Commentary on Mills’ “toward a theory of myth”

In his provocative article on theorizing about myth, Jon Mills kindly cites my own work on the subject. Let me confine my remarks to his comments on me. I now see, thanks to Mills, how confusing some of my statements have perhaps been.     

Toward a theory of myth

James Cresswell provides a thoughtful critique of my essay on a theory of myth (Mills) with a specific focus on the nature of theorizing that challenges the dogma of empirical frames of reference, concluding that scientific theories themselves are contemporary myths. Insofar as myth is an attempt to provide a narrative or discourse about phenomena, Cresswell's argument could apply to any theory. But he takes this point further: theory is synonymous with myth. In order to unpack this evocative claim, it may prove useful to revisit how theory and myth relate to the concepts of logos, truth, ontology and identity. In the end, I suggest theory is not myth because theory sets out to describe, interpret and explain phenomena and is scrutinized for its validity, generalizability and applied consequences, while the premises of myth are often historically and culturally presupposed or simply devolve into belief that may or may not be defensible.     

Where Should We Look for Mental Representations? On the Need for Epistemic Ethics

Recent scientific studies of consciousness reveal the challenges involved in striking the proper balance between concrete fact and abstract theory. Christof Koch believes he is on the road to a scientific understanding of consciousness because he has a research paradigm which appears to create solvable puzzles. Unfortunately, work in other areas of neuroscience reveal that these puzzles rely too heavily on Aristotelian common sense to account for the unique nature of connectionist processing. William Ramsey claims that biological versions of traditional theories of representation, of the sort embraced by Koch, Fodor, and others, are so inadequate that we should give up all attempts to create high level abstract theories about human cognition. I argue, however, that what is needed is more abstract theorizing, not less. The intelligible entities described by Dynamic Systems Theory should be seen as embodiments of mental representations. These embodiments are physical in the sense that they are comprehensible in terms of modern physics, even if they are not material items that can be directly perceived.     

Formalism, Behavioral Realism and the Interdisciplinary Challenge in Sociological Theory

In this paper, I argue that recent sociological theory has become increasingly bifurcated into two mutually incompatible styles of theorizing that I label formalist and behavioral-realist. Formalism favors mathematization and proposes an instrumentalist ontology of abstract processes while behavioral-realist theory takes at its basis the "real" physical individual endowed with concrete biological, cognitive and neurophysiological capacities and constraints and attempts to derive the proper conceptualization of social behavior from that basis. Formalism tends to lead toward a conceptually independent sociology that in principle requires only minimal reference to the empirical and ontological storehouse of other disciplines, while behavioral-realist theory leads to an interdisciplinary sociology that can be located within a hierarchy of behavioral sciences, leading to questions regarding the relationship between sociology and other disciplines as well as issues of transdisciplinary unification and possible interdisciplinary reduction. I explore the consequences of this split for the project of explanatory sociological theory within the context of how it has manifested itself in sociological network theory and social psychology. I close with a critique and assessment of formalist tendencies in sociological theorizing.     

Service users' knowledges and social work theory: conflict or collaboration?

Summary So far, service users have not been systematically involvedin social work theorizing. However, disabled peoples's movements,mental health service users/survivors and other service usershave developed their own knowledges based on direct experienceand they have generated their own conceptual frameworks andbodies of theory. There are fundamental problems in social workseeking to interpret service user knowledges. Their developmentsand interpretation require the direct involvement of serviceusers and their organization in social work theorizing. Thereare strong practical, philosophical and political argumentsfor involving the knowledges and theories of service users andtheir organizations in the process of social work theory-building.This paper considers an inclusive approach to social work theorizing.While highlighting the importance of service users and theirorganizations being effectively included in social work theorizing,it also argues the need for them to have support and opportunitiesto develop their own prior and separate discussions about theory,including social work theory.     

