Appraisals, Rather Than Unpleasantness or Muscle Movements, Are the Primary Determinants of Specific Emotions.

Appraisal theorists can agree with several points in L. Berkowitz and E. Harmon- Jones's (see record 2004-15096-001) analysis of anger generation. However, evidence indicates that appraisals such as control potential and other-person agency are most often key determinants of whether anger vs. another negative emotion results from an undesired event, and there are functional reasons why this should be so. I suggest that cognitive-neoassociationist theory may benefit from going beyond anger and fear to incorporate additional emotions (with their characteristic action tendencies and appraisal determinants) that can occur in response to undesired events, building on work by emotion researchers. Emotion theory can benefit from devoting more attention to primitive emotion-generation processes, as urged by L. Berkowitz and E. Harmon-Jones. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Analyzing Anger: How to Make People Mad.

Comments on the article by L. Berkowitz and E. Harmon-Jones (see record 2004-15096-001). Does simple displeasure cause anger without appraisals or agency attributions? The authors offer 8 observations: (a) Appraisal theory also predicts that displeasure promotes anger, (b) An emotion of frustration can be usefully distinguished from anger, (c) Aggressive reactions to norm violations among animals suggest that they too distinguish bad behavior from bad outcomes, (d) Attributions to agency are perceptual and automatic in social situations, (e) It is tenuous to argue that agency attributions are enacted in angry aggression, but absent in anger elicitation. (f) The contextualized meanings of expressive movements, rather than movements themselves, elicit emotion, (g) Expressions may be better seen as constituents than as causes of emotions, (h) Cognitive components of emotion generally come before, not after, eliciting events. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Anger, Frustration, and Aversiveness.

Comments on the literature review by Berkowitz and Harmon-Jones (see record 2004-15096-001) that evaluates leading theories of anger for which they offer their own theory of aggression as an integration. The current author suggests that their theory leads to a number of empirical questions, which he examines, and he suggests that individual differences should also be considered in formulating theories of aggression. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Conceptual, methodological, and empirical ambiguities in the linkage between anger and approach: Comment on Carver and Harmon-Jones (2009).

C. S. Carver and E. Harmon-Jones (see record 2009-02580-003) have made an important contribution to the understanding of anger, its linkage to higher order dimensions of emotion, and potential neurobiological substrates. The authors believe, however, that their model and future research conducted to test it would be improved by a more precise explication and parsing of the primary constructs, a clearer articulation of the relation between anger and approach, and the use of methods for assessing brain activation that are more precise than the electroencephalogram. Neuroimaging studies reviewed generally fail to corroborate several features of their model. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Locating anger in the hierarchical structure of affect: Comment on Carver and Harmon-Jones (2009).

C. S. Carver and E. Harmon-Jones (see record 2009-02580-003) have presented considerable evidence to support their argument that “anger relates to an appetitive or approach motivational system, whereas anxiety relates to an aversive or avoidance motivational system” (p. 183). However, they have failed to take sufficient account of the extensive psychometric data indicating that anger is strongly related to anxiety (and other negative affects) and more weakly associated with the positive affects. Considering all of the available evidence, the most accurate conclusion is that anger shows both approach and avoidance properties. Moreover, viewed in the context of the hierarchical structure of affect, some evidence suggests that the nonspecific component of anger (i.e., its shared variance with the other negative affects) is primarily related to the aversive or avoidance motivational system, whereas its specific component (i.e., its unique qualities that distinguish it from other negative affects) has a stronger link to the appetitive or approach system. The author concludes by considering the broader implications of these data for affective structure. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Limitations of the motivational intensity model of attentional tuning: Reply to Harmon-Jones, Gable, and Price (2011).

In an integrative review, we concluded that implicit affective cues—rudimentary stimuli associated with the onset of arousing positive or negative emotional states and/or with appraisals that the environment is benign or threatening—automatically moderate the scope of attention by Friedman & F?rster (see record 2010-17510-008). In their comment, Harmon-Jones, Gable, and Price (see record 2011-08310-001) contended that their own recent research, aimed at demonstrating that motivational intensity moderates the relationship between affective state and attentional tuning, requires a tempering of our conclusions. However, Harmon-Jones et al. portrayed these conclusions neither accurately nor comprehensively and offered an insufficient critical assessment of their own competing account. More important, they failed to establish a compelling alternative explanation for the multitude of specific findings we reviewed (Friedman & F?rster, 2010). Therefore, although the work of Harmon-Jones et al. is provocative, it leaves critical issues unresolved and does not yet demand a reconsideration of either our basic assumptions or our overall conclusions. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Appraisal-emotion relationships in daily life.

