结合期权合约与现货市场的原材料采购风险管理

通过建立一个两时点的采购模型,研究在原材料价格波动下一个风险规避制造商的最优组合采购策略.制造商可利用期权合约购买原材料,或者从现货市场采购.研究结果表明,最优期权购买数量受到风险规避程度、期权费以及执行价格的影响.最优购买数量与决策者风险规避程度之间的关系受到期权定价影响;最优购买数量随着期权购买费或执行价格的增加而减少.最后,通过比较说明,采用组合采购策略可以提高制造商的均值-方差效用水平.     

高科技易逝品的三层联合定价与订货决策

研究高科技产业背景下三级供应链系统中原材料供应商的最优定价决策、制造商和零售商的最优定价和订货决策. 围绕高科技易逝品的售价和零部件购买价格随时间递减的特点, 分别建立以零售商和供应商为主导的三层联合定价和订货模型, 并设计了三层粒子群算法对模型进行求解. 数值实验验证了所提出算法的有效性. 对模型特点的分析结果表明, 零售商主导下的三层供应链系统能更好地提高整个供应链的效率.

     

考虑参照价格效应和消费者行为的预售及退货策略

生产商通过预售可以提前获取市场需求信息,但由于消费者产品估值的不确定性,生产商可能面临现货期大量退货的风险,制定合理的预售与退货策略成为生产商必须解决的核心问题.鉴于此,运用报童模型和消费者期望效用理论,考虑参照价格效应对消费者购买行为以及生产商预售期定价策略的影响,构建单一预售、预售退货不再出售、预售退货再出售3种策略下的期望利润模型,求解得到相应的最优生产量以及不同退货策略下的退货补偿价格取值范围,并对模型进行对比分析.研究表明:预售退货不再售与退货再售情形下,高价预售与低价预售策略中均存在一个退货补偿价格临界阈值;知情消费者中具有参照价格效应的消费者其比率决定了生产商在预售期的定价策略,且低价预售策略下,预售价格随退货补偿价格与参照价格系数的提高而降低.     

供应商一级密封报价博弈模型研究

在一个复杂的供应链系统中,由于供应商之间信息保密,那么供应商之间将会出现不完全信息竞争博弈。基于一级密封拍卖方式与供应链中供应商的投标报价的相似性,利用一级密封拍卖模型对供应商的竞争报价进行了研究,建立了供应商报价博弈模型,得到供应商的最优报价策略,定量地解决了报价中的信息不完全的问题,为供应商的报价决策提供参考。     

非对称信息下供应链库存系统Pareto优化模型

运用委托代理理论,研究了非对称信患条件下,由单供应商单分销商组成的供应链Pareto优化问题.在假定分销商所面临的需求是与销售价格有关的随机变量,以及供、销双方关于分销商销售价格信息不对称这两个前提下,将供应商作为委托人,分销商作为代理人,给出了供应商为吸引销售商选择对自己最有利的销售价格而设计的最优激励合同,比较了在不同信息条件下供销双方的最优决策.最后,给出了应用实例和灵敏度分析.     

信息不对称时有损失厌恶型零售商参与的价格补贴契约设计

运用前景理论和委托代理理论,探讨信息不对称时有损失厌恶型零售商和风险中性供应商参与的价格补贴契约设计问题.通过对零售商订货行为和供心商定价策略的研究,发现信息小对称时零售商的最优订货量小于系统的最优订货量.因而价格补贴契约不能使整个供应链达到协调.最后通过算例进行丁验证.     

基于订货阈值的供应商延期支付策略设计

针对完全信息下以供应商为核心企业的二级供应链库存系统,将全单位延期支付与部分延期支付两种手段相结合,并在考虑延期支付期限与订货量相关的条件下,设计了基于供应商视角和订货阈值的延期支付策略,从而得出此策略能使系统利润达到帕累托最优.最后,通过数值算例对相关结论进行了验证和灵敏度分析.     

供应受限和需求不确定环境下制造商技术选择

基于有限产能供应商既供应高技术原材料给自有制造商又供应给下游制造商的供应链结构,研究在供应受限和需求不确定情况下供应商的渠道分布策略和制造商的最优订购以及高低技术选择策略.结果表明:1)供应商的高技术材料生产能力充足时,供应商采用双渠道分布策略,制造商高技术材料的订购数量随供应商生产能力减少而减少,且当低技术需求低于一定临界值时,制造商选择高技术;2)当中等较短缺时,供应商仍为双渠道策略,不同于充足情况的是供应商先满足制造商的订购数量,再将剩余的生产能力用于自有生产,供应受限降低制造商的订购数量和利润;3)短缺时,当制造商的销售价格大于供应商的销售价格时,供应商采用只供应制造商策略,当满足低技术需求小于临界值时,制造商则采用高技术策略,反之,当供应商的销售价格大于制造商的销售价格时,供应商采用垄断策略,制造商只能选择低技术策略.最后,通过案例分析验证模型的有效性,所得结论对供应受限和需求不确定下供应商和制造商的运营实践具有较好的参考价值.     