On the structuralist constraints in social scientific theorizing

Several case studies and theoretical reports indicate that the structuralist concept of a constraint has a central role in the reconstruction of physical theories. It is surprising that there is only little theoretical discussion on the relevance of constraints for the reconstruction of social scientific theories in the literature. Almost all structuralist reconstructions of social theorizing are vacuously constrained. Consequently, constraints are methodologically irrelevant.In this paper I reconstruct three cases selected from social scientific theorizing. The first case is a generalization of Gross, Mason and McEachern's (1958) role expectation conflict theory, which is a qualitative theory. The second case is Cohen and Lee's (1975) quantitative theory of social conformity, which essentially utilizes the theor of Markov chains. The third case is the explanation schema of folk psychology which is one of the most important methodological frameworks in the social sciences.In all the three cases important constraints emerge. From an epistemological point of view it seems that the related constraints work as higher-order laws. In any case, purely conceptual arguments are insufficient to justify them.The three cases,mutatis mutandis, cover nearly all types of social scientific theorizing, so that in my view constraints play a crucial methodological role in the social sciences precisely as they have in the natural sciences.     

社会学的想象与想象的社会学:帕森斯、米尔斯社会学研究进路比较论要

帕森斯的社会理论和米尔斯的社会研究是“二战”后美国社会学的两条重要且独特的研究路径。帕森斯倡导社会科学中的一般理论研究,核心在于理论和经验的互惠发展的动力学,意在促进社会科学的积累性发展,但确立统一的社会科学无异于建立一种不可能实现的“学术巴别塔”。米尔斯强调的基于社会学想象的社会研究纲领,实质上是一种政治导向的社会研究,最终难免落入学术和政治的双重“想象”困境。研究范式的差异,导致他们对其身处的美国社会作出了判然有别的研究论断。进而言之,这种差异的背后隐含着研究者对现代性问题的不同态度以及政治立场上的深刻分歧。     

Materialism, Agnosticism and God

The longstanding philosophical debate between idealism and materialism has recently entered the ontological terrain of critical realism (CR) and dialectical critical realism (DCR). This has been initiated by Roy Bhaskar’s most recent book, From East to West, which attempts an ambitious synthesis of philosophy, social theory and theology. On the one hand, Bhaskar’s attempt to root his philosophy and social theory in a ‘realist theory of God’ has found an echo within the CR and DCR research camp, some of whose members would urge us to take seriously the possibility of a ‘religious sociology’. On the other hand, Bhaskar’s abrupt ‘idealist turn’ has left many critical realists flabbergasted and horrified, particularly those working at the interface between realist philosophy and Marxist social science, especially since Bhaskar’s new philosophical trajec‐tory is radically at odds with the ‘synchronic emergent powers materialism’ outlined in his The Possibility of Naturalism. In response to this ‘split’ within the CR and DCR camp, the spectre of ‘realist agnosticism’ has been raised and defended by Mervyn Hartwig in this journal. Since neither science nor philosophy can settle the issue of what kind of stuff constitutes ‘rock bottom reality’, it is rational to be agnostic on the ‘ultimate question’, to deny positively affirming the claims of either one side or the other. Now this is the move that is resisted in this paper. My argument is that ontolog‐ical idealism is disputable on a number of grounds‐philosophical, scientific, ethical and political. In particular, I argue that objective idealism is unsupported by rational knowledge, is riddled with conceptual and logical defects, is contrary to the logic of scientific discovery, and is an obstacle to eudaimonia (human emancipation). Further, since realist agnosticism rests its case on the myth of infallible knowledge, and obviously stands or falls with the defensibility or other‐wise of objective idealism, this gives us ‘good enough’ reasons for accepting a thoroughgoing materialism as the ontological foundation of social theory.     

Relationship course theory: An interdisciplinary integrative proposition to address the complexification of interpersonal relationships

Researchers have been observing a complexification of interpersonal relationships in contemporary societies. However, current theoretical perspectives on relationships fall short of comprehensively grasping increasingly diverse and fluid relationship types (e.g., friends with benefits, polyamory, living-apart-together, coparenting, etc.) and patterns of change. In an attempt to meet the need for more integrative and interdisciplinary theorizing, this paper introduces a first outline of relationship course theory to better comprehend the complexity of relationships. In contrast to previous theoretical perspectives that conceptualize relationships as a single trajectory, I posit that the course of a relationship is composed of multiple intertwined trajectories, each of which stemming from differentiated domains such as sexuality, friendship, love, family, domesticity, and occupation. These relationship domains constitute a metatypology from which to examine the multiple sets of meanings and temporalities that intertwine throughout the course of a relationship. I propose that relationships are defined based on the combination of relationship domains, with different iterations and permutations of these domains producing various relationship configurations. Furthermore, the theory defines three levels of relationship courses: Sociocultural (i.e., stories that circulate about relationships in given sociocultural contexts), interpersonal (i.e., stories that individuals co-construct about the particular relationships they experience), and life courses (i.e., stories that individuals co-construct about themselves as relational beings). This proposition will hopefully stimulate the theoretical conversation on the complexity of relationships and foster dialogue between researchers from different theoretical and disciplinary affiliations.     

