Exploring the relationship between anthropomorphism and theory‐of‐mind in brain and behaviour

The process of understanding the minds of other people, such as their emotions and intentions, is mimicked when individuals try to understand an artificial mind. The assumption is that anthropomorphism, attributing human‐like characteristics to non‐human agents and objects, is an analogue to theory‐of‐mind, the ability to infer mental states of other people. Here, we test to what extent these two constructs formally overlap. Specifically, using a multi‐method approach, we test if and how anthropomorphism is related to theory‐of‐mind using brain (Experiment 1) and behavioural (Experiment 2) measures. In a first exploratory experiment, we examine the relationship between dispositional anthropomorphism and activity within the theory‐of‐mind brain network (n = 108). Results from a Bayesian regression analysis showed no consistent relationship between dispositional anthropomorphism and activity in regions of the theory‐of‐mind network. In a follow‐up, pre‐registered experiment, we explored the relationship between theory‐of‐mind and situational and dispositional anthropomorphism in more depth. Participants (n = 311) watched a short movie while simultaneously completing situational anthropomorphism and theory‐of‐mind ratings, as well as measures of dispositional anthropomorphism and general theory‐of‐mind. Only situational anthropomorphism predicted the ability to understand and predict the behaviour of the film''s characters. No relationship between situational or dispositional anthropomorphism and general theory‐of‐mind was observed. Together, these results suggest that while the constructs of anthropomorphism and theory‐of‐mind might overlap in certain situations, they remain separate and possibly unrelated at the personality level. These findings point to a possible dissociation between brain and behavioural measures when considering the relationship between theory‐of‐mind and anthropomorphism.     

Inferential reasoning: comparison of patients with schizophrenia and patients with traumatic brain injury

We investigated the cognitive processes underlying inferential reasoning, comparing performance of patients suffering from schizophrenia with that of patients with brain injury in an attempt to understand the nature of the social impairments in schizophrenia. Inferential reasoning on mental and physical states and second-order false belief attribution were assessed in healthy controls, in patients with schizophrenia and in brain trauma patients with predominantly ventromedial prefrontal cortex or dosolateral prefrontal cortex lesions. Our finding that ventromedial prefrontal areas are involved in general inferential reasoning casts further light on the neural structures implicated in socio-cognitive impairments in schizophrenia.     

Are there EEG correlates of mental states in animals?

The thesis of this paper emerges from the fact that mental states are generated by neural processes that also produce an associated electroencephalogram (EEG). Thus, it is logical to expect correlations between mental state and EEG. The corollary is that the EEG can serve as an index of mental state, which can be particularly useful for studies in animals, where mental states are much less accessible for objective study than in humans. Herein, I briefly review the traditional approaches that have informed our attitudes about animal mental states. Virtually all of our conclusions about mental states in animals are drawn by inference from behavioral observation, a process that is highly and unavoidably subject to anthropomorphism. Traditionally, the electroencephalogram (EEG) has been used in a crude way as an objective indication of physical and behavioral state in animals. This, however, has led to substantial controversy, because there are several situations in which EEG patterns and behavior seem to be dissociated. We not only fail to understand these dissociated states, but there are also important humane animal-welfare issues that remain unresolved because we do not fully understand the extent to which the EEG can reflect mental state. At issue is whether EEG-behavioral dissociations, to the extent that they exist, are proof that the EEG is dissociated from mental states. Powerful new EEG methods, such as topographical EEG mapping, wavelet analysis, and testing for nonlinear ('chaotic') dynamical properties and short-term serial dependencies, are now available for studying the extent to which the EEG can index thinking and feeling in humans and, by extrapolation, in animals. Critics who have become disenchanted with the utility of the EEG should at least concede that fresh approaches to old problems are now available and should therefore be thoughtfully considered. If such research does nothing more than improve the rigor of the debate over animal welfare and rights issues, it will be worth the effort.     

