基于获取决策优先权的零售商战略联盟效益分析

对于由一个供应商和多个零售商组成的单一产品、单周期供应链,在确定型市场、零售商成本对称以及供应商具有关于零售商成本结构完全信息的情况下,考虑了同时带来运作成本与决策权分配变化(基于获取决策优先权)的零售商定货数量决策联盟。利用博弈论方法,研究了获取决策优先权的零售商战略联盟对参与联盟的零售商、未参与联盟的零售商、供应商以及供应链整体收益的影响。证明这种零售商战略联盟不可能使供应链中所有成员都同时增加收益。但在一定的条件下,联盟能实现某种部分"多赢";使供应链整体、供应商和参与联盟的零售商收益增加,或使供应商和参与联盟的零售商收益增加。     

不同权力结构下供应链企业社会责任激励

本文以单个供应商和单个零售商组成的两级供应链为对象，假设仅考虑供应商对产品安全方面的社会责任，研究了在供应商主导和零售商主导两种权力配置模式下，供应商履行社会责任程度的差异，以及如何在供应商和零售商间建立合理的契约以激励供应商社会责任的履行。研究发现，相对供应商主导，在零售商主导下供应商会更多地履行社会责任。引入收入共享的事后契约和成本共担的事前契约后，在供应商主导下，两种契约在一定条件下均能有效地激励供应商更好地履行社会责任，但在留存比例与分担比例相等的条件下，成本共担契约的激励效应更强。在零售商主导下，收入共享契约虽能激励供应商的社会责任履行，但因导致零售商的利润下降，故无法达成，而成本共担契约只有在分担足够大时才有激励效应。     

价格相依随机需求下的逆向拍卖采购与定价联合决策

研究价格相依随机需求下零售商的逆向拍卖采购与定价联合决策问题。假定零售商首先确定一个采购合同,然后供应商投标,通过逆向拍卖选取一个获胜的供应商,由该供应商确定采购量并传递给零售商,同时零售商做定价决策影响其需求,目标是寻求一个最优的采购与定价策略以最大化零售商的期望利润。对于一般的随机需求函数,引进期望销售弹性这一新的概念并利用其性质证明零售商的期望收益(不包括采购费用)是采购量的凹函数,从而得到其最优的采购与定价策略。特别地,对正态需求分布情形给出了零售商的采购量和利润函数的解析表达式并进行数值分析。     

网上拍卖销售与逆向拍卖采购下的库存管理

以电子商务为背景研究网上拍卖销售与逆向拍卖采购下的库存管理。在该问题中,零售商一方面利用网上拍卖销售产品,另一方面利用逆向拍卖进行采购。对于单阶段情形,证明网上拍卖下零售商的期望收益函数是采购量的严格递增的凹函数,从而得到零售商的最优采购策略和供应商的最优投标策略。对于多阶段情形,利用马尔可夫决策过程理论建立该问题的最优控制模型,得到零售商的最优采购策略和供应商的贝叶斯-纳什均衡投标策略均与基本库存策略相类似。     

需求信息扭曲条件下供应链成员运营决策研究

本文在供应商和零售商需求信息不对称的背景下，考虑了由一个供应商和两个具有不平等地位零售商组成的供应链，运用信号博弈理论和完美贝叶斯纳什均衡理论，研究批发价格合同下，供应链中存在的信息泄露和信息扭曲对供应链成员运营决策的影响。在批发价格合同下，供应商总会泄露市场地位高的零售商订单信息，两个零售商存在斯塔克伯格竞争。本文进一步研究分析，得到存在信息泄露的两种均衡策略——分离均衡和混同均衡，给出零售商在不同市场需求条件下的订购决策。本文还指出在一定条件下，供应商可能在信息泄露过程中扭曲信息，误导市场地位低的零售商做出错误决策，供应商和市场地位高的零售商获得更大利润。当供应商扭曲信息时，尽管市场地位低的零售商利润降低，但其仍将继续留在市场中，零售商之间仍然保持水平竞争。最后，通过算例分析，对研究结论进行直观验证和说明。本文研究了供应链存在的信息泄露和信息扭曲问题，为现实中供应链各个主体行为提供理论依据。     

