Severe accident analysis for a typical PWR using the MELCOR code

Using the MELCOR code, we simulated and analyzed a severe accident at a Chinese pressurized reactor 1000-MW (CPR1000) power plant caused by station blackout (SBO) with failure of the steam generator (SG) safety relief valve (SRV). The CPR1000 response and results for three different scenarios were analyzed: (i) seal leakage and an auxiliary feed water (AFW) supply; (ii) no seal leakage or AFW supply; and (iii) seal leakage but no AFW supply. The results for the three scenarios are compared with those for a simple SBO accident. According to our calculations, the SG SRV stuck in the open position would greatly accelerate the sequence for a severe accident. For an SBO accident with the SRV stuck open without seal leakage or an AFW supply, the pressure vessel would fail at 9576 s and the containment system would fail at 124,000 s. If AFW is supplied, pressure vessel failure would be delayed nearly 30000 s and containment failure would delay at least 50000 s. When seal leakage exists, pressure vessel failure is delayed about 50 s and containment failure time would delay about 30000 s. The results will be useful in gaining an insight into the detailed processes involved and establishing management guidelines for a CPR1000 severe accident.     

Analysis of severe core damage accident progression for the heavy water reactor

In this study,the severe accident progression analysis of generic Canadian deuterium uranium reactor 6 was preliminarily provided using an integrated severe accident analysis code.The selected accident sequences were multiple steam generator tube rupture and large break loss-of-coolant accidents because these led to severe core damage with an assumed unavailability for several critical safety systems.The progressions of severe accident included a set of failed safety systems normally operated at full power,and initiative events led to primary heat transport system inventory blow-down or boil off.The core heat-up and melting,steam generator response,fuel channel and calandria vessel failure were analyzed.The results showed that the progression of a severe core damage accident induced by steam generator tube rupture or large break loss-of-coolant accidents in a CANDU reactor was slow due to heat sinks in the calandria vessel and vault.     

Overview of containment venting as an accident mitigation strategy in US light water reactors

This paper summarizes the results of previous analyses of containment venting at US light water reactors. The focus of the paper is on the risk aspects of containment venting as a severe accident mitigation strategy; therefore, past risk analyses of venting are critically reviewed and conclusions are drawn where possible concerning the risk and efficacy of this strategy. Because the accident mitigation issues vary from one reactor and containment type to another, the paper examines five containment types separately.     

严重事故下安全壳排气对乏燃料厂房氢气风险影响研究

以我国某三代压水堆核电厂为例,选取了2个典型严重事故工况,采用严重事故一体化程序MAAP开展建模与计算,对安全壳排气的过程及对乏燃料厂房造成的氢气风险进行了分析。结果表明,如果不考虑乏燃料厂房的通风系统,从安全壳内释放的混合气体由于水蒸气的冷凝,会对乏燃料厂房造成一定的氢气风险;如果考虑乏燃料厂房通风系统的作用,乏燃料厂房的氢气风险将会消除。      

Analysis on containment depressurization under severe accidents for a Chinese 1000 MWe NPP

Containment depressurization has been implemented for many nuclear power plants (NPPs) to mitigate the risk of containment overpressurization induced by steam and gases released in LOCA accidents or generated in molten core concrete interaction (MCCI) during severe accidents. Two accident sequences of large break loss of coolant accident (LB-LOCA) and station blackout (SBO) are selected to evaluate the effectiveness of the containment venting strategy for a Chinese 1000 MWe NPP, including the containment pressure behaviors, which are analyzed with the integral safety analyses code for the selected sequences. Different open/close pressures for the venting system are also investigated to evaluate CsI mass fraction released to the environment for different cases with filtered venting or without filtered venting. The analytical results show that when the containment sprays can't be initiated, the depressurization strategy by using the Containment Filtered Venting System (CFVS) can prevent the containment failure and reduce the amount of CsI released to the environment, and if CFVS is closed at higher pressure, the operation interval is smaller and the radioactive released to the environment is less, and if CFVS open pressure is increased, the radioactive released to the environment can be delayed. Considering the risk of high pressure core melt sequence, RCS depressurization makes the CFVS to be initiated 7 h earlier than the base case to initiate the containment venting due to more coolant flowing into the containment.     

