The Living Tomorrow Project: how Philip Morris has used a Belgian tourist attraction to promote ventilation approaches to the control of second hand smoke

Study objective: To examine the involvement of Philip Morris in Living Tomorrow 2 and determine the rationale behind its involvement.

Design: Research was conducted through a web based search of internal tobacco industry documents made publicly available through litigation.

Main results: For approximately €1 000 000 Philip Morris (now Altria) became a co-initiator of Living Tomorrow 2, a tourist complex in Belgium that aims to demonstrate how we will be living in the future. In addition to promoting the company and its grocery products, Philip Morris is using the complex and its website to promote ventilation as a means of accommodating smokers and non-smokers in the indoor environment. Particular emphasis was placed on the bar and restaurant areas. Despite the rationale for its involvement, Philip Morris fails to acknowledge its role as a cigarette manufacturer. As a form of corporate sponsorship Philip Morris thought its involvement could evade any European tobacco advertising ban.

Conclusions: Philip Morris is using a tourist attraction to promote its views on control of second hand smoke (SHS) and accommodation of smokers and non-smokers in the indoor environment. However, ventilation does not deal with the health effects of SHS. Policymakers must be cognisant of the devious tactics the industry employs to promote its own agenda, especially in relation to indoor air quality and smoking in public places. Tobacco control legislation should be continually modified and strengthened in response to the changing activities of the tobacco industry as it strives to evade existing legislation and deter the advent of new legislation.

     

加热不燃烧烟草制品发展现状及展望

为使我国科研技术人员把握国际烟草企业新型烟草制品中加热不燃烧产品的特点和技术走向,对目前市场上销售及在研的加热不燃烧烟草制品进行总结和分析,并着重对加热不燃烧烟草制品烟气化学的安全性进行了综述。结果表明:在新型烟草制品领域,专利数据显示三大跨国烟草企业（菲莫烟草、英美烟草及日本烟草）更注重在加热不燃烧烟草制品方面的技术开发, 尤其是菲莫烟草;烟气化学对比分析表明加热不燃烧烟草制品是行业未来最具发展潜力的热点;在加热不燃烧烟草制品技术领域,电加热型（含混合型）在口感和降低有害成分释放方面优于碳加热型;相比于纯电加热型产品,混合型产品的有害成分释放量更低。      

Courtesy and the challenges of implementing smoke-free policies in Japan.

For decades, the tobacco companies have developed a worldwide campaign to oppose the creation of smoke-free environments. Public health efforts to promote clean indoor air have been uneven throughout the world, and in few places have such efforts faced as many challenges as in Japan. The Japanese market is dominated by Japan Tobacco, which is partly owned by the government, and Philip Morris International is also present in Japan. Japan Tobacco and Philip Morris International have developed campaigns promoting courtesy and tolerance that, until recently, seem to have resonated well with the public. The companies also have supported research promoting ventilation and have funded consultants to act as experts in the area of second-hand smoke exposure. Japan is a critical country to study, partly because of the strength of Japan Tobacco in the country and the growth of Japan Tobacco International in Southeast Asia and the rest of the world, and partly because of Japan's ratification of the World Health Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. This paper uses tobacco industry documents to provide an overview of the tobacco industry's scientific and political efforts to stifle the development of clean indoor measures in Japan. Learning past industry strategies may assist policymakers and advocates in the development of future public health activities.     

Scientific analysis of second-hand smoke by the tobacco industry, 1929-1972.