Using a daily process design, the present study examined relationships between momentary appraisals and emotional experience based on Smith and Lazarus' (1993) theory of emotions (1993). Nine times a day for 2 weeks, participants (N = 33, 23 women) recorded their momentary experience of 2 positive emotions (joy, love) and 4 negative emotions (anger, guilt, fear, sadness) and the core relational theme appraisal contents Smith and Lazarus hypothesized as corresponding to these emotions. A series of multilevel modeling analyses found that the hypothesized relationships between appraisal contents and these emotions were stronger than relationships between contents and other emotions, although appraisals were related to other emotions in many cases. Moreover, there were some individual differences in the strength of these relationships. These results suggest that there are no one-to-one relationships between appraisal contents and specific emotional experiences, and that specific emotions are associated with different appraisal contents, and that specific appraisals are associated with different emotions. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The moral emotions: A social–functionalist account of anger, disgust, and contempt.

Recent research has highlighted the important role of emotion in moral judgment and decision making (Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001; Haidt, 2001). What is less clear is whether distinctions should be drawn among specific moral emotions. Although some have argued for differences among anger, disgust, and contempt (Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 1999), others have suggested that these terms may describe a single undifferentiated emotional response to morally offensive behavior (Nabi, 2002). In this article, we take a social–functionalist perspective, which makes the prediction that these emotions should be differentiable both in antecedent appraisals and in consequent actions and judgments. Studies 1–3 tested and found support for our predictions concerning distinctions among antecedent appraisals, including (a) a more general role for disgust than has been previously been described, (b) an effect of self-relevance on anger but not other emotions, and (c) a role for contempt in judging incompetent actions. Studies 4 and 5 tested and found support for our specific predictions concerning functional outcomes, providing evidence that these emotions are associated with different consequences. Taken together, these studies support a social–functionalist account of anger, disgust, and contempt and lay the foundation for future research on the negative interpersonal emotions. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Correction to Hobfoll et al. (2003).

Reports errors in the original article by S. E. Hobfoll et al (Journal of Personality & Social Psychology, 2003[Mar], Vol 84[3], 632-643). On page 643, in the tables for Appendixes B and C, the variables labeled with "T3" should all read "T2." In Appendix C, the column headings "Nonlinear model" should read "Nonlinear model T1"; the column headings "Linear model" should read "Nonlinear model T2." These changes do not affect the findings, interpretations, or conclusions. (The following abstract of this article originally appeared in record 2003-01588-018): The authors examined a dynamic conceptualization of stress by investigating how economic stress, measured in terms of material loss, alters women's personal and social resources and how these changed resources impact anger and depressive mood. Resource change in women's mastery and social support over 9 months was significantly associated with changes in depressive mood and anger among 714 inner city women. Greater loss of mastery and social support was associated with increased depressive mood and anger. Loss of mastery and social support also mediated the impact of material loss on depressive mood and anger. Resource loss and worsening economic circumstances had more negative impact than resource gain... (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

What does it mean to be angry at yourself? Categories, appraisals, and the problem of language.

According to appraisal theorists, anger involves a negative event, usually blocking a goal, caused by another person. Critics argue that other-agency is unnecessary, since people can be angry at themselves, and thus that appraisal theory is wrong about anger. In two studies, we compared anger, self-anger, shame, and guilt, and found that self-anger shared some appraisals, action tendencies, and associated emotions with anger, others with shame and guilt. Self-anger was not simply anger with a different agency appraisal. Anger, shame, and guilt almost always involved other people, but almost half of the occurrences of self-anger were solitary. We discuss the incompatibility of appraisal theories with any strict categorical view of emotions, and the inadequacy of emotion words to capture emotional experience. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

More Thoughts About Anger Determinants.

Replies to comments (see record 2004-15096-002, 2004-15096-003, 2004-15096-004, and 2004-15096-005) made about the current authors' article on anger (see record 2004-15096-001). The authors propose that (a) although strong negative affect can evoke anger without appraisals, appraisals after the initial reactions conceivably might influence the later emotional experience independently of the felt displeasure; (b) maintaining that particular stimuli can automatically elicit anger does not imply that anger will be dominant; and (c) anger is frequently blended with other negative emotions such as fear. A particular stimulus' context can affect this stimulus' meaning and thus determine its effect, but if the stimulus' meaning is held constant, the stimulus will evoke the response to which it is connected. Carefully controlled experiments are required to resolve the issues raised. The theories advanced should offer testable postulates rather than untestable assertions of what processes supposedly were operating. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Anger and approach: Reply to Watson (2009) and to Tomarken and Zald (2009).

C. S. Carver and E. Harmon-Jones (see record 2009-02580-003) reviewed evidence consistent with the idea that anger arises from a behavioral approach system. Commentary on that article by A. J. Tomarken and D. H. Zald (see record 2009-02580-005) raised questions about the many elements involved in acts of approach and limitations on what information can be provided by electroencephalograms. Commentary by D. Watson (see record 2009-02580-004) raised questions about the extensive psychometric evidence linking the negative affects. This article responds briefly to these issues. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Moral anger, but not moral disgust, responds to intentionality.

