Information revelation in sequential auctions with uncertainties about future objects

In many auctions, buyers know beforehand little about objects to be sold in the future. Whether and how to reveal information about future objects is an important decision problem for sellers. In this paper, two objects are sold sequentially and each buyer’s valuation for the second object is k times that for the first one, and the true value of k is sellers’ private information. The authors identify three factors which affect sellers’ revelation strategies: The market’s competition intensity which is characterized by the number of buyers, buyers’ prior information about the second object, and the difference degree between two objects which is characterized by k. The authors give not only conditions under which revealing information about the second object in advance benefits the seller, but also the optimal releasing amount of information in the market with two sellers and one seller, respectively.     

数字产品动态定价方法

电子商务的定价是基于协商机制的。动态定价是指在交易过程中．在能够尽量满足购买者和销售者需求的前提下，自动进行价格优化的定价模型。需求敏感模型的价格设定算法能够帮助销售商制定根据消费者购买数量极大化总收益的可变价格决策。通过价格的折扣，可以使买卖双方都能受益。本文首先讨论了基于随机逼近的动态定价算法，指出其不足；进而提出了基于需求敏感模型的价格设定算法。研究表明，订货量的增长可以使消费者获得更低的价格，同时使销售商获得更多的收益。降低销售成本。由于网络的浏览成本不同，同时购买同一商品的消费者支付的实际价格是不同的。     

基于序次Probit模型的离散股价研究

分析股票日内价格行为需关注高频分笔交易的价格离散特征.本文使用沪市个股高频分笔交易数据,采用序次Probit模型对离散股票价格建模分析.结合我国股市限制卖空与订单驱动的制度背景,考察了交易时间间隔、交易量和订单信息对价格变动的影响.研究结果表明,序次Probit模型可捕捉价格离散特征.较长交易时间间隔可能预示坏消息,使股价下跌.相对于卖方交易量,买方交易量更具有信息含量.订单信息影响价格变动,买方较多时股价上涨,卖方较多时股价下跌.     

B2B MARKET FORMATION AND WELFARE IMPLICATION IN A BUYER'S MARKET

The emergence of B2B electronic markets has greatly changed the relative bargaining power of buyers and sellers.We study the equilibrium market structure in a buyer＇s market.We find that buyer-controlled B2B markets and neutral B2B markets have different equilibrium structures,and the emergence of B2B markets will increase social welfare,but its effect on buyers and sellers will be different：B2B markets increase the consumer surplus of the end market,but their effects on buyer and seller profits are moderated by the relative bargaining power of buyers and sellers.The profits of the side with much weaker bargaining power will decrease due to the introduction of B2B markets.     

基于财富效用的产权拍卖定价的计算模拟

通过构造财富效用函数建立了产权协商交易定价模型, 导出产权交易定价的加权边际效用零和方程.根据不同竞买人的偏好差异和对产权的预期价值差异, 运用出售方与不同竞买人的加权边际效用零和的定价方程求解出对应的协商交易均衡价格, 并选择最大均衡价格作为产权拍卖中标的参考价格.计算了不同中标价格的出售方和中标人的财富效用值和福利水平值, 比较发现只有以最大均衡价格中标产权拍卖的福利水平和市场效率最高; 若中标价格大于产权的最大预期价值, 拍卖交易的福利水平为负, 并出现所谓的"赢者灾难".对竞买人用于竞标的财富实力对均衡价格的影响作了初步探讨, 其研究结论符合常理.     

二手房组合交易匹配决策方法

针对二手房组合交易匹配决策问题,提出了一种新的决策分析方法.首先,给出二手房组合交易匹配、个体理性、不浪费、公平、帕累托占优和帕累托有效匹配方案的定义.然后,依据交易过程中卖方提供的评价信息以及买方提供的多属性期望水平和距离需求信息,给出买卖双方匹配满意度的计算方法.进一步地,在考虑匹配方案稳定性的基础上,设计了确定最优匹配方案的扩展H-R算法,并证明了其合理性.最后,给出了一个实例,说明扩展H-R算法的有效性和实用性.     

平台匹配规则对B2B交易的影响

针对交易型B2B平台不同匹配规则对B2B交易的影响展开研究。基于讨价还价理论，分别刻画了B2B平台4种匹配规则下交易双方的讨价还价行为，并深入分析了不同竞争情形下的均衡结果。通过对比，研究平台不同匹配规则在不同竞争情形中对B2B交易的影响。研究表明，B2B平台上的交易价格取决于平台的交易匹配规则；匹配规则对B2B平台上的交易额(GMV)的影响与平台收取的佣金系数息息相关；匹配规则对B2B平台上买卖双方利润的影响因买方的竞争情形及最终产品的替代程度而有所差异。此外，匹配规则对交易价格、交易额和买卖方利润的影响在不同的竞争情形中表现出不同的强度。     

基于生存分析的二手房议价持时的实验研究

生存分析(survival analysis)适用于事件持续时间及其影响因素的研究.本文以二手房议价持时为研究对象,采用实验经济学方法设计了二手房交易实验,收集二手房交易的微观数据,使用生存分析方法建立Weibull模型和Cox模型进行实证分析,研究了二手房议价持时的影响因素,得出研究结论并提出了降低二手房议价持时的合理建议.研究表明:二手房议价持时与卖方经验、中介经验、价格偏离度、卖方积极度和时间压力成反比,与买方经验成正比,与买方积极度和成交价格无显著关系.本文的创新点在于使用实验经济学方法收集数据,提高了数据的准确度和针对性,同时引入生存分析方法,为二手房议价持时研究提供了新方法与研究视角.     