The 1972 U.S. surgeon general's report The Health Consequences of Smoking was the first to include a warning about exposure to second-hand smoke. Because the tobacco industry has a record of withholding the results of their research from the public, we searched the internal tobacco industry documents and compared internal industry research on second-hand smoke to what the industry published in the open scientific literature through 1972. We found chemical analyses, sensory evaluations, and discussions of sidestream cigarette smoke (the smoke emitted by the cigarette between puffs, the main component of second-hand smoke), beginning in 1929. American Tobacco Company research in the 1930s indicated that, compared with mainstream smoke, sidestream smoke was produced in larger quantities and contained, per cigarette, 2 times more nicotine and 12 times more ammonia. Research funded by the Tobacco Industry Research Committee in the 1950s revealed that sidestream smoke contained, per unit cigarette, higher concentrations of carcinogenic polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons, per unit mass, including four times more 3,4 benzopyrene. In 1956 and 1957, respectively, Philip Morris and R. J. Reynolds also began to research sidestream smoke. In 1961, Philip Morris began to do sensory evaluation and modification of sidestream odor during product development. This sensory evaluation of sidestream smoke was the first biological testing of sidestream smoke by a tobacco company. Prior to the release of the 1972 U.S. surgeon general's report, the tobacco industry published the majority of its findings in the open scientific literature and does not appear to have perceived second-hand smoke as a threat to human health.     

Tobacco industry consumer research on socially acceptable cigarettes

Objective: To describe tobacco industry consumer research to inform the development of more "socially acceptable" cigarette products since the 1970s. Methods: Analysis of previously secret tobacco industry documents. Results: 28 projects to develop more socially acceptable cigarettes were identified from Philip Morris, RJ Reynolds, British American Tobacco, and Lorillard tobacco companies. Consumer research and concept testing consistently demonstrated that many smokers feel strong social pressure not to smoke, and this pressure increased with exposure to smoking restrictions. Tobacco companies attempted to develop more socially acceptable cigarettes with less visible sidestream smoke or less odour. When presented in theory, these product concepts were very attractive to important segments of the smoking population. However, almost every product developed was unacceptable in actual product tests or test markets. Smokers reported the complete elimination of secondhand smoke was necessary to satisfy non-smokers. Smokers have also been generally unwilling to sacrifice their own smoking satisfaction for the benefit of others. Many smokers prefer smoke-free environments to cigarettes that produce less secondhand smoke. Conclusions: Concerns about secondhand smoke and clean indoor air policies have a powerful effect on the social acceptability of smoking. Historically, the tobacco industry has been unable to counter these effects by developing more socially acceptable cigarettes. These data suggest that educating smokers about the health dangers of secondhand smoke and promoting clean indoor air policies has been difficult for the tobacco industry to counter with new products, and that every effort should be made to pursue these strategies.     

Tobacco industry success in preventing regulation of secondhand smoke in Latin America: the "Latin Project"

OBJECTIVE: To examine the tobacco industry's strategy to avoid regulations on secondhand smoke exposure in Latin America. METHODS: Systematic search of tobacco industry documents available through the internet. All available materials, including confidential reports regarding research, lobbying, and internal memoranda exchanged between the tobacco industry representatives, tobacco industry lawyers, and key players in Latin America. RESULTS: In Latin America, Philip Morris International and British American Tobacco, working through the law firm Covington & Burling, developed a network of well placed physicians and scientists through their "Latin Project" to generate scientific arguments minimising secondhand smoke as a health hazard, produce low estimates of exposure, and to lobby against smoke-free workplaces and public places. The tobacco industry's role was not disclosed. CONCLUSIONS: The strategies used by the industry have been successful in hindering development of public health programmes on secondhand smoke. Latin American health professionals need to be aware of this industry involvement and must take steps to counter it to halt the tobacco epidemic in Latin America.     

Tobacco industry manipulation of the hospitality industry to maintain smoking in public places

OBJECTIVE: To describe how the tobacco industry used the "accommodation" message to mount an aggressive and effective worldwide campaign to recruit hospitality associations, such as restaurant associations, to serve as the tobacco industry's surrogate in fighting against smoke-free environments. METHODS: We analysed tobacco industry documents publicly available on the internet as a result of litigation in the USA. Documents were accessed between January and November 2001. RESULTS: The tobacco industry, led by Philip Morris, made financial contributions to existing hospitality associations or, when it did not find an association willing to work for tobacco interests, created its own "association" in order to prevent the growth of smoke-free environments. The industry also used hospitality associations as a vehicle for programmes promoting "accommodation" of smokers and non-smokers, which ignore the health risks of second hand smoke for employees and patrons of hospitality venues. CONCLUSION: Through the myth of lost profits, the tobacco industry has fooled the hospitality industry into embracing expensive ventilation equipment, while in reality 100% smoke-free laws have been shown to have no effect on business revenues, or even to improve them. The tobacco industry has effectively turned the hospitality industry into its de facto lobbying arm on clean indoor air. Public health advocates need to understand that, with rare exceptions, when they talk to organised restaurant associations they are effectively talking to the tobacco industry and must act accordingly.     

