Economic growth, liquidity, and bank runs

We construct an endogenous growth model in which bank runs occur with positive probability in equilibrium. In this setting, a bank run has a permanent effect on the levels of the capital stock and of output. In addition, the possibility of a run changes the portfolio choices of depositors and of banks, and thereby affects the long-run growth rate. These facts imply that both the occurrence of a run and the mere possibility of runs in a given period have a large impact on all future periods. A bank run in our model is triggered by sunspots, and we consider two different equilibrium selection rules. In the first, a run occurs with a fixed, exogenous probability, while in the second the probability of a run is influenced by banks’ portfolio choices. We show that when the choices of an individual bank affect the probability of a run on that bank, the economy both grows faster and experiences fewer runs.     

Bank runs as coordination failures: An experimental study

We use experimental methods to investigate what factors contribute to breakdowns in coordination among a bank’s depositors. Subjects in our experiment decide whether to leave their money deposited in a bank or withdraw it early; a bank run occurs when there are too many early withdrawals. We explore the effects of adding uncertainty about fundamental withdrawal demand and of changing the number of opportunities subjects have to withdraw. Our results show that (i) bank runs are rare when fundamental withdrawal demand is known but occur frequently when it is stochastic, and (ii) subjects are more likely to withdraw when given multiple opportunities to do so than when presented with a single decision. For the multiple-opportunity case, we evaluate individual withdrawal decisions according to a set of simple cutoff rules. We find that the cutoff rule corresponding to the payoff-dominant equilibrium of the game, which involves Bayesian updating of probabilities, explains subject behavior better than other rules.     

Bank incentives, contract design and bank runs

We study the Diamond-Dybvig [Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity, J. Polit. Econ. 91 (1983) 401-419] model as developed in Green and Lin [Implementing efficient allocations in a model of financial intermediation, J. Econ. Theory 109 (2003) 1-23] and Peck and Shell [Equilibrium bank runs, J. Polit. Econ. 111 (2003) 103-123]. We dispense with the notion of a bank as a coalition of depositors. Instead, our bank is a self-interested agent with a technological advantage in record-keeping. We examine the implications of the resulting agency problem for the design of bank contracts and the possibility of bank-run equilibria. For a special case, we discover that the agency problem may or may not simplify the qualitative structure of bank liabilities. We also find that the uniqueness result in Green and Lin [Implementing efficient allocations in a model of financial intermediation, J. Econ. Theory 109 (2003) 1-23] is robust to our form of agency, but that the non-uniqueness result in Peck and Shell [Equilibrium bank runs, J. Polit. Econ. 111 (2003) 103-123] is not.     

综合收益最优的贷款组合鲁棒优化模型

商业银行信贷经营的基本目标是资金来源与运用在效益性、安全性和流动性上的“三性”平衡,而贷款组合优化配置是商业银行维持或达到资金“三性”平衡的有效方式,也是商业银行信贷经营管理中的重要内容.而贷款的预期收益具有不确定性,如果简单地假设其预期收益率往往会出现与实际脱节的情况,因此需要考虑贷款期间可能出现的变化.针对这一特征,考虑构建风险调整后资本收益率(RAROC)最优的贷款组合鲁棒优化模型.根据某商业银行实际经营数据进行数值分析,结果表明该模型具有鲁棒性,不仅能够兼顾贷款组合综合收益以及未来收益的不确定性因素,同时还可以在贷款组合风险约束范围内获得最大收益,为商业银行贷款优化配置管理提供有效可行的决策依据.     

商业银行分支机构贷款组合优化配置模型及市场化管理思路

以商业银行的经营性分支机构为研究对象,用信贷客户综合收益和经济资本占用系数确定银行的收益目标和约束条件,建立了基于风险调整后资本收益率(RAROC)最优的贷款组合优化配置模型,改进了以往贷款组合模型需要假设收益目标或风险承受度的缺陷。探讨了综合收益RAROC最大化目标下的贷款组合"软约束"市场化管理方法,有效补充了当前商业银行行政色彩浓厚的规模"硬约束"计划管理方式。     

Interbank Lending, Liquidity and Banking Crises

In this paper, we show that abandoning the Diamond and Dybvig hypothesis of a unique bank representing the entire banking system gives rise to the possibility of endogenizing the interbank exchanges. In a system characterized by uncertainty regarding the moment of withdrawal of deposits, access to interbank liquidity decreases the bank risk of failure and bank runs. The possibility, moreover, to invest excess liquidity in the interbank market at a positive interest rate increases expected bank profits.
(J.E.L.: E52, G21).     

Does the BRRD affect the retail banking business model in the Euro area?