供应链委托代理激励契约问题分析

在供应链中,零售商的努力水平系数在很大程度上决定了市场需求,但因信息的不对称,使得供应商无法观察到零售商的实际行为,进而影响到供应商的期望受益和供应链的平衡.本文利用信息经济学的委托代理理论,比较了在信息对称与信息不对称情况下的线性契约,深入研究了一类两级供应链(包括一个供应商和一个零售商)激励契约机制的设立,分析了外部的不确定性等因素对于报酬率、努力水平系数、固定收入、供应商期望收益、零售商的实际收入以及代理成本的影响.     

一类供应链的线性转移支付激励机制研究

针对不同的供应链设计不同的契约是供应链协作的一个重要手段。在由一个零售商和一个供应商组成的供应链中,零售商的促销努力水平对供应链的效率有重大的影响,本文提出了一种线性转移支付激励机制,且证明了在该机制的作用下,零售商将付出对整个供应链最优的促销努力水平,这时供应链的总收益将得到提高,而对新增收益的划分则取决于供应商和零售商之间的讨价还价能力。     

j227基于Stackelberg模型的单供应商两零售商二级供应链回购契约机制研究

本文通过证明由单个供应商和两个零售商所组成的二级供应链中不采用回购契约机制以及采用传统回购契约机制的不合理性,提出了采用Stackelberg利润分配博弈模型设计回购契约的优点:模型表明利用Stackelberg模型设计回购契约可使整个供应链的收益得到进一步改进,同时又可使零售商与供应商的各自收益得到很大改善。     

产能不确定供应商的风险厌恶行为对供应链的影响

针对具有产能不确定性的风险厌恶供应商和风险中性零售商组成的供应链系统,本文采用经典的风险指标Value-at-risk(VaR)衡量供应商的风险厌恶程度,并将其作为供应商的优化约束条件之一。在斯坦伯格顺序博弈的模型框架下,零售商做定价和订货量决策,供应商做批发价决策。本文求得供应商批发价在VaR约束下的理论上下界,研究了风险厌恶程度对最优批发价的影响。与风险中性环境下的结果相比,在设立合理目标利润的前提下,高风险厌恶程度可能使得供应商提高批发价,低风险厌恶程度则对供应商批发价无影响。当目标利润设立很高时,供应商为了逐利将会降低批发价诱导零售商提高订货量。     

考虑公平关切行为下竞争零售商的最优联合购买策略研究

本文考虑一个由两个竞争的零售商和一个供应商组成的两级供应链,其中供应商可通过提供批量折扣契约向两家竞争的零售商销售产品,而零售商表现出纵向公平关切(即当获得利润小于供应商的利润时,其获得一个负效用)。并且,考虑的两个零售商为了获得较低的批发价格可能更喜欢团购,进而它们将选择最佳订单数量来最大化其自身的效用。利用经典的纳什议价解决方案作为公平参考点,本文主要研究竞争与公平关切行为将如何影响零售商的联合购买策略。研究发现,当零售商追求公平时,联合购买策略优于单独购买策略,且越大竞争强度使得使用联合购买策略的优势越明显。此外,当零售商表现出不同的公平关切程度时,若批量折扣比例比较低,对公平关切敏感的零售商的效用总是小于对公平关切不敏感的零售商的效用;否则,对公平关切敏感的零售商的效用总是大于对公平关切不敏感的零售商的效用。     