"Creative Solutions": selling cigarettes in a smoke-free world

Objective: To analyse the development and execution of the "Creative Solutions" Benson & Hedges advertising campaign to understand its social, political, and commercial implications. Methods: Searches of the Philip Morris documents and Legacy Tobacco Documents websites for relevant materials; Lexis/Nexis searches of major news and business publications; and denotative and connotative analyses of the advertising imagery. Results: Philip Morris developed the Creative Solutions campaign in an effort to directly confront the successes of the tobacco control movement in establishing new laws and norms that promoted clean indoor air. The campaign''s imagery attempted to help smokers and potential smokers overcome the physical and social downsides of smoking cigarettes by managing risk and resolving internal conflict. The slogans suggested a variety of ways for smokers to respond to restrictions on their habit. The campaign also featured information about the Accommodation Program, Philip Morris''s attempt to organise opposition to clean indoor air laws. Conclusion: The campaign was a commercial failure, with little impact on sales of the brand. Philip Morris got some exposure for the Accommodation Program and its anti-regulatory position. The lack of commercial response to the ads suggests that they were unable to successfully resolve the contradictions that smokers were increasingly experiencing and confirms the power of changing social norms to counter tobacco industry tactics.     

"Accommodating" smoke-free policies: tobacco industry's Courtesy of Choice programme in Latin America

Objective

To understand the implementation and effects of the Courtesy of Choice programme designed to “accommodate” smokers as an alternative to smoke‐free polices developed by Philip Morris International (PMI) and supported by RJ Reynolds (RJR) and British American Tobacco (BAT) since the mid‐1990s in Latin America.

Methods

Analysis of internal tobacco industry documents, BAT “social reports”, news reports and tobacco control legislation.

Results

Since the mid‐1990s, PMI, BAT and RJR promoted Accommodation Programs to maintain the social acceptability of smoking. As in other parts of the world, multinational tobacco companies partnered with third party allies from the hospitality industry in Latin America. The campaign was extended from the hospitality industry (bars, restaurants and hotels) to other venues such as workplaces and airport lounges. A local public relations agency, as well as a network of engineers and other experts in ventilation systems, was hired to promote the tobacco industry''s programme. The most important outcome of these campaigns in several countries was the prevention of meaningful smoke‐free policies, both in public places and in workplaces.