An evaluation of a general venting strategy in a CANDU 6 reactor building

If the reactor building sprays or local air coolers are not available, depressurization by reactor building venting is considered as a useful mitigation strategy for a severe accident management of the Wolsong plants. As the containment filtered vent system is not established in the Wolsong Units, the reactor building isolation system can be a substitute for reactor building venting. The D₂O vapour recovery system which has a 0.76 m (30 in.) diameter penetration is expected to meet the NRC requirements. To investigate the effectiveness of the Reactor Building Venting Strategy, three kinds of accidents are analyzed: a SBO, a Small LOCA and a Large LOCA. The reactor building pressure behavior was analyzed with the ISAAC computer code for four different cases: without venting, 379 kPa(g)/345 kPa(g) (55 psig/50 psig), 345 kPa(g)/276 kPa(g) (50 psig/40 psig) and 345 kPa(g)/207 kPa(g) (50 psig/30 psig) valve open/close pressures. When the reactor building spray or local air coolers can not be operated, a depressurization strategy by using the D₂O Vapour Recovery System could prevent a reactor building failure and reduce the amount of CsI released to the environment. The present study shows that the operation of valves at a pressure of 379 kPa(g)/345 kPa(g) (55 psig/50 psig) is safe and effective. Based on the current study, the strategy of reactor building venting is involved in severe accident management guidance-5.     

Analysis on hydrogen risk mitigation in severe accidents for Pressurized Heavy Water Reactor

Hydrogen source term and hydrogen mitigation under severe accidents is evaluated for most nuclear power plants (NPPs) after Fukushima Daiichi accident. Two units of Pressurized Heavy Water Reactor (PHWR) are under operating in China, and hydrogen risk control should be evaluated in detail for the existing design. The distinguish feature of PHWR, compared with PWR, is the horizontal reactor core surrounded by moderator in calandria vessel (CV), which may influence the hydrogen source term. Based on integral system analysis code of PHWR, the plant model including primary heat transfer system (PHTS), calandria, end shield system, reactor cavity and containment has been developed. Two severe accident sequences have been selected to study hydrogen generation characteristic and the effectiveness of hydrogen mitigation with igniters. The one is Station Blackout (SBO) which represents high-pressure core melt accident, and the other is Large Break Loss of Coolant Accident (LLOCA) at reactor outlet header (ROH) which represents low-pressure core melt accident. Results show that under severe accident sequences, core oxidation of zirconium–steam reaction will produce hydrogen with deterioration of core cooling and the water in CV and reactor cavity can inhibits hydrogen generation for a relatively long time. However, as the water dries out, creep failure happens on CV. As a result, molten core falls into cavity and molten core concrete interaction (MCCI) occurs, releasing a large mass of hydrogen. When hydrogen igniters fail, volume fraction of hydrogen in the containment is more than 15% while equivalent amount of hydrogen generate from a 100% fuel clad-coolant reaction. As a result, hydrogen risk lies in the deflagration–detonation transition area. When igniters start at the beginning of large hydrogen generation, hydrogen mixtures ignite at low concentration in the compartments and the combustion mode locates at the edge of flammable area. However, the power supply to igniters should be ensured.     

Pressure release of containments during severe accidents in Switzerland

As required by the Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate (HSK) all Switzerland's five nuclear power plants have to install a containment filtered venting system. The integrity of the containment (the last barrier for radioactive releases to the environment) can be threatened by overpressure due to inadequate heat removal. Design requirements have been provided for a specific class of severe accident scenarios. In general the capacity of the system is considered sufficient if it is able to vent the steam production corresponding to a decay heat level of 1% of the thermal reactor power. The mitigation capacity for the reduction of released radioactive material is specified by a retention factor of 1000 for aerosols to prevent or limit a long term ground contamination and a factor of 100 for elementary iodine for prevention or limiting of thyroid doses and to avoid short term evacuation. Besides existing requirements for design, maintenance and operation, additional claims such as passivity and operability at any pressure conditions inside the containment have to be met. Passivity implies that the system can be initiated after a severe accident without any operator action. The system also has to allow early manual venting. Various filtered venting systems are presently available. The nuclear power plants of Beznau, Gosgen, Leibstadt and Muhleberg have already selected such systems and already implemented them or are going to install them step by step. Beznau selected the Sulzer-EWI system which is using a water pool with nozzles-baffle plates and mixing elements to achieve the required filtration of the aerosols. In both Beznau units, the systems are installed and in standby mode. Gosgen, a pressurized water reactor as well as Beznau, is going to implement a filter system developed by Siemens-KWU, known as sliding pressure venting process, combining a venturi scrubber in a water pool and a mesh filter. The boiling water reactor of Leibstadt also selected the same system as Beznau while Müheberg choose the ABB system but not in the common design. The venturi pipes are thereby integrated in the water pool of the outer torus. The system in all five nuclear power plants is fully operable and in standby mode since December 1993.     