Cognitive and affective theory of mind share the same local patterns of activity in posterior temporal but not medial prefrontal cortex

Understanding emotions in others engages specific brain regions in temporal and medial prefrontal cortices. These activations are often attributed to more general cognitive ‘mentalizing’ functions, associated with theory of mind and also necessary to represent people’s non-emotional mental states, such as beliefs or intentions. Here, we directly investigated whether understanding emotional feelings recruit similar or specific brain systems, relative to other non-emotional mental states. We used functional magnetic resonance imaging with multivoxel pattern analysis in 46 volunteers to compare activation patterns in theory-of-mind tasks for emotions, relative to beliefs or somatic states accompanied with pain. We found a striking dissociation between the temporoparietal cortex, that exhibited a remarkable voxel-by-voxel pattern overlap between emotions and beliefs (but not pain), and the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, that exhibited distinct (and yet nearby) patterns of activity during the judgment of beliefs and emotions in others. Pain judgment was instead associated with activity in the supramarginal gyrus, middle cingulate cortex and middle insular cortex. Our data reveal for the first time a functional dissociation within brain networks sub-serving theory of mind for different mental contents, with a common recruitment for cognitive and affective states in temporal regions, and distinct recruitment in prefrontal areas.     

Evolution of human intelligence: the roles of brain size and mental construction

Two competing philosophical paradigms characterize approaches to the evolution of the human mind. One postulates continuity between animal and human behavioral capacities. The other assumes that humans and animals are separated by major qualitative behavioral and mental gaps. This paper presents a continuity model that suggests that expanded human mental capacities primarily reflect the increased information processing capacities of the enlarged human brain including the enlarged neocortex, cerebellum, and basal ganglia. These increased information processing capacities enhance human abilities to combine and recombine highly differentiated actions, perceptions, and concepts in order to construct larger, more complex, and highly variable behavioral units in a variety of behavioral domains including language, social intelligence, tool-making, and motor sequences. Environmental input, including self-generated input, interacts with mental constructional capacities to assure that developing humans acquire species-typical and culturally-specific behavioral patterns. This mental constructional model is compatible with our current understanding of differences between human and non-human primate brains, of human brain plasticity, and of the minimal genetic differences between humans and chimpanzees.     

An fMRI study of theory of mind in schizophrenic patients with "passivity" symptoms

Several studies have shown that patients with schizophrenia underactivate brain regions involved in theory of mind relative to controls during functional brain imaging. However, in most studies the samples were fairly heterogeneous in terms of clinical symptomatology. We examined a group of nine patients with first episode or recurrent episodes, who clinically presented with predominant "passivity" symptoms such as third-person auditory hallucinations or delusion of control, using a cartoon-based theory of mind task and compared activation patterns with a group of 13 healthy controls. All patients responded well to antipsychotic treatment and were only mildly symptomatic at the time of testing. The patient group showed significantly less activation of the right anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and right insula compared with controls, but greater activation in dorsal areas of the medial prefrontal cortex, right temporal areas and left temporo-parietal junction. Patients with schizophrenia with predominant "passivity" symptoms and good response to antipsychotic treatment show a markedly diverging pattern of brain activation during theory of mind task performance compared with healthy controls. These findings suggest abnormal activation of those brain areas involved in the evaluation of self-reference during mental state attribution.     

An investigation of learning strategy supporting transitive inference performance in humans compared to other species

Generalizations about neural function are often drawn from non-human animal models to human cognition, however, the assumption of cross-species conservation may sometimes be invalid. Humans may use different strategies mediated by alternative structures, or similar structures may operate differently within the context of the human brain. The transitive inference problem, considered a hallmark of logical reasoning, can be solved by non-human species via associative learning rather than logic. We tested whether humans use similar strategies to other species for transitive inference. Results are crucial for evaluating the validity of widely accepted assumptions of similar neural substrates underlying performance in humans and other animals. Here we show that successful transitive inference in humans is unrelated to use of associative learning strategies and is associated with ability to report the hierarchical relationship among stimuli. Our work stipulates that cross-species generalizations must be interpreted cautiously, since performance on the same task may be mediated by different strategies and/or neural systems.     

Neurobiological correlates of theory of mind in psychosis proneness

Theory of mind (ToM) refers to the capacity to infer one's own and other persons’ mental states. ToM abilities are compromised in schizophrenia, in association with dysfunctional activity in predominantly prefrontal brain regions. Prior behavioral studies have also suggested ToM deficits in healthy individuals with psychosis proneness (PP), although no study to date had investigated the associated neural mechanisms in such a sample. Here we used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to compare brain activation of subjects with high versus low scores on positive-dimension PP and a ToM task. The ToM task involved first and second order attribution of cognitive and affective mental states to a cartoon character based on verbal and eye-gaze cues. No between-group differences were found on behavioral performance. fMRI analyses revealed a group interaction in anterior prefrontal cortex (BA 10), with the high PP group showing significantly more activity thereof, relative to the low PP, during second order mentalizing than during first order mentalizing. Further between-group differences were observed in dorsomedial and lateral prefrontal regions (BA 46/9), with the high PP group also showing greater activation during second order mentalizing. These results suggest that subjects with positive-dimension PP require more activation of prefrontal areas to adequately mentalize. Differences in the neural mechanisms underlying ToM might be associated with vulnerability to psychosis.     

