidence that the geographic expansion of firm exports occurs slowly over time and that a large share of export growth is due to incumbent exporters entering new destinations. New exporters enter large countries and destinations with characteristics similar to their domestic market. Less similar, distant or less developed countries are entered by firms already exporting to other destinations. I formulate a dynamic general equilibrium model to test if these patterns are due to firms learning how to export (as other recent empirical findings have suggested) or other factors considered in the literature. In this model, heterogeneous firms experience learning in the form of market entry costs that depend on export history. Using Russian firm level data, I find that learning plays a significant role in explaining the observed entry patterns, which standard trade models cannot account for.     

Strategic Trade Policy through the Tax System

If conventional instruments of strategic trade policy are unavailable, the system of foreign profit taxation and transfer price guidelines may serve as surrogate policy instruments. In this paper, I consider a model where firms from two countries compete with each other on a market in a third country. Both firms have affiliates in the third country where (part of) the production takes place. I analyse optimal policy choices of the firms' residence countries aiming at strategically manipulating the competitiveness of their firms. I show that, first, countries prefer the tax exemption system over the tax credit system if there is no intra‐firm trade. Second, if the headquarters provide inputs for production in the affiliate, countries prefer the tax exemption system if the transfer price for these inputs is close to the headquarters' variable cost and if the residence country's tax rate is high. However, if transfer prices are high and the residence country's tax rate is low, I show that the tax credit system is an optimal tax policy choice for both countries. From a policy perspective, the view that the tax exemption system is generally the best policy response if domestic firms' competitiveness is a policy goal has to be qualified.     

Integrating Production Costs in Channel Decisions

Production costs are critical in every business. In this research, we explore how variations in the manufacturer's production cost affect both the manufacturer-retailer channel relationship and the manufacturer's and the retailer's choice of a price-setting rule (e.g., a dollar-amount margin or a percentage-based margin). We employ a multidisciplinary approach that combines executive interviews, survey research, and a game-theoretic analytical model. The analytical model shows that both the manufacturer's and the retailer's price-setting rule influences the other party's approach to production cost. Therefore, the manufacturer's and the retailer's optimal choice of a price-setting rule is not invariant, as previous marketing literature has suggested; such choices depend on the shape of the production cost function. Overall, the results offer new insight into the channel outcomes in light of production costs. The empirical results support the analytical results.     

服务贸易领域的原产地规则在区域经济一体化进程中的应用

乌拉圭回合谈判后,多边贸易体制的调整范围由货物贸易扩大到服务贸易。WTO规则允许各成员根据最惠国原则对不同成员的服务和服务提供者给予差别待遇。《服务贸易总协定》(简称为GATS)第5条对"经济一体化协定"的规定也允许对隶属于区域成员国的服务或服务提供者给予区域性更优惠待遇。服务贸易领域因此也日益关注起对原产地规则的研究。我国自2004年1月1日实施《内地与香港关于建立更紧密经贸关系的安排》(简称为CEPA)起,"香港公司"可以在内地享受市场准入和政策优惠的待遇。但是很多所谓的"香港公司"是由欧美等其他国家的服务提供者在具体进行业务操作,而优惠的实际获得者是这些"搭便车"的外国公司。本文通过对服务原产地规则国际协调和规范的阐释,对我国CEPA的发展现状进行分析并提出几点完善性建议。     

3-D printing: The new industrial revolution

This article examines the characteristics and applications of 3-D printing and compares it with mass customization and other manufacturing processes. 3-D printing enables small quantities of customized goods to be produced at relatively low costs. While currently used primarily to manufacture prototypes and mockups, a number of promising applications exist in the production of replacement parts, dental crowns, and artificial limbs, as well as in bridge manufacturing. 3-D printing has been compared to such disruptive technologies as digital books and music downloads that enable consumers to order their selections online, allow firms to profitably serve small market segments, and enable companies to operate with little or no unsold finished goods inventory. Some experts have also argued that 3-D printing will significantly reduce the advantages of producing small lot sizes in low-wage countries via reduced need for factory workers.     

