基于网络服务水平的农产品供应链分销渠道模式选择

考虑网络服务水平对农产品供应链网络分销渠道模式选择的影响,提出了直销网店和代理网店两种供应链网络分销渠道,及分别构建了直销网店模式和代理网店销模式的博弈模型,得到了农业生产企业收益最大化角度下网络分销渠道模式选择策略,并对比分析了供应链收益最大化角度下网络分销渠道模式选择策略。研究发现, 当线上销售价格与线下销售价格的比值低于一定值时,无论网店的网络服务成本有多低,农业生产企业都不会开展线上销售业务; 当直销网店的网络服务成本系数适中时,农业生产企业收益最大化角度下分销渠道模式选择策略将不利于供应链整体效率的提升;网络分销渠道市场占潜在市场规模百分比能正向影响对直销网店模式的选择。     

双渠道多级分销网络库存整合优化配置

针对拥有线下、线上销售渠道的实体零售企业分销网络运作成本居高不下的现状,研究综合渠道整合和线上订单履行问题下的双渠道库存优化配置问题。在“双渠道库存独立管理、线上订单分散履行”和“双渠道库存整合管理、线上订单集中履行” 2种不同分销网络运作模式下分别建立数学模型,并利用基于实数编码的遗传算法进行求解。通过对比这2种不同运作模式下的运作成本,同时在需求波动率增加条件下对运作成本进行敏感性分析,发现渠道库存整合、线上订单集中履行方法能够将库存总费用降低17.25%,能够将库存总费用从中下游往上游转移,减缓中下游节点的库存总费用。     

基于生鲜电商新需求的农产品包装设计与创新研究

当前中国生鲜电商已经进入了新的高速发展时期,线上、线下、物流三者结合的新销售模式和“在家买菜”的消费方式已经被社会广泛接受。生鲜电商销售新模式从销售方式、配送到商品消费需求定位都与传统线上生鲜销售有巨大的差异,传统的网购农产品包装方式不能适应生鲜电商平台上已成为快速消费品的农产品的需求。生鲜电商平台和包装设计者需要改变生鲜农产品的包装设计思路,充分发挥包装的各方面功能,以适应当前生鲜电商新需求。     

考虑两阶段价格的生鲜农产品供应链协调研究

在生鲜农产品的需求受新鲜度和价格影响的背景下,考虑了生鲜农产品按照两阶段不同的价格进行销售的情况,通过引入收益共享和价格补贴的联合契约,构建了生鲜农产品的供应链协调模型,对订货量和降价时点进行了有效的决策。研究表明,联合契约能使供应链整体的利润达到集中决策时的利润;随着第二阶段销售价格在一定范围内的提高,订货量和供应链整体的利润会随之增加。最后,通过算例验证了模型的有效性,并对模型中第二阶段销售价格进行了灵敏度分析。     

生鲜农产品供应链全渠道运营模式分析

为提高生鲜农产品流通效率,增加农户收入,对“互联网+”背景下生鲜农产品供应链的全渠道零售模式进行系统分析。以合作社和超市组成的“农超对接”式供应链为研究对象,基于消费者效用理论获得渠道需求,探讨由超市自营电商平台和超市提供平台服务并与合作社分成两种渠道运营模式下各决策变量,以及合作社、超市和系统总体收益的变化,借助数值分析进行研究。结果表明,合作社通过超市实体和超市的电商平台销售生鲜农产品,超市分享一定比例的合作社在平台获得的收益。这种渠道模式对合作社、超市和供应链系统而言都是较优的选择。     

碳交易下考虑保鲜投入的生鲜品供应商渠道选择研究

针对生鲜品供应商面临的保鲜投入增加但免费碳排放有限问题,利用消费者效用理论构建了碳交易下单一实体渠道、单一网络渠道及双渠道的生鲜品供应商渠道选择模型,采用逆向归纳法得到3种渠道的供应商最优决策,并分析了不同渠道下保鲜投入成本、消费者生鲜品新鲜度偏好及碳交易价格对生鲜品供应商最优决策的影响。研究结果表明：以生鲜品供应商碳收益最大为目标,其最优渠道选择为单一实体渠道,但此时市场需求会有所减少;以生鲜品供应商利润最大为目标,其最优渠道选择为双渠道。     