Three-dimensional behaviors of the hydrogen and steam in the APR1400 containment during a hypothetical loss of feed water accident

During a hypothetical severe accident in a nuclear power plant (NPP), hydrogen is generated by an active reaction of the fuel-cladding and the steam in the reactor pressure vessel and released with the steam into the containment. In order to mitigate hydrogen hazards which could possibly occur in the NPP containment, a hydrogen mitigation system (HMS) is usually adopted. The design of the next generation NPP (APR1400) developed in Korea specifies that 26 passive autocatalytic recombiners and 10 igniters should be installed in the containment for a hydrogen mitigation. In this study, an analysis of the hydrogen and steam behavior during a total loss of feed water (LOFW) accident in the APR1400 containment has been conducted by using the computational fluid dynamics (CFD) code GASFLOW. During the accident, a huge amount of hot water, steam, and hydrogen is released into the in-containment refueling water storage tank (IRWST). The current design of the APR1400 includes flap-type openings at the IRWST vents which operate depending on the pressure difference between the inside and outside of the IRWST. It was found from this study that the flaps strongly affect the flow structure of the steam and hydrogen in the containment. The possibilities of a flame acceleration and a transition from deflagration to detonation (DDT) were evaluated by using the Sigma–Lambda criteria. Numerical results indicate that the DDT possibility was heavily reduced in the IRWST compartment by the effects of the flaps during the LOFW accident.     

安全壳卸压排放过程模化分析

针对大型非能动先进压水堆安全壳卸压排放过程中涉及的重要热工现象，采用系统性的关键现象识别及重要性分析方法，得到了大型非能动先进压水堆卸压排放过程中的现象过程识别与排序表（PIRT）。结果表明：排放管线及鼓泡器中对安全壳卸压排放过程影响程度较高的现象为临界和摩擦流、两相压降、几何尺寸及流动状态；乏燃料水池中对安全壳卸压排放过程影响程度较高的现象为冷凝、传热、几何尺寸、流体混合、不凝性气体及热分层。利用关键现象识别及重要性分析结果与现有缩放实验台架的搭建经验及研究结果，得到了安全壳卸压排放过程验证性试验装置搭建中应该遵循的相似准则，从而为安全壳卸压排放验证性试验装置的搭建提供设计基础和理论依据。     

Heat transfer coefficients under LOCA conditions in containment buildings

A model to calculate local heat transfer coefficients between the containment atmosphere and the walls of a pressurized water reactor containment building after a loss-of-coolant accident has been developed. The new calculation is based on the containment wall and atmosphere bulk temperatures, mass ratio of steam to air, and condensing or convective heat transfer conditions. Comparison with the Carolinas Virginia Tube Reactor Containment Tests shows good agreement. The model has been implemented into the containment code TECAR.     

Detailed Evaluation of RCS Boundary Rupture during High-Pressure Severe Accident Sequences

A depressurization possibility of the reactor coolant system (RCS) before a reactor vessel rupture during a high-pressure severe accident sequence has been evaluated for the consideration of direct containment heating (DCH) and containment bypass. A total loss of feed water (TLOFW) and a station blackout (SBO) of the advanced power reactor 1400 (APR1400) has been evaluated from an initiating event to a creep rupture of the RCS boundary by using the SCDAP/RELAP5 computer code. In addition, intentional depressurization of the RCS using power-operated safety relief valves (POSRVs) has been evaluated. The SCDAPRELAP5 results have shown that the pressurizer surge line broke before the reactor vessel rupture failure, but a containment bypass did not occur because steam generator U tubes did not break. The intentional depressurization of the RCS using POSRV was effective for the DCH prevention at a reactor vessel rupture.     

