Religion and the environmental opinion in 22 countries: a comparative study

The objective is to test if religiosity affects environmental opinion in Europe. Using data from European Social Survey (ESS) 2002/2003, the study answers three questions. At the societal level: Is public opinion about the environment different in political systems with different Christian traditions? Is environmental concern less or higher in the public opinion depending on the degree of secularization in the political systems? At the individual level: Is the environmental opinion of the individual affected by the personal confession of faith, religious involvement, and the dominant religious context? At the societal level, the findings show stronger concern for the environment in Catholic and Eastern Orthodox countries than in Protestant countries. The tendency also shows a weakened concern for the environment in countries with a rather secular population. At the individual level, there are significant positive effects on environmental care from Catholic culture, negative effect from Protestant culture, and no effect from religious involvement.     

Muslim religious accommodations in Western Europe: Do multicultural policies impact religiosity levels among Muslims,Catholics and Protestants?

How do religious accommodations for Muslim minorities shape religiosity levels among Muslims minorities? Answering this question is critical in the contemporary period, as Western European countries have experienced greater diversity in religious affiliations due to immigration. In this article, we address this question by analysing individual data across multiple waves of the European Social Survey (ESS). Our analysis improves on existing studies in that it (1) incorporates a greater number of countries than prior studies, (2) covers a historically novel period of religious accommodations for Muslim minorities and (3) more effectively controls for unmeasured country and time‐invariant processes than previous research. We find that in countries that have instituted greater religious accommodations, Muslim respondents generally report higher levels of religiosity. Interestingly, we also find that the greater institutionalization of religious accommodations for Muslims also impacts the subjective religiosity levels of Protestant majorities. We find no effect for Catholic respondents.     

Gender,Religiosity, Spirituality,and Attitudes toward Homosexuality

This article investigates the relationship between religiosity, spirituality, gender, and attitudes toward homosexuality. The article augments the existing literature by examining the effects of religious affiliation, religiosity, and spirituality on attitudes toward homosexuality separately for men and women using the 2008 and 2010 General Social Surveys. Results indicate significant gender differences in attitudes toward homosexuality for two variables. Southern residence decreases tolerance among men, but not women. Also, men who self-identify as spiritual, but not religious, are more likely to report that homosexuality is not morally wrong than their more religious counterparts; however, a similar finding was not evident among the women who self-identified as spiritual.     

Marriage,Cohabitation, and Happiness: A Cross‐National Analysis of 27 Countries

The authors investigated how the reported happiness of married and cohabiting individuals varies cross‐nationally with societal gender beliefs and religious context. They used the 2002 International Social Survey Programme data from 27 countries (N = 36,889) and specified hierarchical linear models with macro – micro level interactions in order to examine how the social – institutional context affects happiness at the individual level. Consistent with previous research, they found a happiness gap between married and cohabiting persons. In the case of women, this gap was moderated by the gender climate and the religious context in the country. This suggests that, at least for women, this gap is not intractable but is rather an outcome of the social context. For men, the relationship between marital status and happiness was less variable across the different social contexts studied.     

“Female ejaculation” and urinary stress incontinence

A substantial increase in religious identification has been observed in most European post-communist countries. As religiosity has been associated with sexually transmitted infection (STI) and HIV vulnerability among young people, this article examined the impact of religious upbringing and personal religiosity (religiousness) on sexual risks among University of Zagreb first-year undergraduate students, using data collected in 1998, 2003, and 2008. Female participants who reported strict religious upbringing were less knowledgeable about human sexuality than other women. Religiousness was negatively correlated with basic knowledge of human sexuality, but again only among women. Contrary to expectations, no significant associations were found between religious upbringing or religiousness and condom use. Both measures of religiosity, however, were related to decreased odds of sexual debut among young women. In the case of male participants, the impact of religiosity was marginal. Religious upbringing was associated (negatively) with sexual literacy and sexual debut—but only at the beginning of the observed period. Overall, religiosity does not seem to substantially reduce STI- and HIV-related risk-taking, particularly among men. Since the observed increase in the proportion of sexually active students during the 1998 through 2008 period was not matched by an increase in condom use, reducing STI and HIV vulnerability among Croatian youth remains an essential task.     