Applying Diffusion of Innovation Theory to Intervention Development

Few social science theories have a history of conceptual and empirical study as long as does the diffusion of innovations. The robustness of this theory derives from the many disciplines and fields of study in which diffusion has been studied, from the international richness of these studies, and from the variety of new ideas, practices, programs, and technologies that have been the objects of diffusion research. Early theorizing from the beginning of the 20th century was gradually displaced by post hoc empirical research that described and explained diffusion processes. By the 1950s, diffusion researchers had begun to apply the collective knowledge learned about naturalistic diffusion in tests of process interventions to affect the spread of innovations. Now, this purposive objective has given form to a science of dissemination in which evidence-based practices are designed a priori not just to result in internal validity but to increase the likelihood that external validity and diffusion both are more likely to result. Here, I review diffusion theory and focus on seven concepts-intervention attributes, intervention clusters, demonstration projects, societal sectors, reinforcing contextual conditions, opinion leadership, and intervention adaptation-with potential for accelerating the spread of evidence-based practices, programs, and policies in the field of social work.     

Culture and Women's Sexualities

Anthropological studies of women's same-sex relations in non-Western societies provide an important source for theorizing women's sexuality because they allow us to go beyond a narrow focus on Western cultures and concepts. Looking at studies from groups other than the dominant societies of Europe and America, I explore the diversity of women's sexualities and the sociocultural factors that produce sexual beliefs and practices. This article argues that sexual practices take their meaning from particular cultures and their beliefs about the self and the world. Cultural systems of gender, in particular, construct different sexual beliefs and practices for men and women. I conclude the article by suggesting some broad patterns at work in the production of women's sexualities across cultures.     

Racing to Theory or Retheorizing Race? Understanding the Struggle to Build a Multiracial Identity Theory

Empirical research on the growing multiracial population in the United States has focused largely on the documentation of racial identification, analysis of psychological adjustment, and understanding the broader political consequences of mixed-race identification. Efforts toward theory construction on multiracial identity development, however, have been largely disconnected from empirical data, mired in disciplinary debates, and bound by historically specific assumptions about race and racial group membership. This study provides a critical overview of multiracial identity development theories, examines the links between theory and research, explores the challenges to multiracial identity theory construction, and proposes considerations for future directions in theorizing racial identity development among the mixed-race population.     

The Failings of Three Event Perception Theories

Empirical research on the perception of physical events is rarely designed to test a particular theory. The research often fails to be embedded in a larger theoretical context or it is carried out with the implicit goal to support a particular theoretical approach. I argue that this is not very productive. While three theories are relevant for our understanding of events, their limits have rarely been addressed. I expose these limits. The three theories or approaches are (1) direct or ecological perception, (2) inference theory, and (3) the concept of internalization. I demonstrate that all three fail empirically and/or theoretically with respect to explaining the perception of events. They fail because they adhere to simplistic stationary views or because they remain too vague. An adequate theory of event perception has to include three factors at the level of the explanans, namely the stimulus, the purpose of the action to which the percept belongs, and the appraisal of this action's success. Examples from the domains of arrival-time judgment and perception of events involving classical mechanics are used to support the claims. I suggest that a new pragmatic theory of event perception ought to modify and to incorporate the three concepts of affordances, thought-like processes, and evolutionary principles.     