This paper discusses how the introduction of the Banking Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) in European Union legislation may change the retail banking business model, which is the most prevalent model in Southern European countries. The main point is the treatment of deposits in the BRRD. Uninsured deposits may be written down or converted into equity in case of resolution of a bank. This contrasts with the treatment of other short-term liabilities, in particular repurchase agreements. Short maturity repos are excluded from the bail-in, regardless of their size. Also, liabilities related to securities lending and derivatives are given privileged treatment. It is argued that this will be an advantage for wholesale and investment banks, which use these types of short-term funding largely to finance asset purchases. Moreover, it will severely hit retail banking business models of various types by undermining the trust of depositors in the bank, causing bank runs whenever rumours circulate about financial distress situations, thus increasing its cost of funding and lowering the value of its shares. Therefore, to avoid runs on repos, runs on banks are resurging.     

Fuzzy value-at-risk and expected shortfall for portfolios with heavy-tailed returns

This paper is concerned with linear portfolio value-at-risk (VaR) and expected shortfall (ES) computation when the portfolio risk factors are leptokurtic, imprecise and/or vague. Following Yoshida (2009), the risk factors are modeled as fuzzy random variables in order to handle both their random variability and their vagueness. We discuss and extend the Yoshida model to some non-Gaussian distributions and provide associated ES. Secondly, assuming that the risk factors' degree of imprecision changes over time, original fuzzy portfolio VaR and ES models are introduced. For a given subjectivity level fixed by the investor, these models allow the computation of a pessimistic and an optimistic estimation of the value-at-risk and of the expected shortfall. Finally, some empirical examples carried out on three portfolios constituted by some chosen French stocks, show the effectiveness of the proposed methods.     

A bank runs model with a continuum of types

We consider a bank runs model à la Diamond and Dybvig (1983) [3] with a continuum of agent types, indexed by the degree of patience. Much of our understanding based on the two-type model must be modified. The endogenous determination of a cutoff type is central to the analysis. In the case where the bank can credibly commit to a contract, the optimal contract results in socially excessive early withdrawals in every equilibrium of the post-deposit subgame. Thus, even at the best equilibrium the socially efficient outcome is not achieved, and agents? behavior exhibits features of a bank run. In the case where commitment is not possible, there are strictly more early withdrawals and strictly lower welfare than the full-commitment equilibrium.     

Liquidity risk and bank portfolio management in a financial system without deposit insurance: Empirical evidence from prewar Japan

Using data from prewar Japan, this paper investigates the impact of a liquidity shock induced by depositors' behavior on bank portfolio management during financial crises in a system lacking deposit insurance. It is found that banks reacted to the liquidity shock sensitively through an increase in their cash holdings not by liquidating bank loans but by selling securities in the financial market. Moreover, banks exposed to local financial contagion adjusted the liquidity of their portfolio mainly by actively selling and buying their securities in the financial market. Finally, there is no evidence to conclude that the existence of the lender of last resort mitigated the liquidity constraints in bank portfolio adjustments.     

Contagious bank runs

We present a model of the propagation process of bank runs. A bank failure alone is not sufficient to trigger a panic. In accord with the empirical evidence, runs become contagious only during periods of macroeconomic instability. In addition, we make a clear distinction between illiquidity and insolvency as possible causes of bank failures. We also show that, despite the possibility of runs, the deposit contract is superior to autarky.     

Multi-period portfolio optimization under possibility measures

A single-period portfolio selection theory provides optimal tradeoff between the mean and the variance of the portfolio return for a future period. However, in a real investment process, the investment horizon is usually multi-period and the investor needs to rebalance his position from time to time. Hence it is natural to extend the single-period fuzzy portfolio selection to the multi-period case based on the possibility theory. In this paper, we propose the possibilistic expected value and variance for the terminal wealth with fuzzy forms after T periods by using the central value operator. Classes of multi-period possibilistic mean-variance models are formulated originally under the assumption that the proceeds of risky assets are fuzzy variables. Besides, we apply a particle swarm optimization algorithm to solve the proposed multi-period fuzzy portfolio selection models. A numerical example is given to illustrate the performance of the proposed models and algorithm.     

Private money and bank runs

Abstract This paper studies bank runs in a model with private money. We show that allowing claims on demand deposits to circulate as a medium of exchange can help prevent bank runs. In our model, there exists a unique banking equilibrium where no one demands early withdrawals of real goods and agents in need of liquidity use private money to finance consumption. With private money, the unique equilibrium not only eliminates bank runs but also improves banking efficiency. The implications of our model are consistent with the evidence from the banking history of the United States.     