The determinants of religiosity among immigrants and the native born in Europe

This paper examines differences in religious behaviors of the native born and immigrants in European countries, measured by self-reported religiosity, frequency of praying, and frequency of church attendance. Using the European Social Survey, we first show that, on average, the religiosity of immigrants is greater than that of the native born and is greater than that of the stayers in the European origins, even among those who report they have no religious affiliation. Hypotheses are tested that can explain these observations. Differences in individual characteristics, such as age, education, income, marital status, and notably religious denominations, partly account for the overall differences. Religiosity of migrants declines with duration in the destination, approaching the levels of both the native born in destination countries and of the stayers in European origin countries. Both origin and destination country characteristics affect religiosity, such as economic development, religious pluralism, religious freedom, and societal attitudes towards religion, suggesting that both economic and culture persistence and adaptation take place.     

The Partisan Paradox: Religious Commitment and the Gender Gap in Party Identification

A large body of scholarly literature points to the growing influenceof religious devotion on U.S. partisanship. This article attemptsto reconcile the growing religious commitment cleavage in theAmerican party system with the commensurate growth in the gendergap. If women are, on average, more religiously devout thanmen, and if contemporary shifts in partisanship are disproportionatelyfounded on religious and cultural cleavages, then why are womenmore likely to identify with the Democratic Party? I pose threepossible explanations for this apparent paradox: (1) that theinfluence of religion is only considerable among the most committed;(2) that men and women politicize their religious beliefs indifferent ways; and (3) that gender differences in opinion onnonreligious issues sustain the partisan gap, over and abovethe conservative influence of religiosity. Findings from structuralequation analyses demonstrate that religious devotion affectsthe politics of men and women in similar ways. Religious commitmentaffects partisan choices but does not override the powerfuleffects of gender. Gender differences in support for the socialwelfare state and the preeminence of social welfare opinionin the partisan calculus of men and women largely explain thepersistence of the gender gap.     

When Women are Right: THE INFLUENCE OF GENDER,WORK AND VALUES ON EUROPEAN FAR-RIGHT PARTY SUPPORT

Far-right political party support in Western Europe has been examined primarily in terms of the men who constitute the majority of party membership. However, few have examined why women are less likely than men to be drawn to these movements. This article attempts to bridge the quantitative–qualitative divide and assess what brings women to support the far right. Looking at five European countries using the 1999–2002 World Values Survey, results indicate that men have a slightly higher propensity to vote for the far right. This gender gap cannot be explained by value differences, but is partially a result of differences in men's and women's occupational location. Thus, this article provides some support to Mayer's contention that women's support of the far right is largely to do with their being less likely than men to be employed in blue-collar work.     

Differences in Family Norms for Men and Women Across Europe

The authors examined double standards regarding divorce among parents with young children and regarding having children within nonmarital cohabitation across Europe. Whether people disapprove more of men or of women engaging in these behaviors is not a priori clear. The authors formulated arguments in both directions and expected double standards to vary cross‐nationally by the level of socioeconomic gender equality in a country. They conducted multilevel analyses on a sample of about 44,000 individuals nested in 25 countries, obtained from the European Social Survey (2006). Double standards were measured with a split‐ballot design. The findings indicated that men were generally more disapproved of than women when displaying the family behaviors under study. Overall, women endorsed both double standards, whereas men endorsed only the double standard regarding divorce. However, substantial cross‐national differences in the double standards exist. The higher the level of socioeconomic gender equality, the larger these double standards in favor of women.     

Is Marriage More Than Cohabitation? Well‐Being Differences in 30 European Countries

The study aims to assess, first, whether there is a gap in well‐being between unmarried cohabitants and the married, second, if selection factors can explain this so‐called cohabitation gap, and third, if the size of the cohabitation gap differs across countries and how this can be explained. We use pooled data from young adults (18–44) in 3 rounds of the European Social Survey (N ? 31, 500). Multilevel regression analyses show that there is a moderate cohabitation gap that can be partly explained with the selection factors material resources and religiosity. Country differences were clear and could partly be explained with the level of institutionalization: In countries where cohabitation is more accepted and more prevalent, the cohabitation gap is smaller.     