风险规避型双渠道供应链的融资和定价决策

在零售商资金约束下,基于CVaR准则构建了风险规避的供应商和零售商组成的双渠道供应链的定价模型。分析了零售商资金充足时,供应商和零售商的最优决策、资金约束情况下零售商的银行借贷融资、延期支付策略和组合融资时零售商和供应商的最优决策以及零售商和供应商的风险规避程度对最优决策变量和收益的影响。通过数值分析,进一步验证了零售商和供应商的风险规避度对三种融资模式下零售商和供应商的最优决策变量和利润的影响。研究表明：资金充足和延期支付策略下最优决策变量与风险规避度的关系一致;银行借贷和组合融资下最优决策变量与风险规避度的关系一致;单一延期支付策略和组合融资优于单一银行借贷融资;组合融资比例大于一定值时,优于单纯延期支付策略。     

非对称信息下供应链库存系统Pareto 优化模型

运用委托代理理论,研究了非对称信息条件下,由单供应商单分销商组成的供应链 Pareto优化问题. 在假定分销商所面临的需求是与销售价格有关的随机变量,以及供,销双方关于分销商销售价格信息不对称这两个前提下,将供应商作为委托人,分销商作为代理人,给出了供应商为吸引销售商选择对自己最有利的销售价格而设计的最优激励合同,比较了在不同信息条件下供销双方的最优决策 .最后,给出了应用实例和灵敏度分析.

     

期权工具存在下的最优混合采购策略研究

原材料价格与需求不确定下,研究制造商混合期权合约、长期合约、现货采购的最优采购策略。利用期望效用模型建立了一个风险规避制造商的决策模型,并得到效用函数为二次效用函数下制造商的最优采购策略。研究结果表明,制造商最优采购量与风险规避度的关系取决于原材料期望价格与长期合约价格以及期权价格间的相对大小关系;当价格漂移率增加时,长期合约预定数量增加,期权购买量减小;当价格波动率或长期合约价格增加时,长期合约预定数量减少,期权购买量增加;采用混合采购策略可提高制造商的期望效用水平。     

Designing a supply contract to coordinate supplier’s production,considering customer oriented production

This paper investigates how a manufacturer, who is trying to develop a customer-oriented production system, should design a supply contract with its component supplier. The manufacturer sells its products during a selling season, with stochastic demand and tries to coordinate supplier’s production quantity, with long lead-time, in order to provide sufficient stock. Along this line, a coordinating contract based on an option mechanism is used as the supply contract. The manufacturer’s optimal order, the supplier’s optimal production and the necessary conditions for coordination between them in the mentioned environment are obtained. Also, risk and profit sharing analysis between the contract partners is provided. A numerical example is conducted to illustrate the analysis.     

Supply chain coordination with dual procurement sources via real-option contract

In a two-stage supply chain with a supplier and a manufacturer, the manufacturer can purchase a product either from the supplier or in the spot market. The spot market, however, inevitably involves price fluctuation risk and supply risk. Assuming that the manufacturer is the leader in a procurement game and offers a real-option contract to the supplier, we study the manufacturer’s optimal mixed procurement strategy that integrates the use of the real-option contract and the spot market. Moreover, we analyze the effects of the price risk and the supply risk in the spot market on market equilibrium. We show that using the real-option contract mechanism improves the overall expected profit of a supply chain and guarantees supply chain coordination in the presence of the spot market. The results also demonstrate that the price risk and the supply risk in the spot market adversely affect the manufacturer’s expected profit. On the contrary, these two risks bring benefits to the supplier.     

Three stage trade credit policy in a three-layer supply chain–a production-inventory model

The main purpose of this paper is to investigate the optimal replenishment lot size of supplier and optimal production rate of manufacturer under three levels of trade credit policy for supplier–manufacturer–retailer supply chain. The supplier provides a fixed credit period to settle the accounts to the manufacturer, while the manufacturer gives a fixed credit period to settle the account to the retailer and the retailer, in turn, also offers a credit period to each of its customers to settle the accounts. We assume that the supplier supplies the raw material to the manufacturer and sends back the defective raw materials to the outside supplier after completion of inspection at one lot with a sales price. The system always produces good items in the model. Also, we consider the idle times of supplier and manufacturer. Finally, numerical examples are provided to illustrate the behaviour and application of the model with graphical simulation.     