Conclusions

Courtesy of Choice remains an effective public relations campaign to undermine smoke‐free policies in Latin America. The tobacco companies'' accommodation campaign undermines the implementation of measures to protect people from second‐hand smoke called for by the World Health Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, perpetuating the exposure to tobacco smoke in indoor enclosed environments.Latin Americans are highly exposed to second‐hand tobacco smoke (SHS) both in public places and in workplaces.^1,2 In 2001, the Pan American Health Organization launched its “Smoke Free Americas” initiative³ to “raise awareness of the harm caused by secondhand tobacco smoke, and support efforts to achieve more smoke‐free environments in the Americas.” There is longstanding strong public concern over the effects of SHS in Latin America. In 1997, research conducted for Philip Morris International (PMI) showed that about 80% of respondents in four Latin American countries agreed that “Other people''s tobacco smoke poses a long term health risk to nonsmokers.”⁴ These results reflect a stronger consensus that SHS is hazardous than Philip Morris (PM) found in the US in 1989—62% of non‐smokers and 32% of smokers—as the movement for smoke‐free workplaces and public places was beginning to accelerate them.⁵ A 2001 survey conducted for the World Health Organization (WHO) in the main urban areas of Argentina showed strong public support (94%; 96% non‐smokers and 89% smokers) for the creation of smoke‐free places to avoid SHS.⁶ Public opinion polls conducted in 2006 in Argentina⁷ and Uruguay⁸ reported that 92% of respondents agreed that “SHS is dangerous for nonsmokers'' health”, showing an increase in public concern about SHS by 12% since 1997.The main barrier to progress in implementing smoke‐free policies in Latin America has been the efforts by two transnational tobacco companies, PMI and British American Tobacco (BAT), which control almost the entire cigarette market in the region through their subsidiaries (PMI 40%, BAT 60%). Similar to the voluntary self‐regulating advertising codes, which the tobacco companies use to fight restrictions on tobacco advertising,^9,10 the tobacco industry has orchestrated public relations campaigns in Latin America since the mid‐1990s to avoid legislated smoke‐free policies.^11,12 As in the US, beginning in the late 1980s,¹¹ this effort mobilised the hospitality industry to block meaningful tobacco control legislation to preserve the social acceptability of smoking and to protect industry profits. These programmes, known as Accommodation in the US and Courtesy of Choice in most parts of the rest of the world,^11,13,14,15 encourage the voluntary creation of smoking and non‐smoking sections in the hospitality industry as an alternative to legislation requiring 100% smoke‐free environments. Also, as in the US, the tobacco industry sought to present ventilation as the “solution” to SHS.¹⁶As of April 2007, 12 Latin American countries (Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela) had ratified the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC). The FCTC, the first international public health treaty, calls for the implementation of “effective legislative, executive, administrative or other measures … at the appropriate governmental level to protect all persons from exposure to tobacco smoke” (Article 4.1) “in indoor workplaces, public transport, indoor public places and, as appropriate, other public places.” (Article 8).¹⁷ Given the fact that the only truly effective protection from SHS is the creation of 100% smoke‐free environments,¹⁸ in 2003, Venezuela approved a state law (in Monagas¹⁹) and between 2005 and 2006, Argentina passed and regulated two provincial laws (in Santa Fe and Tucumán) to establish 100% smoke‐free public places and workplaces. In March 2006, Uruguay became the first 100% smoke‐free country in the Americas. In response to this movement, one can expect the tobacco industry to accelerate its Accommodation efforts as a way of undermining such effective smoke‐free policies to implement FCTC.     

Philip Morris's Project Sunrise: weakening tobacco control by working with it

Objective

To analyse the implications of Philip Morris USA''s (PM''s) overtures toward tobacco control and other public health organisations, 1995–2006.

Data sources

Internal PM documents made available through multi‐state US attorneys general lawsuits and other cases, and newspaper sources.

Methods

Documents were retrieved from several industry documents websites and analysed using a case study approach.

Results

PM''s Project Sunrise, initiated in 1995 and proposed to continue through 2006, was a long‐term plan to address tobacco industry delegitimisation and ensure the social acceptability of smoking and of the company itself. Project Sunrise laid out an explicit divide‐and‐conquer strategy against the tobacco control movement, proposing the establishment of relationships with PM‐identified “moderate” tobacco control individuals and organisations and the marginalisation of others. PM planned to use “carefully orchestrated efforts” to exploit existing differences of opinion within tobacco control, weakening its opponents by working with them. PM also planned to thwart tobacco industry delegitimisation by repositioning itself as “responsible”. We present evidence that these plans were implemented.

Conclusion

Sunrise exposes differences within the tobacco control movement that should be further discussed. The goal should not be consensus, but a better understanding of tensions within the movement. As the successes of the last 25 years embolden advocates to think beyond passage of the next clean indoor air policy or funding of the next cessation programme, movement philosophical differences may become more important. If tobacco control advocates are not ready to address them, Project Sunrise suggests that Philip Morris is ready to exploit them.     