Family Policy and Fertility Intentions in 21 European Countries

European countries show substantial variation in family policy and in the extent to which policies support more traditional male‐breadwinner or more gender egalitarian earner–carer family arrangements. Using data from the European Social Survey, the authors implemented multilevel models to analyze variation in fertility intentions of 16,000 men and women according to individual‐level characteristics and family policy across 21 European countries. Both traditional and earner–carer family support generosity were positively related to first‐birth intentions for men and women. In contrast, only earner–carer support maintains its positive relationship with second birth intentions. Family policy is not in general related to third and higher order parity intentions.     

From attitudes to social networks: National gender-role attitudes and gender differences in late-life social relationships

Studies often find gender differences in social networks in later life, but are these findings universal, or do they differ in various cultural contexts? To address this research gap, the current study examines the association between gender differences in social relationships and country-level gender-role attitudes. We combined data from the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) of individuals aged 50 years and older with country-level data on gender-role attitudes from the European Values Survey (EVS) for 15 European countries. We estimated a series of multivariate hierarchical regression models that predicted the size of the personal social network, its emotional closeness, and the proportion of the spouse, children, and friends in the network. The results indicated gender differences in social network characteristics. Women reported larger social networks and were more likely to have larger proportions of children and friends but smaller proportions of the spouse in their social networks. The magnitude of gender differences was associated with country-level gender-role attitudes. In countries with more egalitarian gender-role attitudes, women had larger networks with a larger proportion of friends compared to men. In countries with more traditional gender-role attitudes, women had larger proportions of their children and spouse in their social networks and had emotionally closer networks. Our findings suggest that the societal context and opportunity structures for social interactions play an important role in shaping the structure of women’s and men’s social relationships in later life.     

Gender Equality and Restless Sleep Among Partnered Europeans

Sleep is situated in the work–family nexus and can be shaped by national norms promoting gender equality. The authors tested this proposition using individual data from the European Social Survey matched to a country‐level measure of gender equality. In individual‐level models, women's sleep was more troubled by the presence of children in the home and partners' unemployment, whereas men's restless sleep was associated with their own unemployment and worries about household finances. In country‐level models, the authors find that in nations that empower women and elevate their status, men and women alike report sounder sleep, and the gender gap in restless sleep is significantly reduced among those living in gender‐equal countries. This study adds to the understanding of gender differences in sleep quality and provides new evidence on the importance of the national context in shaping the pattern of gender inequality in the domestic sphere.     

Exploring the Relationship between Secularity and Marital Behavior

The higher religiosity of women is a longstanding feature of the religious landscape in the Western World. With the recent vibrancy of secular movements, the greater religiosity of women is reflected in a gender imbalance within the secular groups. For instance, more than three quarters of American atheists are male. Given the effects of both religiosity and secularity on worldview and lifestyle, this gender imbalance is likely consequential for marital behavior and outcomes. Using the latest cycle of the Canadian General Social Survey focused on family, this paper examines how marital behavior of individuals without any tie with religion or spirituality compares with others. Secular males are found appreciably more likely to experience marital dissolution, whereas their female counterparts are shown no different from others. This result lends support to the theories that posit religiosity as a complementary marital trait, requiring the mating of the like. The analysis also indicates that union formation behavior of secular females manifests a larger shift away from the traditional conceptions of marriage compared with secular males. Various explanations are explored.     

Heterosexuals' attitudes toward bisexual men and women in the United States

This paper examines heterosexual adults’ attitudes toward bisexual men and women using data from a 1999 national RDD survey (N = 1,335). Ratings on 101‐point feeling thermometers were lower (less favorable) for bisexual men and bisexual women than for all other groups assessed—including religious, racial, ethnic, and political groups—except injecting drug users. More negative attitudes toward bisexuals were associated with higher age, less education, lower annual income, residence in the South and rural areas, higher religiosity, political conservatism, traditional values concerning gender and sexual behavior, authoritarianism, and lack of contact with gay men or lesbians. White heterosexual women expressed significantly more favorable attitudes than other women and all men. A gender difference was observed in attitudes toward bisexuals and homosexuals: Heterosexual women rated bisexuals significantly less favorably than they rated homosexuals, regardless of gender, whereas heterosexual men rated male targets less favorably than female targets, regardless of whether the target was bisexual or homosexual.     