保鲜成本分担下考虑零售商公平关切的生鲜品双渠道供应链协调

研究了由一个供应商和一个零售商组成的两级生鲜品供应链协调问题,零售商通过线上和线下相结合的方式销售生鲜品,供应链成员共担保鲜成本。考虑零售商的公平关切行为,构建了保鲜成本分担下的生鲜品双渠道供应链模型,在批发价契约的基础上提出了收益共享契约。研究结果表明:收益共享契约可以实现供应链的协调,且零售商的公平关切行为对供应链具有协调作用;当公平关切系数和收益共享比例在一定范围内,调整保鲜成本分担比例可以在一定程度上提高供应链成员的利润。     

考虑公平关切和消费者异质性的BOPS全渠道零售决策研究

考虑线下零售商的公平关切行为和消费者渠道选择异质性，构建了线上线下零售商合作的线上购物、线下取货（buy online and pick up in store,BOPS）全渠道零售模型。基于公平中性、线上零售商考虑线下零售商公平关切、线上零售商不考虑线下零售商公平关切三种情形，分析了传统消费者需求占比和线下零售商公平关切对供应链决策、各销售渠道需求和供应链利润的影响。研究表明，线下零售商的公平关切行为促使其降低服务水平，致使零售系统总需求和线上零售商利润降低。线上零售商不考虑线下零售商公平关切的情形下，线下零售商公平关切对线上零售商获利能力的削弱作用更为显著。线上零售商考虑线下零售商公平关切的情形下，在全渠道零售模式的发展初期，服务水平、零售价格和线上零售商利润随着传统消费者需求占比的逐渐降低而增大。随着全渠道零售模式的发展，线下零售商利润和零售系统总利润均随传统消费者占比的降低先增大后减小。当全渠道零售模式发展到一定阶段，传统消费者占比较低时，线下零售商的公平关切行为对其自身和整个零售系统的获利能力起到增强作用。线下零售商的公平关切并非总能增强其自身获利能力，在传统消费者占比较高时...     

线上平台搭便车效应下O2O渠道供应链定价策略研究

基于线上平台借助线下实体店提供服务的搭便车现象,研究了O2O渠道供应链中成员的定价策略以及搭便车效应对渠道利润的影响。考虑市场中增加线上渠道之后,同时存在线上平台和线下实体店,以及可以从这两个渠道选择的消费者组成的O2O供应链系统。利用Stackelberg博弈模型,分析了集中式下和分散式下的最优定价策略。探究了服务水平、搭便车效应系数、补贴策略对渠道定价决策、利润的影响。结果发现,线上平台通过搭便车效应,能够有效增加两个渠道的价格和利润;补贴策略使得线上平台价格提高,但却使其利润降低。说明补贴模式并不能为两个渠道对象提高收益,仅能促进双方合作。     

基于需求依赖库存的变质性商品最优库存-配送模型

超市型销售终端中商品展示水平的“选择效应”和“广告效应”,使得商品需求在很大程度上依赖其库存展示水平。针对这一实际情形,假设销售商在此类终端销售某一变质性商品,其中需求线性依赖于该商品当前库存水平,当库存水平下降到一定量时,立即从配送中心运送商品对超市库存进行补充。以单位平均利润最大化为目标构造相应的库存-配送模型,使用最优化理论讨论了模型最优解的存在性及唯一性,并提供寻求模型整体最优解的算法,以此求出最优的库存与配送方案。最后给出了数值例子,分析了模型参数变化对系统最优策略和利润的影响。     

Optimal two-level piecewise-constant price discrimination for a storable perishable product

Price differentiation over time is an additional policy that firms might consider when determining prices for perishable products. The common policy of a fixed price regardless of freshness might result in leaving some expired inventory unsold. Price differentiation can impact the demand for perishable products, which declines as the expiration date approaches. We develop an optimisation model with the goal of evaluating the monetary effectiveness of the strategy of simultaneously combining price discrimination across heterogeneous consumers with price differentiation over time for perishable inventory under separable multiplicative demand factors of price and time. Necessary optimality equations are derived, and their solutions are proved to constitute a unique global optimal solution. It is proved that an optimal pricing policy is to implement price discrimination with respect to consumers’ sensitivity to freshness, while dynamically changing the price over time, starting with a lower price at the early stages of the product’s shelf life and increasing it at a later stage. The monetary benefit that the retailer and consumer can derive from the suggested pricing policy is evaluated by comparing the model to other models in which price discrimination or dynamic pricing are not implemented. A numerical example that illustrates the significance is introduced. From the analysis of a numerical illustration of the model, it is concluded that a dynamic price discrimination policy can be approximated by an identical-to-all dynamic pricing policy in order to maximise the retailer’s profit and thus, mitigate the retailer’s risk from failing in the process of implementing price discrimination.     