Tobacco industry successfully prevented tobacco control legislation in Argentina

Objective: To evaluate how transnational tobacco companies, working through their local affiliates, influenced tobacco control policymaking in Argentina between 1966 and 2005. Methods: Analysis of internal tobacco industry documents, local newspapers and magazines, internet resources, bills from the Argentinean National Congress Library, and interviews with key individuals in Argentina. Results: Transnational tobacco companies (Philip Morris International, British American Tobacco, Lorillard, and RJ Reynolds International) have been actively influencing public health policymaking in Argentina since the early 1970s. As in other countries, in 1977 the tobacco industry created a weak voluntary self regulating code to avoid strong legislated restrictions on advertising. In addition to direct lobbying by the tobacco companies, these efforts involved use of third party allies, public relations campaigns, and scientific and medical consultants. During the 1980s and 1990s efforts to pass comprehensive tobacco control legislation intensified, but the organised tobacco industry prevented its enactment. There has been no national activity to decrease exposure to secondhand smoke. Conclusions: The tobacco industry, working through its local subsidiaries, has subverted meaningful tobacco control legislation in Argentina using the same strategies as in the USA and other countries. As a result, tobacco control in Argentina remains governed by a national law that is weak and restricted in its scope.     

How Philip Morris built Marlboro into a global brand for young adults: implications for international tobacco control

Objective: To describe Philip Morris'' global market research and international promotional strategies targeting young adults. Methods: : Analysis of previously secret tobacco industry documents. Results: Philip Morris pursued standardised market research and strategic marketing plans in different regions throughout the world using research on young adults with three principle foci: lifestyle/psychographic research, brand studies, and advertising/communication effectiveness. Philip Morris identified core similarities in the lifestyles and needs of young consumers worldwide, such as independence, hedonism, freedom, and comfort. In the early 1990s Philip Morris adopted standardised global marketing efforts, creating a central advertising production bank and guidelines for brand images and promotions, but allowing regional managers to create regionally appropriate individual advertisements. Conclusions: Values and lifestyles play a central role in the global marketing of tobacco to young adults. Worldwide counter marketing initiatives, coupled with strong, coherent global marketing policies such as the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, are needed to break associations between young adult values and tobacco brands. As globalisation promotes the homogenisation of values and lifestyles, tobacco control messages that resonate with young adults in one part of the world may appeal to young adults in other countries. Successful tobacco control messages that appeal to young people, such as industry denormalisation, may be expanded globally with appropriate tailoring to appeal to regional values.     

Understanding Philip Morris's pursuit of US government regulation of tobacco

Objective: To investigate Philip Morris's support of US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulation of tobacco products and analyse its relationship to the company's image enhancement strategies.

Data sources: Internal Philip Morris documents released as part of the Master Settlement Agreement.

Methods: Searches of the Legacy Tobacco Documents Library (http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu) beginning with such terms as "FDA" and "regulatory strategy" and expanding to include relevant new terms.

Results: Philip Morris's support for government regulation of tobacco is part of a broader effort to address its negative public image, which has a damaging impact on the company's stock price, political influence, and employee morale. Through regulation, the company seeks to enhance its legitimacy, redefine itself as socially responsible, and alter the litigation environment. Whereas health advocates frame tobacco use as a public health policy issue, Philip Morris's regulatory efforts focus on framing tobacco use as an individual choice by informed adults to use a risky product. This framing allows Philip Morris to portray itself as a reasonable and responsible manufacturer and marketer of risky products.

Conclusions: Philip Morris's ability to improve its image through support of FDA regulation may undermine tobacco control efforts aimed at delegitimising the tobacco industry. It may also create the impression that Philip Morris's products are being made safer and ultimately protect the company from litigation. While strong regulation of tobacco products and promotion remain critical public health goals, previous experiences with tobacco regulation show that caution may be warranted.

     

Philip Morris'' new scientific initiative: an analysis

In the fall of 2000, Philip Morris re-initiated an external research grants programme ("Philip Morris External Research Program", or PMERP), the first since the dissolution of the Council for Tobacco Research (CTR) and the Center for Indoor Air Research (CIAR). The ostensible purpose of the programme is to help develop cigarette designs "that might reduce the health risk of smoking". Internal company documents also indicate that Philip Morris urgently seeks to restore its scientific "credibility", as part of a "new openness" in relation to the external community. The structure of the review panel--a cohort of external peer reviewers, a science advisory board, and an internal, anonymous review and approvals committee--is nearly identical to that of the CIAR. The majority of the named reviewers have had previous affiliation with the tobacco industry either as reviewers or grantees, but only a minority have done research directly on tobacco or smoking. The programmatic substance of the PMERP could be interpreted as soliciting exculpatory evidence with respect to smoking and exposure to smoke. We remain sceptical about the scientific integrity of PMERP.     