Organizational Resources and the Gender Gap in Congregational Lay Leadership

The purpose of this study is to examine how organizational resources affect the gender gap within lay (volunteer) leadership in religious congregations. Using institutional theory as a framework, this study situates congregations within a larger field of organizations competing for legitimacy. Congregations with higher levels of resources—such as wealthier members, better-educated members, or larger memberships—are more likely to be connected to the core of the field and therefore more likely to have gender egalitarian practices in order to signal their legitimacy. Therefore, I hypothesize that women in resource-rich congregations will have greater access to volunteer leadership positions than women in congregations that are resource deficient. I analyze 70,942 individuals in 344 religious congregations from the 2001 U.S. Congregational Life Survey using multilevel modeling. I show that religious congregations with more members, better-educated attenders, and wealthier attenders have smaller gender gaps in volunteer leadership positions. Congregational resources can mitigate the gender gap in lay leadership, and women within resource-rich organizations have greater access to positions of authority.     

Religiosity and Labour Earnings in Canadian Provinces

Using recent data from the Canadian General Social Survey, I examine how religious belief and practice relate to labour earnings in Canada. Noting that religious landscape strongly varies across Canadian provinces, I explore whether these discrepancies are reflected in the association of wages and religiosity indicators, for men and women. Moreover, I identify two groups of individuals, one without any tie with religion and spirituality, and the other shaping their lives around them. I find that males belonging to the least religious group earn significantly below otherwise identical individuals in the high affiliation province of Newfoundland, while they enjoy a ceteris paribus wage premium in the low religiosity provinces of British Columbia and Québec. Females of the most religious group, on the other hand, are found at a disadvantage in the Canadian west, where affiliation with Conservative Protestantism is more prevalent.     

Why do men get more heart disease than women? An international perspective

Biological, behavioral, and psychosocial contributions to the gender gap in coronary heart disease (CHD) are discussed. Although CHD is the Number 1 cause of death for both sexes in the industrialized world, CHD mortality rates between these countries are larger than those between men and women, suggesting that biological factors are not the sole influences on the gender gap in CHD. Traditional coronary risk factors cannot explain the rapid increase in CHD mortality among middle-aged men in many of the newly independent states of eastern Europe. However, eastern European men score higher on stress-related psychosocial coronary risk factors (e.g., social isolation, vital exhaustion) than men living in the West. Comparisons between the sexes also reveal gender differences in psychosocial and behavioral coronary risk factors, including excessive alcohol consumption and smoking, favoring women. Overall, it appears that men's coping with stressful events may be less adaptive physiologically, behaviorally, and emotionally, contributing to their increased risk for CHD.     

Religiosität und politische Orientierung – Radikalisierung,Traditionalisierung oder Entkopplung?

In Germany as in other European countries the share of religious and churched persons is shrinking. The process of secularization is progressing gradually but inexorably and affects both Christian churches alike. In this contribution we examine if and how the numerical shrinkage of religious core segments affects the relation between religiosity and political attitudes. From secularization theory one can derive three partly opposing expectations. The radicalization thesis—particularly popular in the USA—assumes religious groups feel threatened by an increasingly secular society and this ties them together, radicalizes and mobilizes them. A second expectation rests on the assumption that in particular younger, economically well-off and highly educated people leave the churches. Through this process the social composition of the remaining church members changes leading not to radicalization but to traditionalization and withdrawal from politics. Finally, according to a third view it can be expected that the secularization process affects the entire society leading to a disintegration of tight religious milieus which in turn leads to a dissolution of social control and a decoupling of religiosity and political orientations. The central finding of our analyses is that—in support of our third hypothesis—religion loses its function for political attitudes and behaviors. In the German context the effect of religiosity on politics has been nearly exclusively studied with respect to voting behavior. By extending the focus to a wide range of other attitudes and behaviors and by taking a dynamic perspective this contribution thus closes an important research gap.     

The Gender Gap in Attitudes About Childlessness in the United States

Acceptance of childlessness has increased since the 1970s, with women reporting greater acceptance than men. Using the National Survey of Families and Households (1987 – 1988; N = 10,648) and the General Social Survey (1994; N =1,395), we examined this gender gap as it relates to both structural and sociocultural factors, including religion, gender attitudes, and other attitudes about gender and family. Women were more likely than men to hold positive attitudes about childlessness, and women’s less traditional attitudes about marriage, gender equality, and women’s employment only partially explained this difference. In the childbearing ages, positive attitudes were strongly related to intentions to remain childless and showed a greater gender gap at higher education levels. The findings highlight important differences in men’s and women’s experiences of family, work, and gender issues.