Adding the “Symbolic” to Interactionist Practice: A Theoretical Elaboration of William Schwartz' Legacy to Group Workers

Symbolic interactionism is one of the premier theoretical perspectives on group life, but group work theorists have neglected it. This article provides metatheoretical reflections on the legacy of William Schwartz and the stalled project of theorizing about the communicative foundation of groups. Exemplars in the interactionist tradition are profiled, and their conceptual and practical contributions to a “symbolic” interactionist group theory are highlighted. The structure of interactionist theory is mapped, and a set of distinctive concepts and assumptions organized around the construct of symbolic practices is presented. The article concludes with a call to group workers to harvest the fruits of the interactionist theoretical and research program.     

《史记》感生神话与司马迁表现艺术

《史记》记载了商、周、秦始祖和汉高祖的感生神话,其中商、周、秦的感生神话都以经典为依据,但都简略;而刘邦的感生神话则详细、系统,与他的史学思想相悖。通过深入研究发现,从汉高祖到汉武帝经历了历史神话化的过程,形成了君权神授的理论。司马迁的《史记》完成了神话历史化,但又在其中设下了微言大义。后世不察,以此为书写历史著作的模范。     

从“大众社会”到“社会学的想像力” 理解米尔斯的一条内在线索

摘要：本文试图阐明,在米尔斯对美国社会的经验研究与其关于社会科学的认识论纲领之间存在着一以贯之的内在逻辑。通过对米尔斯最具代表性的三个经验研究成果,即由《权力新贵：美国的劳工领袖》、《白领：美国的中产阶级》以及《权力精英》所组成的“美国社会分层三部曲”的考察,作者发现,从这些研究中所浮现出的“大众社会”图景深刻地影响了米尔斯关于“社会学的想像力”的论述。在此基础上,本文进一步揭示了米尔斯的社会学著述所关注的两个基本问题,即对于社会变迁可能性的探寻,以及对于现代社会中人的意义的关切。     

MYTHS OF WELFARE REFORM

In Australian welfare reform debate, a range of approaches and policies has been advocated. Regardless of their diversity, I argue that the debate has an unnecessarily narrow framework resulting from the widespread acceptance of at least three welfare reform myths. First, is the idea that the current system is anachronistic and in disrepair. Instead of this narrow focus on welfare policy, I argue that the welfare reform debate must be widened to include other domains of public policy to involve a ‘joined up’ approach to addressing poverty and disadvantage. The second myth is that welfare recipients need to be the focus of policy attention. Policy reforms focus on changing the behaviour of recipients and their communities. Because structural changes underlie increased benefit receipt, such reforms will only have minimal consequences. The third welfare reform myth is the false notion that the current welfare system lacks obligation.     

Rational preference: Decision theory as a theory of practical rationality

In general, the technical apparatus of decision theory is well developed. It has loads of theorems, and they can be proved from axioms. Many of the theorems are interesting, and useful both from a philosophical and a practical perspective. But decision theory does not have a well agreed upon interpretation. Its technical terms, in particular, utility and preference do not have a single clear and uncontroversial meaning.How to interpret these terms depends, of course, on what purposes in pursuit of which one wants to put decision theory to use. One might want to use it as a model of economic decision-making, in order to predict the behavior of corporations or of the stock market. In that case, it might be useful to interpret the technical term utility as meaning money profit. Decision theory would then be an empirical theory. I want to look into the question of what utility could mean, if we want decision theory to function as a theory of practical rationality. I want to know whether it makes good sense to think of practical rationality as fully or even partly accounted for by decision theory. I shall lay my cards on the table: I hope it does make good sense to think of it that way. For, I think, if Humeans are right about practical rationality, then decision theory must play a very large part in their account. And I think Humeanism has very strong attractions.     

九尾白狐与禹娶涂山女神话

赵晔《吴越春秋》记载了著名的禹娶涂山女神话。但《书钞》、《类聚》、《御览》等类书引此神话时,部分条目注出《吕氏春秋》,故古今有学者据此认为这是该书佚文,这是错误的。禹娶涂山女神话神秘怪诞之处在于九尾白狐意象。战国时期,九尾白狐被认为是以金德王天下的商汤兴起之瑞,与以木德王天下的禹无关。汉儒根据五行相生说改造古史系统,以禹为金德,九尾白狐遂成禹兴之瑞。汉人将九尾白狐意象纳入禹与涂山女的婚姻故事,一段近实的历史传说蜕变为一则浪漫的神话。禹娶涂山女神话是历史神话化的一个实例。