基于拍卖方偏好揭示的多属性网上拍卖模型

为了揭示拍卖方偏好对多属性网上拍卖的影响,研究由一个买方和多个卖方组成的多属性网上拍卖模型.根据模型,在多属性拍卖开始时,买方需要揭示偏好信息,给出每个属性的期望值和保留值.在拍卖过程中,买方Agent和卖方Agent分别代表拍卖双方进行评标和投标,由买方Agent控制拍卖协商过程.最后用一个多人参与的算例说明了该模型的有效性.这种方法能够避免多属性加权和模型的缺点,并且可以有效的控制拍卖过程.     

价量分布下的股票流动性深度的度量

首先分析了市场深度的含义,然后从股票的价量分布角度,分别给出了股票实际成交深度、买方深度和卖方深度的新的度量方法。最后,运用实际成交深度的度量方法,描绘了我国上海股市深度的日内分时特征和日走势图,支持上海股市日内深度也大致呈现M型的观点。     

Optimal policy with a total order quantity commitment contract in the presence of a spot market

In this paper,the optimal policy is considered when the buyer faces two supply sources:one is the contract supplier from which the buyer orders over a specific contract period(say,a year) at a pre-agreed price,and the other is the spot market.However,when ordering from the contract supplier,the buyer must fulfill a pre-determined total order quantity,or the so-called definite total order quantity commitment,over the whole contract period.In other words,the commitment secures the buyer a fixed price but obliges him/her a total order quantity over the contract period.Although the spot market gives the buyer more flexibility in terms of order quantities,its prices are volatile.Such a combination of contract and spot procurements is often observed in practice.Within the contract period,there are multiple sub-periods,during each of which the buyer reviews the inventory,issues an individual order,and uses the on-hand inventory to meet the random demand.Thus,in each(ordering) period,the buyer will weigh between the current known spot price(by procuring from the spot market) and a lower future price(by waiting while consuming the remaining commitment).An optimal dual ordering policy is characterized for each period,depending on the on-hand inventory level,the spot price,and the remaining commitment quantity.The optimal policy in each period is also shown to be independent of the contract price.Through a numerical study,the inventory cost is demonstrated to be(1) insensitive to the contract price when the total commitment quantity is lower than the total expected demand over the contract period and(2) non-increasing in the variability of spot prices.     

购物中心大额购买者与小额购买者的行为差异:一项跨国和跨地区的比较研究

通过对在西安、美国和香港进行问卷调查所得数据的分析,研究了购物中心大额购买者与小额购买者之间在惠顾动机、惠顾行为和购买行为上的异同,得到三个适用性较强的结论:第一,大额购买者有较强的购买动机和较明确的购物计划,小额购买者的购买动机较弱,购物计划也比较模糊;第二,大额购买者是购买非食品类产品的主体,同时在食品购买方面也很重要,而小额购买者在购买食品方面十分重要;第三,在购买时,大额购买者比小额购买者更注重品牌.另外,还得到了一些只是在一定条件下适用的结论.最后讨论了研究结果的应用.     

Advance selling in the presence of product diffusion effect

Product diffusion refers to the phenomenon that the later demand is dependent on the early sales. To investigate how a firm’s advance selling strategy is affected by the effect of product diffusion, we consider a monopolist seller who sells a fashionable product in a market that comprises of myopic and strategic consumers over two periods (i.e., the advance selling season and the regular selling season). For a linear product diffusion effect we find that, when the effect of product diffusion is positive, the seller may set an extremely high advance selling price to induce the strategic consumers to purchase in the regular selling season, which is counter-intuitive. Moreover, the optimal procurement quantity for the seller may increase in the negative effect of product diffusion and decrease in the amount of strategic consumers. When we extend our model to consider a concave quadratic product diffusion effect, however, the optimal procurement quantity is concave in the amount of strategic consumers. Numerical studies are further presented to discuss the managerial insights.     