We propose that, when people judge moral situations, anger responds to the contextual cues of harm and intentionality. On the other hand, disgust responds uniquely to whether or not a bodily norm violation has occurred; its apparent response to harm and intent is entirely explained by the coactivation of anger. We manipulated intent, harm, and bodily norm violation (eating human flesh) within a vignette describing a scientific experiment. Participants then rated their anger, disgust, and moral judgment, as well as various appraisals. Anger responded independently of disgust to harm and intentionality, whereas disgust responded independently of anger only to whether or not the act violated the bodily norm of cannibalism. Theoretically relevant appraisals accounted for the effects of harm and intent on anger; however, appraisals of abnormality did not fully account for the effects of the manipulations on disgust. Our results show that anger and disgust are separately elicited by different cues in a moral situation. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Fear, anger, and risk.

Drawing on an appraisal-tendency framework (J. S. Lerner & D. Kelmer, 2000), the authors predicted and found that fear and anger have opposite effects on risk perception. Whereas fearful people expressed pessimistic risk estimates and risk-averse choices, angry people expressed optimistic risk estimates and risk-seeking choices. These opposing patterns emerged for naturally occurring and experimentally induced fear and anger. Moreover, estimates of angry people more closely resembled those of happy people than those of fearful people. Consistent with predictions, appraisal tendencies accounted for these effects: Appraisals of certainty and control moderated and (in the case of control) mediated the emotion effects. As a complement to studies that link affective valence to judgment outcomes, the present studies highlight multiple benefits of studying specific emotions. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The effects of subliminal anger and sadness primes on agency appraisals.

Two studies examined whether appraisals can be differentially affected by subliminal anger and sadness primes. Participants from Singapore (Experiment 1) and China (Experiment 2) were exposed to either subliminal angry faces or subliminal sad faces. Supporting appraisal theories of emotions, participants exposed to subliminal angry faces were more likely to appraise negative events as caused by other people and those exposed to subliminal sad faces were more likely to appraise the same events as caused by situational factors. The results provide the first evidence for subliminal emotion-specific cognitive effects. They show that cognitive functions such as appraisals can be affected by subliminal emotional stimuli of the same valence. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Toward an Understanding of the Determinants of Anger.

Research bearing on several popular conceptions of the major determinants of anger arousal indicates that the particular appraisals often identified as causes of anger frequently only serve to affect the intensity of the anger that is generated. Research into effects of physical pain or other physically unpleasant conditions or involving social stresses suggests that decidedly aversive conditions are a major spur to anger. Experiments are also reviewed showing that anger-related muscular movements can also lead to anger-related feelings, memories, cognitions, and autonomic responses. Alternative explanations for the findings are discussed. The authors urge emotion theorists to widen their methodology and analyses so that they give careful, detailed attention to the many different factors that can influence anger. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Anger and posttraumatic stress disorder symptoms in crime victims: A longitudinal analysis.

Among trauma-exposed individuals, severity of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) symptoms is strongly correlated with anger. The authors used 2 longitudinal data sets with 282 and 218 crime victims, respectively, to investigate the temporal sequence of anger and PTSD symptoms following the assault. Cross-lagged regression analyses indicated that PTSD symptoms predicted subsequent level of anger, but that anger did not predict subsequent PTSD symptoms. Testing alternative models (common factor model, unmeasured 3rd variable model) that might account for spuriousness of the relation strengthened confidence in the results of the cross-lagged analyses. Further analyses suggested that rumination mediates the effect of PTSD symptoms on anger. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Anger and social appraisal: A "spicy" sex difference?

The central objective of this study was to investigate the role of social appraisal in sex differences in anger expression. Anger expression was inferred from the amount of hot sauce given to the person who induced anger. Participants were randomly assigned to a social condition, in which they expected to meet this person, or to a nonsocial condition, in which they had no such expectation. Men and women differed in their anger expressions, despite the fact that they did not differ in anger experience. Women expressed anger to a lesser extent than men, but only in the social condition. Social appraisal partly mediated the relation between sex and anger expression. The role of social appraisal in emotion and appraisal theory is discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Dispositional optimism and primary and secondary appraisal of a stressor: Controlling for confounding influences and relations to coping and psychological and physical adjustment.

Previous research has shown that dispositional optimism (M. E Scheier & C. S. Carver, 1985) is linked to both coping and adjustment but has failed to consider the potential influence of appraisals in the stress and coping process (R. S. Lazarus & S. Folkman, 1984). The present study examined the influence of optimism and appraisals on coping and psychological and physical adjustment in 726 college students. Results from correlational analyses indicated that stress-related appraisals were associated with optimism, coping, and adjustment. Comparative analyses further indicated that optimists (n?=?109) and pessimists (n?=?110) differed significantly in secondary (but not primary) appraisal, coping, and adjustment. In addition, optimism was found to add significant incremental validity in predicting adjustment, beyond what was accounted for by appraisals and coping. The implications of these findings for understanding the influence of dispositional optimism are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)