The determinants of cross-border equity flows

We explore a new panel data set on bilateral gross cross-border equity flows between 14 countries, 1989-1996. We show that a “gravity” model explains international transactions in financial assets at least as well as goods trade transactions. Gross transaction flows depend on market size in source and destination country as well as trading costs, in which both information and the transaction technology play a role. Distance proxies some information costs, and other variables explicitly represent information transmission, an information asymmetry between domestic and foreign investors, and the efficiency of transactions. The geography of information is the main determinant of the pattern of international transactions, while there is weak support in our data for the diversification motive, once we control for the informational friction. We broaden the scope of our results by presenting some evidence linking the results on equity transactions to equity holdings.     

An information-based theory of international currency

This paper develops an information-based theory of international currency based on search frictions, private trading histories, and imperfect recognizability of assets. Using an open-economy search model with multiple competing currencies, the value of each currency is determined without requiring agents to use a particular currency to purchase a country's goods. Strategic complementarities in portfolio choices and information acquisition decisions generate multiple equilibria with different types of payment arrangements. While some inflation can benefit the country issuing an international currency, the threat of losing international status puts an inflation discipline on the issuing country. When monetary authorities interact in a simple policy game, the temptation to inflate can lead optimal policy to deviate from the Friedman rule. The calibrated model can produce a welfare cost of losing international status for the issuing country larger than previous findings, though estimates depend critically on inflation rates and information costs.     

Sovereign debt as a contingent claim: a quantitative approach

We construct a dynamic equilibrium model with contingent service and adverse selection to quantitatively study sovereign debt. In the model, benefits of defaulting are tempered by higher future interest rates. For a wide set of parameters, the only equilibrium is one in which the sovereign defaults in all states; additional output losses, however, sustain equilibria that resemble the data. We show that due to the adverse selection problem, some countries choose to delay default to reduce loss of reputation. Moreover, although equilibria with no default imply greater welfare levels, they are not sustainable in highly indebted and volatile countries.     

Per capita income,market access costs,and trade volumes

There is strong empirical evidence that countries with lower per capita income tend to have smaller trade volumes even after controlling for aggregate income. Furthermore, poorer countries do not just trade less, but have a lower number of trading partners. In this paper, I construct and estimate a general equilibrium model of trade that captures both these features of the trade data. The key element of the model is an association between trade costs (both variable and fixed) and countries' development levels, which can account for the effect of per capita income on trade volumes and explain many zeros in bilateral trade flows. I find that market access costs play an important role in fitting the model to the data. In a counterfactual analysis, I find that removing the asymmetries in trade costs raises welfare in all countries with an average percentage change equal to 29% and larger gains for smaller and poorer countries. Real income inequality falls by 43%.     

Vertical Product Differentiation and Advertising

A duopoly model is developed in which firms' strategic variables include brand quality, the number of distinct market segments to enter and price. Informative advertising is used to overcome consumer ignorance about brands. In contrast to many existing models in which firms engage in price competition, the subgame perfect equilibria of the game are not characterised by the production of vertically differentiated products. Further, whilst the firms typically produce identical high quality products, in some circumstances the production of homogeneous low quality brands can be an equilibrium strategy.     

Strategic Interactions and Contagion Effects under Monetary Unions

This paper applies game theory and a cost‐benefit analysis to study voluntary exits and contagion effects in countries joined to a monetary union. The paper looks at two non‐core or periphery countries of a large union and examines the role of structural asymmetries and strategic interactions as determinants of equilibrium outcomes, following both country‐specific and common shocks. The paper finds that under almost symmetry between countries, country‐specific shocks are never associated with multiple equilibria and, if large enough, can spread to other countries leading to contagion. By contrast, common shocks are seen to sustain multiple equilibria if almost‐symmetric countries are considered and to have implications similar to those found in the country‐specific case if large structural asymmetries are admitted.