A STUDY ON THE CHAOS MODEL OF LIQUIDITY IN STOCK MARKET

For a Stock Market, the critical problem is the maintenance of its liquidity. Market liquidity can be described in various ways, in particular, in terms of the bid/offer spread and the market depth. Model of market liquidity dynamics has been proposed in Schmidt, A.B.' literate. In our study, we improve his model. On one hand, we think that trading volume is determined by the total number of traders, as well as the relations between the numbers of buyers and sellers, while the model of Schmidt only considers the first, item. On the other hand, Schmidt assumes that the number of "newcomers" in the market is in proportion to the current number of trades. However, we all know that the continual rise or fall of the price will also attract more buyers or sellers, that, is, "newcomers", into the market, which he has not taken for granted. We also prove it, to be a chaos model through analysis of Lyapunov exponent. On the assumption that price variation can be neglected, we discuss the conditions in which chao     

面对相同供应商时市场进入决策的博弈分析

论文研究了两个销售商在拥有各自销售市场并面对相同供应商情况下的市场进入策略. 分析了单个企业进入对方市场和两个企业同时互相进入对方市场的情况, 得出了在不同情况下供应商的最优定价策略, 以及销售商们的采购数量和销售商们在各市场上输出的产品数量. 研究发现在大多数情况下销售商们的纳什均衡解为互相进入对方市场. 但是当两个市场的市场规模和价格弹性相近的时候, 销售商们面临'囚徒困境'---虽然互相进入对方的市场是市场进入博弈的纳什均衡, 但销售商的利润值均低于各自选择不进入对方市场时的收益.     

经济复杂系统的建模研究--人工经济模型

经济系统是一个由大量自由买卖主体构成的复杂适应系统,可以用基于Agent的计算经济学（Agent-based Computational Economics, ACE）方法进行研究.本文提出了一个自主开发的ACE系统：SIMECO模型.用CRA（Classifiers, Rules, Actions）三层结构对Agent建模可以得到比传统基于简单固定规则的ACE模型更丰富的涌现行为,包括社会分工的自发形成、价格围绕某一固定区间动态波动、流的自发出现并增长.进一步,计算机模拟实验中还形成了由集体大规模Agent自发的交易行为导致的交易网络之上的商品流,它会伴随着系统的进化而不断增强,并使得SIMECO中的大量Agent能更好地适应多变的环境.     

价值互补性、数据披露与交易策略

数智经济时代,聚合不同维度的用户数据能够发掘出巨大价值。基于数据使用者互补性购买行为,构建数据披露与数据交易的两阶段博弈模型,考察数据拥有者的披露价格（获取价格）与数据经纪商的交易价格。结论显示：当经纪商都不获取数据时,最优交易价格与数据价值互补性程度呈现非线性关系。相比经纪商都不获取数据,当有一个经纪商获取数据时,如果数据价值互补性程度较高,获取数据的经纪商最优交易价格上升,没有获取数据的经纪商最优交易价格不变;如果数据价值互补性程度较低,获取数据的经纪商最优交易价格上升,没有获取数据的经纪商最优交易价格下降。相比经纪商都不获取数据,当经纪商都获取数据时,最优交易价格保持不变。通常认为,数据存在非排他性与非竞争性,会促使数据拥有者的多重销售行为。然而,本文发现,在一定的数据价值互补性程度下,数据拥有者制定最优披露价格,将只向一个数据经纪商披露数据。     

Pricing Strategies in a Supply Chain with Multi-Manufacturer and a Common Retailer Under Online Reviews

Online reviews play an important role in consumer purchasing behavior when shopping online, and in turn affect pricing strategies of sellers. We consider a supply chain consisting of three competitive manufacturers and an e-tailer, which sells multiple substitutable products procured from different manufacturers. Considering reviews in terms of quality information and fit information, we study the effect of online reviews on consumers’ purchasing decisions as well as pricing strategies of manufacturers and the e-retailer. Through modelling customer choice with online reviews based on neo-Hoteling model and solving Stackelberg game composed by manufacturers and e-tailer, we obtain the optimal equilibrium prices of manufacturers and the e-tailer. And we distinguish two kinds of effect from online reviews: effect of the opinion bias in product quality and effect of the match informativeness. Furthermore, compared to the case without online reviews, we find online reviews improve a manufacturer’s optimal wholesale price, profit as well as the retailer’s optimal retailing price, when the adjusted quality revealed by reviews is high; however, online reviews can improve the e-tailer’s optimal profit, only when the standard deviation of products’ quality revealed by reviews is large enough. Last, we get that the increase of competing manufacturers’ quantity would change the dominance between two kinds of effect from reviews on supply chain members.     

确定有批量价格折扣问题的经济订购批量的最大利润法

供货方实行有批量折扣价格，零售商如何确定订购量，才能获利最大？本文建立了基本符合新财税体制的零售商的销售利润数学模型，提出了求解利润性经济订购批量的方法．     

有限产能下智能电子产品供应链的产量博弈模型

以智能电子产品供应链为背景,针对有限产能下供应链中各方的产量决策这一问题,基于博弈论和约束极值理论,建立有限产能下供应链中的三阶段博弈模型,刻画了博弈均衡和均衡下各方的利润分配,分析了模型参数对均衡及各方利润的影响.发现上游供应商(同时也是下游制造商的竞争者)有可能利用其产能将下游制造商挤出市场,而额外订购的选项对下游制造商而言并不能完全抵消未能从上游获得足够产能分配额的影响.研究结论为有限产能下智能电子产品供应链中各方的产量竞争提供了有益的管理启示.