Projections privées, projections publiques : Contenus, objectifs et lieux des processus de délocalisation psychique dans les états psychotiques

The concept of projection has, in Freud writings, wide uses. By trying to clarify them, it appears: on one hand, that neurotic projection concerns representations, while psychotic projection concerns sensations, affects, and more generally somatic states; on the other hand, neurotic projection concerns especially mental elements relative to the object, while psychotic projection concerns mental elements relative to the ego. Thus, psychotic projection appears as the attribution to another ego of somatic-psychic states and representations that the ego refuses to recognize as his own experiences. Therefore, this projection always has a “public” character in the sense that, being by definition anthropomorphic, it requires the other human: another “ego”, receptacle of the projected parts of the ego. The relationship of this mechanism with the processes of « hominisation » is discussed. Grounded in this conception of projection, a hypothesis on the constitution of the category of the “subject” between the “ego” and the “object”, is outlined.     

Non-human Primate Models for Brain Disorders – Towards Genetic Manipulations <Emphasis Type="Italic">via</Emphasis> Innovative Technology

Modeling brain disorders has always been one of the key tasks in neurobiological studies. A wide range of organisms including worms, fruit flies, zebrafish, and rodents have been used for modeling brain disorders. However, whether complicated neurological and psychiatric symptoms can be faithfully mimicked in animals is still debatable. In this review, we discuss key findings using non-human primates to address the neural mechanisms underlying stress and anxiety behaviors, as well as technical advances for establishing genetically-engineered non-human primate models of autism spectrum disorders and other disorders. Considering the close evolutionary connections and similarity of brain structures between non-human primates and humans, together with the rapid progress in genome-editing technology, non-human primates will be indispensable for pathophysiological studies and exploring potential therapeutic methods for treating brain disorders.     

A bird-brain view of episodic memory

In humans, the hippocampus plays a critical role in the formation of episodic memories. Although non-human animals are unable to report whether they also re-experience past events, at least some birds and mammals exhibit ‘episodic-like’ memory characterized by an ability to recall what happened where and when. In mammals, the hippocampus interacts closely with virtually the entire neocortex to form episodic-like memories. The hippocampus receives highly processed information from high-order association areas, and thereby the rest of the neocortex. Distinct neurophysiological hippocampal rhythms (theta and sharp-wave ripples) coordinate activity between the hippocampus and high-order association areas during the encoding and retrieval of information contributing to episodic-like memories. Although recent studies have demonstrated that food hoarding birds are able to remember what food they hid where and when, neuroanatomical and neurophysiological studies suggest that there may be a fundamental difference between episodic-like memory in birds and mammals. In contrast to the mammalian hippocampus, the avian hippocampus only receives visual and olfactory input; most high-order association areas in the avian brain involved in performing functions similar to those performed by neocortical association areas do not project to the hippocampus or structures providing it with direct input. Consistent with this neuroanatomical difference, mammalian-like rhythms involved in communicating between the hippocampus and neocortical high-order association areas have not been found in birds. Collectively, this suggests that information contributing to episodic-like memory is more limited and processed in a different manner in birds when compared to mammals.     

Non-human Primate Models for Brain Disorders – Towards Genetic Manipulations via Innovative Technology

Modeling brain disorders has always been one of the key tasks in neurobiological studies. A wide range of organisms including worms, fruit ?ies, zebra?sh, and rodents have been used for modeling brain disorders. However,whether complicated neurological and psychiatric symptoms can be faithfully mimicked in animals is still debatable.In this review, we discuss key ?ndings using non-human primates to address the neural mechanisms underlying stress and anxiety behaviors, as well as technical advances for establishing genetically-engineered non-human primate models of autism spectrum disorders and other disorders.Considering the close evolutionary connections and similarity of brain structures between non-human primates and humans, together with the rapid progress in genome-editing technology, non-human primates will be indispensable for pathophysiological studies and exploring potential therapeutic methods for treating brain disorders.     

