依临界损失分析法界定相关市场的理论与司法实践研究

界定相关市场是反垄断三大制度的前提性和基础性问题。目前包括我国在内的大多数国家均采用假定垄断者测试作为界定相关市场的主要方法,但在司法实践中,该方法对数据的高要求、复杂的测试过程、基准价格和价格涨幅确定难以及适用范围的局限,使其在许多领域的反垄断执法中遭遇重重困境。临界损失分析法作为假定垄断者测试的实施方法和衍生品,有利于克服后者对数据要求高、计算复杂、无法直接判断涨价成功等缺点,解决相关市场界定的司法困境,增强反垄断审查的科学性、客观性和合理性。目前,美国已通过美国联邦贸易委员会诉西方石油公司合并案等判例将临界损失分析法用于司法实践中,对我国也有借鉴意义。     

相关市场的认定与发展及对中国反垄断执法的借鉴

相关市场是与经济学中的市场不同的一个概念,它仅仅是为了反垄断目的而界定出来的市场。相关市场界定理论的产生晚于其司法实践,它是伴随着经济学理论的发展而产生发展起来的。产业组织理论中的哈佛学派揭示了反垄断中相关市场的含义,构建了一套用以分析反垄断所有领域的经济学和法律问题的系统分析框架;其后的芝加哥学派完善了相关市场界定的理论方法,提出了具有里程碑意义的、目前国际通行的SSNIP检验法。     

互联网产品和SSNIP测试的适用性——3Q案的相关市场界定问题研究

3Q案被誉为中国互联网反垄断第一案。最高人民法院将该案的争议归纳为22个问题,其中9个问题与相关市场有关。该案的独特性在于即时通讯软件、微博和社交网络等涉案的互联网产品不同于普通产品。因此,本文分析了互联网产品的技术经济特征,考察了SSNIP测试这一主流的相关市场界定范式是否适用于3Q案,采用假定垄断行为测试界定3Q案的相关市场。本文对有关各方在涉及互联网产品的反垄断案件中更准确地界定相关市场具有重要的现实意义。     

知识产权反垄断中的相关市场界定研究

知识产权领域的相关市场包括3个方面的内容:产品市场、技术市场以及创新市场。在知识产权反垄断执法中首先要根据涉案的标的物来进行相应层次的相关市场界定。界定的主要方法有替代分析法、弹性分析法以及SSNIP测试法。     

网络平台企业免费产品相关市场界定与案例应用——以视频平台为例

平台企业对单边提供免费品，使基于价格变动的SSNIP测试法无法用于判断相关市场。本文以视频平台为例，基于Filistrucchi双边市场测试法，通过将SSNIP测试法中对一边市场的产品价格提升替代为广告时长的增加，改进了基于价格变动的假定垄断测试法，构建了网络平台企业免费产品的SSNDQ模型。在此基础上分析了加入会员收入的情况。主要结论是：（1）虽然传统的SSNIP测试法不适用于免费产品，但是影响用户“注意力”的变量“广告时长”能降低产品质量，是SSNIP测试法中价格的有效替代变量。本文证明了改进的SSNDQ测试法具有一般性，并给出了基于SSNDQ测试法的相关市场判断条件。（2）给出了界定网络平台免费产品相关市场的思路和分析框架、平台付费化趋势下免费产品与付费产品共存状态下的情形，并推导出不同利润差结果下判断平台用户不同行为及相关市场范围的条件。基于这一方法的测试为并购审查和反垄断认定，提供了依据和证据。     

并购反垄断执法中相关市场界定——基于商务部反垄断局审查案例的研究

相关市场界定是现阶段中国反垄断执法的基础.本文以《反垄断法》实施以来的并购案件公告为基础,对中国反垄断执法中相关市场界定问题进行剖析,并对不同类型并购案件的相关市场界定方法进行比较.案例分析结果显示:中国反垄断执法仍处在探索、渐进发展阶段,理论研究和实践都具有较大的改善空间;非横向并购案件的常态化暴露出当前的相关市场界定方法存在缺陷;与欧美国家相比,中国相关市场界定以定性分析为主,较少使用定量分析.     