The role of BWR secondary containments in severe accident mitigation: Issues and insights from recent analyses

All commercial boiling water reactor (BWR) plants in the US employ primary containments of the pressure suppression design. These primary containments are surrounded and enclosed by secondary containments. While not designed for severe accident mitigation, these secondary containments might also reduce the radiological consequences of severe accidents. This issue is receiving increasing attention due to concerns that BWR MK I primary containment integrity would be lost should a significant mass of molten debris escape the reactor vessel during a severe accident.The fission product retention capability of an intact secondary containment will depend on several factors. Recent analyses indicate that the major factors influencing secondary containment effectiveness include: the mode and location of the primary containment failure, the internal architectural design of the secondary containment, the design of the standby gas treatment system, and the ability of fire protection system sprays to remove suspended aerosols from the the secondary containment atmosphere. Each of these factors interact in a very complex manner to determine secondary containment severe accident mitigation performance.This paper presents a brief overview of US BWR secondary containment designs and highlights plant-specific features that could influence secondary containment severe accident survivability and accident mitigation effectiveness. Current issues surrounding secondary containment performance are discussed, and insights gained from recent secondary containment studies of Browns Ferry, Peach Bottom, and Shoreham are presented. Areas of significant uncertainty are identified and recommendations for future research are presented.     

严重事故条件下安全壳响应模拟研究

压水堆核电厂发生严重事故期间，从主系统释放的蒸汽、氢气以及下封头失效后进入安全壳的堆芯熔融物均对安全壳的完整性构成威胁。以国内典型二代加压水堆为研究对象，采用MAAP程序进行安全壳响应分析。选取了两种典型的严重事故序列：热管段中破口叠加设备冷却水失效和再循环高压安注失效，堆芯因冷却不足升温熔化导致压力容器失效，熔融物与混凝土发生反应（MCCI），安全壳超压失效；冷管段大破口叠加再循环失效，安全壳内蒸汽不断聚集，发生超压失效。通过对两种事故工况的分析，证实了再循环高压安注、安全壳喷淋这两种缓解措施对保证安全壳完整性的重要作用。     

Analysis of large-scale tests for AP-600 passive containment cooling system

All next-generation light water reactors utilize passive systems to remove heat via natural circulation and are significantly different from past and current nuclear plant designs. One unique feature of the AP-600 is its passive containment cooling system (PCCS), which is designed to maintain containment pressure below the design limit for 72 h without action by the reactor operator. During a design-basis accident (DBA), i.e., either a loss-of-coolant or a main-steam-line break accident, steam escapes and comes in contact with the much cooler containment vessel wall. Heat is transferred to the inside surface of the steel containment wall by convection and condensation of steam and through the containment steel wall by conduction. Heat is then transferred from the outside of the containment surface by heating and evaporation of a thin liquid film that is formed by applying water at the top of the containment vessel dome. Air in the annular space is heated by both convection and injection of steam from the evaporating liquid film. The heated air and vapor rise as a result of natural circulation and exit the shield building through the outlets above the containment shell. All of the analytical models that are developed for and used in the COMMIX-1D code for predicting performance of the PCCS will be described. These models cover governing conservation equations for multicomponents single-phase flow, transport equations for the k − two-equation turbulence model, auxiliary equations, liquid-film tracking model for both inside (condensate) and outside (evaporating liquid film) surfaces of the containment vessel wall, thermal coupling between flow domains inside and outside the containment vessel, and heat and mass transfer models. Various key parameters of the COMMIX-1D results and corresponding AP-600 PCCS experimental data are compared and the agreement is good. Significant findings from this study are summarized.     

Evaluation of Containment Failure Probability by Ex-Vessel Steam Explosion in Japanese LWR Plants

The containment failure probability due to ex-vessel steam explosions was evaluated for Japanese BWR and PWR model plants. A stratified Monte Carlo technique (Latin Hypercube Sampling (LHS)) was applied for the evaluation of steam explosion loads, in which a steam explosion simulation code JASMINE was used as a physics model. The evaluation was made for three scenarios: a steam explosion in the pedestal area or in the suppression pool of a BWR model plant with a Mark-II containment, and in the reactor cavity of a PWR model plant. The scenario connecting the generation of steam explosion loads and the containment failure was assumed to be displacement of the reactor vessel and pipings, and failure at the penetration in the containment boundary. We evaluated the conditional containment failure probability (CCFP) based on the preconditions of failure of molten core retention within the reactor vessel, relocation of the core melt into the water pool without significant interference, and a strong triggering at the time of maximum premixed mass. The obtained mean and median values of the CCPF were 6.4x 10^?2 (mean) and 3.9x 10^?2 (median) for the BWR suppression pool case, 2.2x10^?3 (mean) and 2.8x10^?10 (median) for the BWR pedestal case, and 6.8X10^?2 (mean) and 1.4x10^?2 (median) for the PWR cavity case. The evaluation of CCFPs on the basis of core damage needs consideration of probabilities for the above-mentioned preconditions. Thus, the CCFPs per core damage should be lower than the values given above. The specific values of the probability were most dependent on the assumed range of melt flow rate and fragility curve that involved conservatism and uncertainty due to simplified scenarios and limited information.     