An Auction Mechanism for Pricing and Capacity Allocation with Multiple Products

We consider a pricing and short‐term capacity allocation problem in the presence of buyers with orders for bundles of products. The supplier's objective is to maximize her net profit, computed as the difference between the revenue generated through sales of products and the production and inventory holding costs. The objective of each buyer is similarly profit maximization, where a buyer's profit is computed as the difference between the time‐dependent utility of the product bundle he plans to buy, expressed in monetary terms, and the price of the bundle. We assume that bundles' utilities are buyers' private information and address the problem of allocating the facility's output. We directly consider the products that constitute the supplier's output as market goods. We study the case where the supplier follows an anonymous and linear pricing strategy, with extensions that include quantity discounts and time‐dependent product and delivery prices. In this setting, the winner determination problem integrates the capacity allocation and scheduling decisions. We propose an iterative auction mechanism with non‐decreasing prices to solve this complex problem, and present a computational analysis to investigate the efficiency of the proposed method under supplier's different pricing strategies. Our analysis shows that the problem with private information can be effectively solved with the proposed auction mechanism. Furthermore, the results indicate that the auction mechanism achieves more than 80% of the system's profit, and the supplier receives a higher percentage of profit especially when the ratio of demand to available capacity is high.     

Allocating Capacity with Demand Competition: Fixed Factor Allocation*

We consider a supply chain consisting of a supplier and two retailers. The supplier sells a single product to the retailers, who, in turn, retail the product to customers. The supplier has limited production capacity, and the retailers compete for the supplier's capacity and are duopolists engaged in Cournot competition for their customers. When the sum of the retailers' orders exceeds the supplier's capacity, the supplier allocates his capacity according to a preannounced allocation rule. We propose a new capacity allocation rule, fixed factor allocation, which incorporates the ideas of proportional and lexicographic allocations: it prioritizes retailers as in lexicographic allocation, but guarantees only a fixed proportion of the total available capacity to the prioritized retailer. We show that (1) the fixed factor allocation rule incorporates lexicographic and proportional allocations from the perspectives of the supplier and the supply chain; (2) under fixed factor allocation, the supply chain profit is not affected by the allocation factor when it is greater than a threshold; (3) the retailers share the supply chain profit with the supplier depending on the value of the allocation factor; and (4) the fixed factor allocation coordinates the supply chain when the market size is sufficiently large. We also compare fixed factor with proportional and lexicographic allocations, respectively. Furthermore, we demonstrate how the supplier can optimize his capacity level and wholesale price under fixed factor allocation.     

Market Good Flexibility in Capacity Auctions

We consider the allocation of limited production capacity among several competing agents through auctions. Our focus is on the contribution of flexibility in market good design to effective capacity allocation. The application studied is a capacity allocation problem involving several agents, each with a job, and a facility owner. Each agent generates revenue by purchasing capacity and scheduling its job at the facility. Ascending auctions with various market good designs are compared. We introduce a new market good that provides greater flexibility than those previously considered in the literature. We allow ask prices to depend both on agents’ utility functions and on the number of bids at the previous round of the auction, in order to model and resolve resource conflicts. We develop both optimal and heuristic solution procedures for the winner determination problem. Our computational study shows that flexibility in market good design typically increases system value within auctions. A further increase is achieved if each agent is allowed to bid for multiple market goods at each round. On average, the multiple flexible market goods auction provides over 95% of the system value found by centralized planning.     

Option Contracts and Capacity Management—Enabling Price Discrimination under Demand Uncertainty

We explore using an option contract as a price discrimination tool under demand uncertainty. In our capacity game model, a monopolistic supplier has to build capacity before observing the uncertain demand. The demand is generated by two potential customers, who privately know their own types. The types could be either high or low, differing in willingness to pay for each unit of demand. To discriminate between the customer types, the supplier designs option contracts so that only the high type will buy options in advance. The high type will do so because the options can hedge their risk of demand loss when capacity is tight. The supplier profits in three ways. First, the high type customers pay higher marginal prices on average. Second, the high type customers' demand is satisfied as a first priority, guaranteeing allocation efficiency. Third, the supplier can observe the number of options being purchased and so determine customer types, improving capacity investment efficiency. We compare our results to those of classical second degree price discrimination. We show that our proposed framework guarantees the same level of supplier profit even when the supplier cannot discriminate between the customers by bundling products.     