Neural time-course of the observation of human and non-human object touch

Recent functional magnetic resonance imaging studies have reported activation of primary and secondary somatosensory cortices when participants observe another person or object being touched. In this study, we used event-related potentials to examine the nature and time-course of the neural mechanisms associated with the observation of humans and non-human objects being touched. Participants were presented with short video clips of a human arm or a non-human cylindrical object being touched by an object, compared with an object moving in front of the arms or cylinders without touching them. Touch vs non-touch effects were observed in the amplitudes of the N100 and N250 components, as well as a late slow wave component (500–600 ms), measured from electrodes over primary somatosensory cortex. Human vs non-human stimulus effects were reflected in the latencies of the N100, P170 and N250 components recorded over somatosensory cortex, as well as the temporal–parietal visual-perceptual N170 and N250 components. These findings suggest that human and non-human touch observation are associated with somatosensory processing at both an early sensory-perceptual stage and a relatively late cognitive stage, both preceding and following the perceptual encoding of the humanness of stimuli that typically occurs in extrastriate visual areas.     

Making sense of another mind: the role of the right temporo-parietal junction

Human adults conceive of one another as beings with minds, and attribute to one another mental states like perceptions, desires and beliefs. That is, we understand other people using a 'Theory of Mind'. The current study investigated the contributions of four brain regions to Theory of Mind reasoning. The right temporo-parietal junction (RTPJ) was recruited selectively for the attribution of mental states, and not for other socially relevant facts about a person, and the response of the RTPJ was modulated by the congruence or incongruence of multiple relevant facts about the target's mind. None of the other three brain regions commonly implicated in Theory of Mind reasoning--the left temporo-parietal junction (LTPJ), posterior cingulate (PC) and medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC)--showed an equally selective profile of response. The implications of these results for an alternative theory of reasoning about other minds--Simulation Theory--are discussed.     

Mental state attribution, neurocognitive functioning, and psychopathology: what predicts poor social competence in schizophrenia best?

BACKGROUND: Research into mental state attribution has repeatedly shown that patients with schizophrenia are impaired in their capacity to reflect upon their own and others' beliefs, knowledge and intentions, with important confounds being executive functioning, intelligence, duration of illness, and medication. Furthermore, the extent to which impaired mental state attribution, neurocognition and psychopathology explain abnormal social behavior in schizophrenic patients has been a matter of debate. We sought to determine whether mental state attribution in schizophrenia predicts poor social competence better than "non-social" cognitive factors or psychopathology. METHODS: Intelligence, executive functioning, mental state attribution, psychopathology and social behavior were assessed in 38 patients diagnosed with schizophrenia according to DSM-IV criteria and compared with 29 healthy controls paralleled for age and sex. All patients received antipsychotic treatment, and all participants had no history of substance abuse or traumatic brain injury. RESULTS: In the entire schizophrenia group impaired mental state attribution alone accounted for about 50% of the variance of deviant social behavior, whereas the PANSS positive score and the duration of illness contributed an additional small amount of variance. This effect was even more pronounced in a subgroup of patients with at least normal intelligence, where neither the PANSS score nor the chronicity of the disorder remained significant predictors of poor social competence. Medication was not associated with any one of the neurocognitive measures including mental state attribution, psychopathology or social behavior. CONCLUSIONS: Impaired capacity to appreciate one's own and others' mental states is the single-best predictor of poor social competence in schizophrenia, and should perhaps be included in future definitions of the "core" symptomatology of schizophrenic disorders.     

Cortical control in locomotion

Although simple in appearance, bipedal (Bp) and even quadrupedal (Qp) locomotion are highly tuned motor behaviors that require coordinated control in the spatial and temporal domains of head, neck, trunk, and limbs. Seamless integration of limb movements and accompanying posture is a crucial determinant for the execution of desired locomotor movements. Recent functional brain imaging studies have shown that multiple cerebral sensorimotor cortices and the cerebellum are highly activated during human BP locomotion, suggesting that humans depend on the cerebrum and cerebellum for the elaboration of Bp locomotion. We have found that a young Japanese monkey, Macaca fuscata, acquires novel Bp walking capability with a long-term locomotor task and physical maturation. This model animal has kinematic features that are common with those of humans. Our imaging study showed that multiple cortical motor related areas are activated during monkey Bp walking, similar to that observed in humans. Furthermore, cortical inactivation studies revealed that each cortical region has an assigned functional role for the elaboration and refinements of its locomotor task. All these results show that selective yet multiple involvement of cortical motor regions are necessary for the elaboration of Bp locomotion in both humans and non-human primate models. Presumably, such multi-faceted recruitment of motor cortices is required to accommodate the limb movement and postural demands for Bp upright standing and walking. To cure locomotor dysfunctions due to CNS impairments, it is necessary to understand the CNS mechanisms involved in fine-tuning of limb movements and accompanying posture. Multi-comparative interdisciplinary studies should be initiated to reveal the CNS mechanisms involved in the control of Bp upright standing and locomotion in humans and non-human primate models.     