Capacity reservation under supply uncertainty

Shortages of input materials and components used in the production process often adversely influence sales of manufacturing firms. Manufacturers can guarantee delivery of the inputs by initiating capacity reservation arrangements with their suppliers. We study a multi-period capacity reservation contract between a manufacturer and a long-term supplier when there is uncertainty about the quantity of an input item available in the spot market. The contract requires the manufacturer to pay a fixed amount to the supplier at each period. In return, the supplier guarantees availability of the input up to a predetermined level of volume. The manufacturer can also meet some of input needs from a spot market, which may exist in the form of a B2B electronic exchange. Optimal inventory policy for the manufacturer in this dual supplier environment is derived analytically. Numerical examples are used to explore the strategies of the manufacturer and the supplier in certain and uncertain supply environments. We find that uncertain input markets lead to an increase in the share of inputs purchased in advance via long-term contracts. Capacity reservation contracts are shown to increase capacity utilization of the supplier compared to the traditional unit-price based supply contracts.     

大型客机初创期“主供”发展模式下的关系契约协调

研究我国大型客机研制初创期情景下的“主供”供应链协调.在供应商及主制造商交叉竞争的条件下,主制造商从寻求强势供应商建立合作关系入手,设计基于专有投资的关系契约,以线性分成合作关系带来的收益激励强势供应商与主制造商建立合作关系;分析不同契约状态时交叉竞争供应链的均衡决策,对关系契约的占优性、关系契约的演化等方面进行分析.研究得出,当关系契约能够自执行且满足强势供应商及弱主制造商的盈利预期时,供应商接受契约,双方合作关系达成;当强势供应商不接受关系契约,即无契约协调时,双方的最优交易量及供应价格完全由市场竞争决定.与完全竞争条件下相比,关系契约协调时供应商成本结构对其与不同主制造商最优交易量的影响呈相反趋势,且关系契约具有占优性,能够协调弱主制造商及相对强势供应商建立合作关系,并提升二者的盈利能力和竞争能力.     

基于LA型供应商的易逝品供应链价格补贴契约

针对由单个损失厌恶型供应商和单个风险中性型零售商组成的供应链系统,在前景理论框架下,研究了存在缺货损失下的基于批发价格契约和价格补贴契约的易逝品供应链协调问题。首先分析了分散化供应链系统在批发价格契约下供应商和零售商的最优决策,并将供应商的最优生产量与集中化供应链系统下的最优生产量进行了比较;从理论上严格证明了当供应商的最优生产量小于集中化供应链系统下的最优生产量时,供应商不能通过批发价格契约使得自己的生产量为集中化供应链的生产量。然后分析了在缔结政府提供的价格补贴契约下供应商和零售商的最优决策。研究结果表明,损失厌恶型供应商在批发价格契约下的最优生产量可能偏离系统最优生产量,这时政府可以通过价格补贴契约来协调整个供应链。     

Contract efficiency for a decentralized supply chain in the presence of quality improvement

In this paper, we study a joint pricing and product quality decision problem in a decentralized supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer. Although the manufacturer decides the product quality with an associated cost, the retailer decides the retail price. We aim to study and compare different contract formats for this decentralized supply chain. There is a trade‐off in the choice of contracts: simpler format contract (with a few parameters) is less complicated, but the contract efficiency is low. We start with the simplest one‐parameter contract: a wholesale price contract that serves as the benchmark. We then study how contract efficiency can be improved by adding one more parameter. Specifically, we consider three two‐parameter contracts that are commonly used in reality: two‐part tariff contract, revenue‐sharing contract, and effort cost sharing contract. We find that the contract efficiency is improved under all the three contracts, but in different ways: the improvement in contract efficiency under each of them dominates the other two when manufacturer's quality improvement effectiveness is relatively low, moderate, and high, respectively. Furthermore, through numerical examples, we find that under some cases, a choice from these three two‐parameter contracts can achieve a close‐to‐perfect efficiency (>85%). Finally, we investigate whether a combination of the three two‐parameter contracts can achieve coordination. Interestingly, we find that only the combination of effort cost sharing contract and revenue‐sharing contract can achieve coordination, whereas combinations of either of them and two‐part tariff contract cannot.     

The comparison of two procurement strategies in the presence of supply disruption

The emergency procurement strategy and the optimal allocation procurement strategy are widely used for managing supply disruption risks. In this paper, we investigate two competing manufacturers using these procurement strategies in the presence of supply disruption risks. The joint pricing and ordering decisions of both manufacturers are analyzed using the game theoretic framework. The structural property of the manufacturer with the optimal allocation procurement strategy is characterized by the reliability threshold value, which further determines the equilibrium outcomes for both manufacturers. We find the reliability threshold is a generalization of the supplier’s reliability level, which involves all the critical factors that influence manufacturers’ procurement decisions under a competitive scenario. The optimal allocation procurement strategy for manufacturer profit maximization in a non-competitive scenario does not necessarily generate competitive advantage in a competitive scenario; under a wide range of parameters, the emergency procurement strategy can produce larger profit for the manufacturer than the optimal allocation procurement strategy when all suppliers are unreliable. The effects of reliability level and costs on procurement decisions are examined using comparative studies and numerical computations.