An Analysis of Scoring and Buyer‐Determined Procurement Auctions

In procurement auctions, the object for sale is a contract, bidders are suppliers, and the bid taker is a buyer. The suppliers bidding for the contract are usually the current supplier (the incumbent) and a group of potential new suppliers (the entrants). As the buyer has an ongoing relationship with the incumbent, he needs to adjust the bids of the entrants to include non‐price attributes, such as the switching costs. The buyer can run a scoring auction, in which suppliers compete on the adjusted bids or scores, or, he can run a buyer‐determined auction, in which suppliers compete on the price, and the buyer adjusts a certain number of the bids with the non‐price attributes after the auction to determine the winner. Unless the incumbent has a significant cost advantage over the entrants, I find that the scoring auction yields a lower average cost for the buyer, if the non‐price attributes are available. If the non‐price attributes are difficult or expensive to obtain, the buyer could run a buyer‐determined auction adjusting only the lowest price bid.     

Managing Downstream Competition via Capacity Allocation

Consider a supply chain with one supplier and multiple retailers. The supplier produces a single product and sells it to the retailers, who in turn sell the product to consumers. The supplier has limited production capacity, and the retailers are engaged in a Cournot competition at the consumer/market level. When the sum of the retailer orders exceeds the capacity, the supplier allocates her capacity according to a pre‐announced allocation mechanism. Two mechanisms are considered: proportional allocation and lexicographic allocation. An extensive study of the two allocation mechanisms shows that the lexicographic mechanism has the ability to dampen the competition at the retail level, increasing the profits for both the supplier and the supply chain.     

Keyword Auctions,Unit‐Price Contracts,and the Role of Commitment

Motivated by the enormous growth of keyword advertising, this paper explores the design of performance‐based unit‐price contract auctions, in which bidders bid their unit prices and the winner is chosen based on both their bids and performance levels. The previous literature on unit‐price contract auctions usually considers a static case where bidders' performance levels are fixed. This paper studies a dynamic setting in which bidders with a low performance level can improve their performance at a certain cost. We examine the effect of the performance‐based allocation on overall bidder performance, auction efficiency, and the auctioneer's revenue, and derive the revenue‐maximizing and efficient policies accordingly. Moreover, the possible upgrade in bidders' performance level gives the auctioneer an incentive to modify the auction rules over time, as is confirmed by the practice of Yahoo! and Google. We thus compare the auctioneer's revenue‐maximizing policies when she is fully committed to the auction rule and when she is not, and show that the auctioneer should give less preferential treatment to low‐performance bidders when she is fully committed.     

需求信息可部分观察时供应链中的信息汇聚效应

考虑由一个供应商和两个零售商组成的二级供应链,供应链中的上下游企业共享需求信息.假设产品的需求分布未知且需求信息只可部分观察,企业按贝叶斯法则更新自己的先验.由于需求信息在供应商处汇聚,供应商与零售商占有的信息量不同,这就可能扭曲供应商对市场需求的认识,造成供应商认为市场过度膨胀或萎缩,我们把这种现象称为信息汇聚效应.本文将给出信息汇聚效应的定义,并给出在两周期供应链中发生信息汇聚效应的充分条件,进而推出发生信息汇聚效应概率的下界.数值算例表明,在一定情况下,在供应链中发生信息汇聚的概率会很可观.     

双渠道供应链中紧俏产品升级成本分担演化博弈分析

针对一个制造商和一个零售商所组成的双渠道供应链系统,本文运用演化博弈模型研究了供应链企业在紧俏产品升级成本分担中的产能分配问题,比较了无合作机制以及引入合作机制下供应链系统的演化稳定策略。研究发现：当无合作机制时,供应链系统根据不同的产能分配范围最终会稳定在以下3种策略上：(制造商投资,零售商不投资)、(制造商不投资,零售商投资)以及(制造商不投资,零售商不投资);当引入合作机制时,供应链系统在一定的产能分配范围内最终会稳定在双方共同投资的策略上。本文还通过算例分析了无合作机制时销售新产品的增加值以及产品升级成本对演化稳定策略的影响;产能分配比例,新产品批发价格对单方面投资概率的影响;引入合作机制下分享比例对共同投资为演化稳定策略时的影响。