BACON: A tool for reverse inference in brain activation and alteration

Over the past decades, powerful MRI‐based methods have been developed, which yield both voxel‐based maps of the brain activity and anatomical variation related to different conditions. With regard to functional or structural MRI data, forward inferences try to determine which areas are involved given a mental function or a brain disorder. A major drawback of forward inference is its lack of specificity, as it suggests the involvement of brain areas that are not specific for the process/condition under investigation. Therefore, a different approach is needed to determine to what extent a given pattern of cerebral activation or alteration is specifically associated with a mental function or brain pathology. In this study, we present a new tool called BACON (Bayes fACtor mOdeliNg) for performing reverse inference both with functional and structural neuroimaging data. BACON implements the Bayes'' factor and uses the activation likelihood estimation derived‐maps to obtain posterior probability distributions on the evidence of specificity with regard to a particular mental function or brain pathology.     

Mental state attribution in schizophrenia: What distinguishes patients with “poor” from patients with “fair” mentalising skills?

PurposeAlthough many patients with schizophrenia are impaired in mental states attribution abilities, a significant number perform within normal or near-normal ranges in mental state attribution tasks. No studies have analysed cognitive or behavioural differences between patients with – to some extent – preserved mental state attribution skills and those with poor mentalising abilities.Material and methodsTo examine characteristics of “poor” and “fair” mentalisers, 58 patients with schizophrenia performed a mental state attribution task, a test of general intelligence, and two executive functioning tests. “Poor” and “fair” mentalising skills were defined according to a median-split procedure; the median score in the patient group was also within two standard deviations of the control group. In addition, patients’ social behavioural skills and psychopathological profiles were rated.ResultsPatients performing within normal or near normal ranges on the mental state attribution task had fewer social behavioural abnormalities than patients with poor mentalising abilities (even when controlled for intelligence), but did not differ in executive functioning. Fair mental state performers showed less disorganisation and excitement symptoms than poor performers. The degree of disorganisation mediated the influence of mental state attribution on social behavioural skills.ConclusionsSchizophrenia patients with (partially) preserved mentalising skills have fewer behavioural problems in the social domain than patients with poor mentalising abilities. Conceptual disorganisation mediates the prediction of social behavioural skills through mentalising skills, suggesting that disorganised patients may require special attention regarding social-cognitive skills training.     

Is there an evolutionary mismatch between the normal physiology of the human dopaminergic system and current environmental conditions in industrialized countries?

A large body of evidence has recently defined a field theory known as 'evolutionary mismatch', which derives its attributes largely from the fact that current environmental conditions are completely different from those in which the human central nervous system evolved. Current views on the evolutionary mismatch theory lack, however, any attempts to define which brain areas or neuronal circuits should be mostly involved in coding such misevolved traits and to what extent our neurobiological knowledge can be applied to the topographical localization of a specific psychopathology. In this respect the mesocorticolimbic dopaminergic circuits have long been misconceptualized as simple reward or reinforcement systems. Instead, they motivate and coordinate the functions of the higher brain areas that mediate planning and foresight and direct finalized movement in both animals and humans. These systems make animals intensely interested in exploring the world around them, but by the same means they also make them susceptible to the environmental stimuli that have been sought and consumed. It is has been speculated that the cortical dopamine targets that developed most recently in phylogeny are of particular functional value, and that the mesocorticolimbic dopaminergic system is involved in more complex integrative functions than previously assumed. In the present paper I will argue that some mental disorders may have their deep roots in the evolutionary mismatch between the normal physiology of the mesocorticolimbic dopaminergic system and the current environmental conditions in affluent societies.