Old ways, new means: tobacco industry funding of academic and private sector scientists since the Master Settlement Agreement

When, as a condition of the Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) in 1998, US tobacco companies disbanded the Council for Tobacco Research and the Center for Indoor Air Research, they lost a vital connection to scientists in academia and the private sector. The aim of this paper was to investigate two new research projects funded by US tobacco companies by analysis of internal tobacco industry documents now available at the University of California San Francisco (San Francisco, California, USA) Legacy tobacco documents library, other websites and the open scientific literature. Since the MSA, individual US tobacco companies have replaced their industry-wide collaborative granting organisations with new, individual research programmes. Philip Morris has funded a directed research project through the non-profit Life Sciences Research Office, and British American Tobacco and its US subsidiary Brown and Williamson have funded the non-profit Institute for Science and Health. Both of these organisations have downplayed or concealed their true level of involvement with the tobacco industry. Both organisations have key members with significant and long-standing financial relationships with the tobacco industry. Regulatory officials and policy makers need to be aware that the studies these groups publish may not be as independent as they seem.     

Second hand smoke and risk assessment: what was in it for the tobacco industry?

OBJECTIVE: To describe how the tobacco industry attempted to trivialise the health risks of second hand smoke (SHS) by both questioning the science of risk assessment of low dose exposure to other environmental toxins, and by comparing SHS to such substances about which debate might still exist. METHODS: Analysis of tobacco industry documents made public as part of the settlement of litigation in the USA (Minnesota trial and the Master Settlement Agreement) and available on the internet. Search terms included: risk assessment, low dose exposure, and the names of key players and organisations. RESULTS/CONCLUSION: The tobacco industry developed a well coordinated, multi-pronged strategy to create doubt about research on exposure to SHS by trying to link it to the broader discussion of risk assessment of low doses of a number of toxins whose disease burden may still be a matter of scientific debate, thus trying to make SHS their equivalent; and by attempting, through third party organisations and persons, to impugn the agencies using risk assessment to establish SHS as a hazard.     

Youth smoking prevention and tobacco industry revenue

Objectives

Epidemiological surveys make it clear that youth smoking contributes to both current and future tobacco industry revenue: over 80% of adult smokers reportedly began smoking before age 18. This paper estimates annual and lifetime revenue from youth smoking, and highlights the association between declines in youth smoking and declines in tobacco industry revenue.

Main outcome measures

This paper reports the amount of tobacco industry revenue generated by youth smoking at two points in time (1997 and 2002), and describes the distribution of youth generated tobacco income among the major tobacco companies. The authors project the amount of tobacco industry revenue that will be generated by members of two cohorts (the high school senior classes of 1997 and 2002) over the course of their lifetimes.

Results

In 1997, youth consumed 890 million cigarette packs, generating $737 million in annual industry revenue. By 2002, consumption dropped to 541 million packs and revenue increased to nearly $1.2 billion. Fifty eight per cent of youth generated revenue goes to Philip Morris USA, 18% to Lorillard, and 12% to RJ Reynolds. The authors project that, over the course of their lives, the 1997 high school senior class will smoke 12.4 billion packs of cigarettes, generating $27.3 billion in revenue. The 2002 high school senior class is projected to smoke 10.4 billion packs, generating $22.9 billion in revenue over the course of their lives.

Conclusions

Cigarette price increases from 1997 to 2002 have resulted in greater revenue for the tobacco industry, despite declines in youth smoking prevalence. However, in the absence of further cigarette price increases, declines in youth smoking are projected to lead ultimately to a loss of approximately $4 billion in future tobacco industry revenue from a single high school cohort.     