考虑随机市场需求和不同博弈地位的双渠道供应链策略分析

为研究供应链成员不同博弈地位下双渠道定价及随机库存问题,分别构建制造商主导、零售商主导及双方同等博弈地位的双渠道供应链博弈模型,考察随机市场需求对定价、库存及利润的影响,分析具有不同博弈地位的供应链策略差异,并通过数值仿真探讨最佳响应策略。结果表明,主导方凭借地位优势拥有更强的价格把控权及库存调配能力,获得更高收益;制造商主导型供应链具有更强的渠道整合能力,供应链的整体利润水平高于零售商主导型;同等博弈地位情形的博弈双方可根据共同市场信息及竞争对手策略更新自身策略,具有较低的库存风险,渠道定价越低,但双重边际效应降低了双方收益;市场需求波动越大,渠道定价、库存量及供应链利润均越大,此时主导方利润增幅大于追随者。     

需求信息部分已知下生鲜品的低碳订购策略研究

为了研究需求信息缺失和低碳减排下的生鲜品企业运营决策问题,基于单周期随机库存系统,分别建立受碳限额与交易政策规制和无碳约束的分布式鲁棒优化模型,通过极大极小期望利润准则和最优化方法求解出两种情形下生鲜品的最优订购量,并运用数值算例检验需求随机因子的标准差系数和碳排放权交易价格对生鲜品订购量、利润和碳排放的影响。结果表明,存在唯一的最优库存因子使得生鲜品企业在最坏分布下的期望利润取得最大;与不受碳政策规制情形相比,生鲜品企业在碳限额与交易政策下能够实现高利润和低排放;需求信息缺失对生鲜品企业在碳限额与交易政策下期望利润的影响小于不受碳政策规制情形。     

Automobile manufacturers’ strategic choice in applying green practices: joint application of evolutionary game theory and fuzzy rule-based approach

Satisfying the end-of-life vehicle (ELV) legislations is essential for business activities in some markets. However, with the lack of similar regulations for the treatment of ELV, automotive manufacturers follow different green practices. These practices can be a complex task such as an eco-design strategy or issuing a guideline or manual for the end-of-life phase of the product. Each of these practices also has different impacts on the other players in the market. Several factors contribute to manufacturers’ gain as a result of applying green practices. The uncertainties in these features and the absence of data availability raise the difficulty in the manufacturers’ profit estimation. This paper proposes a new approach to analysing automotive manufacturers’ strategic choice in applying ELV practices considering the competitive advantages of performing these practices and the interaction between players. A joint application of evolutionary game theory and fuzzy rule-based approach is proposed to analyse the strategic behaviour of automotive manufacturers. The proposed model provides a simulation environment for testing the interaction of the different market factors and players’ action. The experimental design highlights the validity of the model and its implications. The result reveals that when we have two populations of players including the market leader in recycling initiatives and market reader; the market elements such as ‘elasticity of demand to price’ and ‘loyalty of consumers to market leader’ play an essential role in determining the stable strategy of the game.     

Should short warranty always be interpreted as low quality: the effect of brand advantages on warranty’s signalization

Brand and warranty information have been always been accepted as signals of unknown product quality. Given this, offering an attractive warranty is suggested as an effective competitive strategy. However, manufacturers with strong brand tend to provide the minimal industry standard warranty period in reality. This paper considers two competing manufacturers with different brand reputations selling their products through common retailer. The demand of products depends on price, brand and warranty period. A model for this problem is proposed when the manufacturers decide the warranty periods and the wholesale prices meanwhile the retailer decides the retail prices. We find that brand reputations influence all the optimal decisions of each party. We show that under certain condition, the strong brand manufacturer realises his profit maximisation by providing a shorter warranty compared to the weaker brand manufacturer. To a certain extent, this brand advantage modifies signalisation of manufacturers’ warranty. Several numerical examples and managerial insights are presented and used to illustrate the model presented in this paper.     