Optimal diversification,bank value maximization and default probability

This study argues that the optimal level of diversification for the maximization of bank value is asymmetrical and depends on the business cycle. During times of expansion, systematic risks are relatively low; hence, the effect of raising systematic risks from portfolio diversification is slight. Consequently, the benefit of reducing individual risks dominates any loss from raising systematic risks, leading to a higher value for a bank by holding a diversified portfolio of assets. On the contrary, during times of recession, systematic risks are relatively high. It is more likely that the loss from raising systematic risks surpasses the benefit of reducing individual risks from portfolio diversification. Consequently, more diversification leads to lower bank values. Finally, some empirical evidence from the banks in Taiwan is provided.     

The influence of government ideology on monetary policy: New cross‐country evidence based on dynamic heterogeneous panels

Using data of 23 OECD countries over the 1980–2005 period, we examine whether government ideology affects monetary policy, conditional on central bank independence. Unlike previous studies in this line of literature, we estimate central bank behavior using forward‐looking and real‐time data in Taylor rule models and use estimators that allow for heterogeneity across countries. Our models with heterogeneous slope coefficients for the full sample do not suggest partisan effects. We also do not find evidence that central bank behavior is conditioned by the interaction of the ideology of the incumbent government and the electoral calendar.     

MICROECONOMIC FOUNDATION OF LENDER OF LAST RESORT FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF PAYMENTS*

We construct a model to clarify the mechanism by which the lender of last resort (LLR) can prevent bank runs. In our model, a bank has both the function of facilitating payments in which inside money is settled using outside money and the function of financial intermediation using a deposit contract. The deposit contract might lead to a bank run, and might even contribute to an efficient allocation. Therefore, to consider the liquidity supply by the LLR, we introduce the deposit contract as a factor of instability in the banking model. We show that the LLR can assist in the recovery of both the efficiency and stability of the financial system.     

THE MULTIPRODUCT DEPOSITORY FIRM, INTEREST-BEARING TRANSACTION BALANCES, INTEREST-BEARING RESERVES, AND UNCERTAINTY

In this paper a model of depository firm behavior is developed in which the depository institution acts as a multiple product producer. The multi-product model is an application of the general theory of value to the particular case of depository firms. It generalizes the theory of bank behavior to include production and cost aspects of banking activity as well as its financial aspects and reconciles the rivaling intermediary and firm-theoretic views on depository institutions. By so doing, it bridges the gap between models which treat depository firms as mere portfolio holders and those which analyze the check clearance function in isolation. Risk aversion, production function constraint, jointness, and multiple sources of uncertainty are simultaneously introduced. The model is used to analyze the effects of interest payment on transaction balances, interest payment on reserves of depository institutions by the Central bank, and the Central bank policy swings.     

X-Efficiency and Productivity Change in Australian Banking

This paper investigates X -efficiency and productivity change in Australian banking between 1995 and 1999 using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and Malmquist productivity indexes. It differs from earlier studies by examining efficiency by bank type, and finds that regional banks are less efficient than other bank types. The study concludes that diseconomies of scale set in very early and hence are not a sufficient basis on which to allow mergers between large banks to proceed. Total factor productivity in the banking sector was found to have increased by an average annual 7.6 per cent between 1995 and 1999. All of the productivity increase was due to technological advance shifting out the frontier. The banking sector's performance was less efficient relative to the frontier in 1999 than it had been in 1995.     

Bank privatization in Argentina: A model of political constraints and differential outcomes

Although case studies suggest that political constraints affect bank privatization transactions, these constraints have been neither theoretically modeled nor econometrically tested. This paper presents a simple model of the tradeoffs governments and buyers face during these transactions. In addition to price, the buyer is concerned about solvency and profitability following privatization. Similarly, politicians are concerned about layoffs and service coverage. We apply the framework to provincial bank privatizations in Argentina, finding that provinces with fiscal problems were willing to accept more layoffs and guarantee more of the privatized bank's portfolio in return for a higher price.     

Japanese Bank Productivity, 2007–2012: A Dynamic Network Approach

We estimate a dynamic network (DN) directional output distance function for 100 Japanese banks operating during 2007–2012. Network production occurs in that deposits and other funds raised are produced as intermediate products in stage 1 and those intermediate products are used to generate a portfolio of assets in stage 2. The dynamic technology links production periods via nonperforming loans (NPL) and carryover assets, which take the form of excess reserves. Carryover assets expand the future production possibility set while NPL shrink future production possibilities. We extend previous DN methods to measure the performance of three types of Japanese commercial banks: city banks, regional banks and second regional banks. We test for and find differences in the three bank technologies relative to a common technology. Such differences are likely due to different institutional and regulatory structures. Unlike previous DN studies, we also allow for a non‐uniform abatement factor between previously‐produced NPL and other inputs in stage 1 and between performing loans and NPL in the current period. Measured productivity change is greater when each bank faces their own group technology rather than the pooled technology consisting of all bank types.