数字平台反垄断相关市场界定

相关市场界定是中国数字经济反垄断的重要政策难题.在进行多边平台相关市场界定时,基于平台盈利模式和依据交易型与非交易型平台的类型化界定方法非常武断,市场界定应主要基于不同平台的交叉网络效应分析来进行确定.数字平台反垄断相关市场界定应摒弃固守市场界定作为必要前置程序和采用数量分析工具的束缚,回归市场界定理论的本源——竞争性约束,应根据个案灵活地选用市场界定方法,重点突出采用以竞争损害为核心的反垄断审查逻辑,并基于个案的商业经济现实来分析特定行为对不同用户群的整体竞争影响,从而进行相关市场的界定.     

双边市场中相关市场界定研究最新进展与判例评析

传统的反垄断分析方法直接应用于双边市场将产生错误的结论。本文对过去十几年间国外产业经济学界对双边市场中相关市场界定问题研究进行较全面、系统的回顾和梳理,对学术讨论中提出的一些建议进行了初步评估,以期筛选出较合理的建议,为中国反垄断法实施提供思路和参考。本文详细总结了国际产业经济学界最新的观点,建议竞争法执法机关应该根据双边市场的类型采取不同的市场界定改进方法。     

互联网平台反垄断相关市场界定

解决竞争问题的前提是要界定相关市场,但由于互联网平台的交叉网络外部性和价格结构不对称性等特质导致传统的替代性分析、假定垄断者测试界定方法陷入失灵的窘境。为此,需要以交叉网络效应的强弱为标准,判断平台两侧用户是否属于同一市场,采取增加替代性因素、更换测试变量等方式对传统方法予以修正,并探索盈利模式测试法和直接证据法在数字平台经济环境中适用的合理性。     

经营者集中案件中的定量经济分析——以希捷收购三星硬盘驱动器案为例

定量经济分析有利于增加案件判例实践的客观性和准确性,在经营者集中案件中的具体分析框架和实际操作方法需要进一步明确和探索。通过对市场界定环节和单边效应模拟环节的定量分析方法的研究,提出适用以希捷收购三星硬盘驱动器案件的一系列方法。应用SSNIP方法和价格关联法对该案件进行相关市场的界定分析,提出与判例不同的相关市场界定结果。根据该相关市场界定结果进行单边效应模拟,其结论部分证明该判例公告具有合理性。     

SSNIP, state-owned enterprises, public goods and complements

State-owned enterprises sometimes operate in markets below marginal costs in order to provide public goods. In practice it happens that they can cross-subsidize their activity in other markets since regulation is not perfect. Based on a simple model, I show that such cross-subsidization reduces at least consumer welfare. In competition law, the SSNIP test is used to identify market power. If the state-owned enterprises have some scope for price discrimination, the paper argues that the paradox of the SSNIP test that companies operating below marginal costs are a monopolist on a ??relevant market?? makes sense. The paper recommends imposing a duty to deal as a special responsibility for these companies. Finally, it is argued that some criteria are necessary to refine the applicability of competition law in such situations. Subadditivity of the underlying cost structure should be one sufficient condition to apply competition law.     

Regulating a multi-product monopolist

The purpose of the present paper is to construct a regulatory scheme that serves to correct suboptimal behavior of a multi-product monopolist in a situation of doubly asymmetric information, where the regulator cannot observe the monopolist's cost structure and consumers' preference while the monopolist cannot identify consumer types. We construct a tax scheme that induces the monopolist to offer socially optimal qualities to all types of consumers and discuss some interesting features of the scheme.The authors gratefully acknowledge the helpful comments of two anonymous referees.     

Pricing behavior of the budget-constrained public enterprise

By assuming that a budget-constrained multiproduct public enterprise chooses prices with the goal of maximizing its budget, its revenue or its output, specific pricing rules can be derived. Rather than overstating demand elasticities and then pricing like a monopolist, as a budget-constrained welfare-maximizing firm would do, the enterprise pursuing one of these alternative goals is shown to understate marginal cost and then price like a monopolist. Non-optimal price discrimination and even cross subsidization may result. The outcome tends to be more perverse when statutory entry barriers protect some markets of the enterprise. In its pricing, the U.S. Postal Service has shown some of the signs of such other-than-welfare-maximizing pricing behavior.     