ASHRAE Standard 62: tobacco industry's influence over national ventilation standards

OBJECTIVE: To describe the role of the tobacco industry in the development of ventilation standards for indoor air quality by influencing the American Society of Heating, Refrigeration, and Air Conditioning Engineers (ASHRAE). METHODS: Review of tobacco industry documents available on the internet between January 2001 and March 2002. Search terms included "ASHRAE", "ventilation", "minutes", "memo", and the names of key players and organisations as identified in the initial searches. Analysis of ASHRAE and other relevant documents publicly available and the personal files of a Standard 62 committee member; interviews of a selected number of ASHRAE players; observation of an ASHRAE meeting. RESULTS: The tobacco industry has been involved in the development of ventilation standards for over 20 years. It has successfully influenced the standard and continues to attempt to change the standard from a smoke-free framework into an "accommodation" framework. The industry acts directly and through consultants and allies. The major health groups have been largely absent and the health interests have been poorly represented in standard development. While concentrated in the USA, ASHRAE standards are adopted worldwide. CONCLUSION: The tobacco industry determined that allowing smoking in ventilation standards for indoor air quality was a high priority and dedicated significant human and financial resources to ensure that its interests were represented. The health groups, until recently, have largely ignored the policy implications for tobacco control of standard development. This situation is changing, but unless health groups maintain high visibility within ASHRAE, the tobacco industry may succeed in creating a standard that ignores the dangers of secondhand smoke.     

Industry sponsored anti-smoking ads and adolescent reactance: test of a boomerang effect

Objective

To examine whether adolescents'' exposure to youth smoking prevention ads sponsored by tobacco companies promotes intentions to smoke, curiosity about smoking, and positive attitudes toward the tobacco industry.

Design

A randomised controlled experiment compared adolescents'' responses to five smoking prevention ads sponsored by a tobacco company (Philip Morris or Lorillard), or to five smoking prevention ads sponsored by a non‐profit organisation (the American Legacy Foundation), or to five ads about preventing drunk driving.

Setting

A large public high school in California''s central valley.

Subjects

A convenience sample of 9th and 10th graders (n  =  832) ages 14–17 years.

Main outcome measures

Perceptions of ad effectiveness, intention to smoke, and attitudes toward tobacco companies measured immediately after exposure.

Results

As predicted, adolescents rated Philip Morris and Lorillard ads less favourably than the other youth smoking prevention ads. Adolescents'' intention to smoke did not differ as a function of ad exposure. However, exposure to Philip Morris and Lorillard ads engendered more favourable attitudes toward tobacco companies.

Conclusions

This study demonstrates that industry sponsored anti‐smoking ads do more to promote corporate image than to prevent youth smoking. By cultivating public opinion that is more sympathetic toward tobacco companies, the effect of such advertising is likely to be more harmful than helpful to youth.     

The Virginia Slims identity crisis: an inside look at tobacco industry marketing to women

Objectives: Because no prior studies have comprehensively analysed previously secret tobacco industry documents describing marketing female brands, the Virginia Slims brand was studied to explore how Philip Morris and competitors develop and adapt promotional campaigns targeting women.

Methods: Analysis of previously secret tobacco industry documents. The majority of the documents used were from Philip Morris.

Results: The key to Virginia Slims advertising was creating an aspirational image which women associated with the brand. Virginia Slims co-opted women's liberation slogans to build a modern female image from 1968 through to the 1980s, and its market share grew from 0.24% to 3.16% during that time period. Ironically, the feminist image that worked very well for the brand was also the reason for its subsequent problems. Philip Morris experienced unprecedented losses in market share in the early 1990s, with a decline in market share for four consecutive years from 3.16% to 2.26%; they attributed this decline to both the fact that the brand's feminist image no longer appealed to young women aged 18–24 years, and increased competition from more contemporary and lower priced competitors. Throughout the 1990s, attempts to reacquire young women while retaining Virginia Slims loyal (now older) smokers were made using a "King Size" line extension, new slogans, and loyalty building promotions.

Conclusions: Tobacco advertisers initially created distinct female brands with aspirational images; continued appeal to young women was critical for long term growth. The need for established brands to evolve to maintain relevance to young women creates an opportunity for tobacco counter-marketing, which should undermine tobacco brand imagery and promote aspirational smoke-free lifestyle images. Young women age 18–24 are extremely valuable to the tobacco industry and should be a focus for tobacco control programmes.