AP1000核电厂大量放射性释放源项分析

在AP1000核电厂的某些严重事故情景中,安全壳可能发生失效或旁通,导致大量放射性物质释放到环境中,造成严重的放射性污染。针对大量放射性释放频率贡献最大的3种释放类别（安全壳旁通、安全壳早期失效和安全壳隔离失效）,分别选取典型的严重事故序列（蒸汽发生器传热管破裂、自动卸压系统阀门误开启和压力容器破裂）,使用MAAP程序计算分析了释放到环境中的裂变产物源项。该分析结果为量化AP1000核电厂的放射性释放后果和厂外剂量分析提供了必要的输入。     

Efficacy assessment of independent severe accident mitigation measures in OPR1000 using MELCOR code

In-vessel and ex-vessel mitigation strategies have been revisited to improve the severe accident management (SAM) for operating nuclear power plants. Because independent mitigation measures tend to produce positive and adverse effects simultaneously, it is necessary to investigate the efficacy of individual measures by means of proper quantification. Thus, in the present study we investigated the overall efficacy of existing SA mitigation strategies prepared for the Optimized Power Reactor 1000 MWe (OPR1000) by means of MELCOR 1.8.6 code. The numerical evaluation showed that the Mitigation-01, feeding water into the steam generators, is the most effective among the other mitigations. In addition, Mitigation-02, reactor coolant system depressurization, could not mitigate the SA sufficiently when applied individually. Among the four ex-vessel mitigation strategies, execution of containment spray was effective in removing most of the aerosol fission product but also intensified hydrogen combustion by increasing the partial hydrogen pressure owing to steam condensation. Mitigation-07, operation of passive autocatalytic recombiners (PARs), could reduce the hydrogen concentration, though the catalytic reaction was predicted to increase the containment pressure. In conclusion, this study suggests that mitigation measures should be carefully selected, and that counteracting measures should be prepared to minimize potential adverse effects.     

An analysis of containment responses during a station blackout accident

An analysis of the responses of the containment during a station blackout accident is performed for the APR1400 nuclear power plant using MELCOR 2.1. The analysis results show that the containment failure occurs at about 84.14 h. Prior to the failure of the reactor vessel, the containment pressure increases slowly. Then, a rapid increase of the containment pressure occurs when a large amount of hot molten corium is discharged from the reactor pressure vessel to the cavity. The molten corium concrete interaction (MCCI) is arrested when water is flooded over a molten corium in the cavity. The boiling of water in the cavity causes a fast increase in the containment pressure. During the early phase of the accident, a large amount of steam is condensed inside the containment due to the presence of the heat structures. This results in a mitigation of a containment pressure increase. During the late phase, the containment pressure increases gradually due to the addition of steam and gases from an MCCI and water evaporation. It was found that two-thirds of the total mass of steam and gases in the containment is from an MCCI and one-third of the mass is from water evaporation.     

Investigations of the melting behaviour of the U–Zr–Fe–O system

During a severe nuclear accident, the UO₂ fuel rods, Zircaloy cladding, guide tubes, absorber and steel structural components inside the reactor pressure vessel overheat and a series of interactions between these elements and the steam atmosphere occur. These produce more heat in addition to the decay heat and result in a liquid corium of oxidic and metallic phases depending on the exact conditions and processes. A major systems resulting from this is the U–Zr–Fe–O system. High-temperature data for this system is important in order to be able to model these interactions. The Joint Research Centre, Institute for Transuranium Elements (JRC-ITU) has been examining the melting ranges for this system over the whole FeO range by means of a specialized laser flash technique that achieves very high temperatures and avoids crucible contamination. The melted zones were examined for their structure, composition and for estimation of the liquidus and solidus temperatures. The results showed that with FeO contents of over 20mol% there was a very large melting range that would permit long liquid cooling times and extend the relocation of fuel material within the reactor pressure vessel. Based on these results, the main phase regimes expected under severe accident conditions could be identified.