Local content and emission taxes when the number of foreign firms is endogenous

We consider a vertical relationship where an upstream monopolist supplies input to downstream duopolistic firms. Under the assumption that downstream firms produce under a soft capacity restriction, we show that the balance between price and quantity in downstream firms’ strategy is endogenous. In this way, the monopolist’s charge for input co-determines downstream market conduct. We spell out some consequences of this, for example, that an increase of downstream capacity costs can result in increased output. We discuss other implications in relation to pass-through and incidence of cost changes.     

Ranking the optimum tariff and the maximum revenue tariff in vertically related markets

This paper firstly shows that in a vertically related industry with either domestic upstream monopolist or foreign upstream monopolist, when the upstream firm adopts uniform input pricing, the optimum-welfare tariff is higher than the maximum-revenue tariff, if the number of foreign competitors is sufficiently large. Secondly, when domestic upstream monopolist adopts discriminatory input pricing, the maximum-revenue tariff is higher than the optimum-welfare tariff. Thirdly, when foreign upstream monopolist adopts discriminatory input pricing, the optimum-welfare tariff will exceed the maximum-revenue tariff if the sizes of domestic and foreign firms become more unequally distributed.     

Can Hypothetical Questions Reveal True Values? A Laboratory Comparison of Dichotomous Choice and Open-Ended Contingent Values with Auction Values

Can hypothetical questions reveal true values? An examination of thelaboratory experimental literature examining contingent valuation (CV)lends some support for using open-ended hypothetical willingness to payquestions. However, experimental studies examining dichotomous choicehave found that hypothetical answers overstate demand. Consistent withthe experimental literature, published CV studies comparing open-ended todichotomous choice questions have shown that values from the dichotomouschoice method equal or exceed those of the open-ended method in everycase. This paper presents a series of experiments employing more than 800subjects to test this hypothesis for CV and compares the CV results toactual auction values in a single controlled experimental environment.     

Welfare and product testing by a regulated monopolist

This paper studies a monopoly firm with the ability to conduct costly pre-market testing of its product in order to predict how safe this product is to consume. While there are private incentives to test, the amount of testing effort supplied by a monopolist need not be optimal. In a model which allows for an imperfect system of liability, we characterize and compare the allocations of testing effort and output at the full social optimum, the pure monopoly solution, and the second-best regulated optimum wherein the regulator chooses testing effort and the monopolist chooses output and price.     

Location decisions of a polluting firm and the time consistency of environmental policy

This paper considers location decisions of a monopolist, who faces a tax on its emissions in the home country, under ex post that is, time consistent, and ex ante, that is precommitment, environmental policies. We show that the monopolist will relocate more often under ex post optimal emission taxes. A government which cannot commit to an ex ante emission tax and sets its tax ex post after abatement effort has been chosen, is unable to affect the monopolist’s location decision, because it cannot commit to strategically reduce its tax level in the first stage. Domestic welfare is often higher under ex post emission taxes whenever the monopolist relocates under both policy regimes. Otherwise, welfare is higher under government commitment to an ex ante emission tax level. Thus, government commitment to a policy is not always welfare improving.     

Using Market Structure to Regulate a Vertically Integrated Monopolist

A natural monopolist whose cost is private information produces a good which is combined with another good that can be produced by the monopolist or by other firms. The agency that regulates the monopolist can impose any of several different market structures in the industry: integrated monopoly, vertical separation with free entry downstream, or liberalization downstream (both integrated and independent production). When several firms produce downstream, a Cournot quantity-setting game with free entry determines the market price. We derive the optimal contracts to offer the monopolist under all three market structures and examine the influence of downstream cost differences on access prices.We then study the optimal regulatory policy where the regulator can condition the downstream market structure on the monopolist's cost report to the regulator. The optimal regulatory policy awards a monopoly to a low-cost upstream firm, but requires free entry downstream if the monopolist reports high upstream costs. Thus, the choice of market structure is an additional tool to limit rent extraction by the monopolist. Simulation analysis reveals the possibility of significant welfare gains from this additional regulatory tool.