非对称信息下考虑政府补贴的绿色供应链博弈模型

考查由1个生产商和1个零售商构成的两级绿色供应链系统,绿色产品的市场需求由产品价格和产品绿色度共同决定。假设消费者对绿色产品的偏好程度是非对称信息,生产商无法准确预测消费者的绿色偏好。构建3种不同情形下的博弈模型,得到3种情形下的批发价、产品绿色度、零售价、生产商利润和零售商利润的最优解。比较分析3种情形下最优解的不同变化,并分析消费者的绿色偏好程度对最优决策和利润产生的不同影响。     

The effect of supply and demand uncertainties on the optimal production and sales plans for new products

When introducing a new product, firms face a hierarchy of decisions at the strategic and operational levels including capacity sizing, time to market or starting sales, initial inventory required by the product’s release time and production management in response to changes in the demand (hereafter referred to as production-sales policies). The goal of this paper was to show the importance of considering both supply and demand uncertainties in the determination of the production-sales policy which has been overlooked in the existing literature. More specifically, we test two main hypotheses: (1) ignoring supply and demand uncertainties may lead to potentially incorrect decisions; and, (2) the decision could be different if risk is used as the primary performance measure instead of the commonly used expected (mean) profit. We perform extensive experimentation with a Monte Carlo simulation model of the stochastic supply-restricted new product diffusion and use different statistical procedures, namely, the Welch’s t-test and a nonparametric double-bootstrap method to compare the average and percentiles of the profit for different policies, respectively. The results indicate that the correctness of the two hypotheses depends on the diffusion speed, consumers’ backlogging behaviour, production capacity, price and variable production and inventory costs. The findings also have important implications for managers regarding market entry time, parameter estimation, production strategy and the implementation of the proposed model.     

基于消费者风险规避的社区支持农业合作机制

研究社区支持农业体系中投资型消费者的风险规避度对生鲜农产品公司收益和决策以及其合作机制的影响。构建了新鲜度和价格共同影响的需求函数和风险规避的投资型消费者效用函数,以及生鲜农产品公司和投资型消费者的收益共享函数,通过求解得到完全和不完全信息情况下最优的分红比例、投入的保鲜努力以及各参与者的利润,并对其进行了数值仿真。发现在完全信息情况下,存在帕累托最优结果;在不完全信息情况下,存在均衡解且随着投资型消费者风险规避度的增加,消费者的收益逐渐减少,公司的收益和投入的保鲜努力都增大。在面对风险规避的消费者时,其风险规避度越大公司应投入的保鲜努力也越大,以此来保证和消费者的长久合作,保障社区支持农业的发展。     

Joint pricing and advertising strategy with reference price effect

Consumers are susceptible to reference price effects when they make purchase decisions for a certain product. Meanwhile, the sales price and advertisement are the determinable factors that have impact on consumers’ reference price which are also fundamental marketing strategies. Therefore, how to determine an appropriate sales price and advertising effort level to maximise firms’ profits is an essential task. A joint pricing and advertising problem for a monopolistic firm with consideration of reference price effect is investigated, where consumer demand rate is price-sensitivity and depends on the gap between the sales price and the reference price in consumers’ mind. An optimisation model is established to maximise the firm’s total profit by making a joint pricing and advertising strategy. The static and dynamic joint strategies are obtained by applying Pontryagin’s maximum principle. Results show that the dynamic strategies dominate the static ones. Furthermore, the dynamic pricing and dynamic advertising strategies are strategic complements. Additionally, the length of the sales period plays a key role in determining the superiority of the two dynamic strategies. Specifically, a relatively short sales period highlights the value of the dynamic advertising while a long sales period strengthens the function of the dynamic pricing.     

基于信号博弈的包装企业品牌策略决策研究

为解决向食品制造商提供包装的包装企业面临的品牌策略决策问题,将消费者观察到的包装企业生产外包装的材质以及设计水平作为传递产品质量的信号,运用信号博弈理论,以包装企业与产品制造商得益最大为目标,研究并分析了合并均衡、分离均衡和混合均衡下的包装企业品牌策略结果。结果表明,不完全信息博弈下包装企业的最优品牌策略决策为：对高质量产品的制造商提供并实施混合均衡下的高档次品牌策略,对于低质量产品的制造商提供并实施分离均衡下的低档次品牌策略。对比完全信息博弈结果,包装企业的品牌策略能作为信号,传递且有效区分产品制造商的产品质量。虽然高档次的品牌策略能帮助制造商将低质量产品伪装成高质量产品进入市场,但这种情况下消费者买到高质量产品的可能性反而有所提高。