Resilience Analysis of a Remote Offshore Oil and Gas Facility for a Potential Hydrocarbon Release

Resilience is the capability of a system to adjust its functionality during a disturbance or perturbation. The present work attempts to quantify resilience as a function of reliability, vulnerability, and maintainability. The approach assesses proactive and reactive defense mechanisms along with operational factors to respond to unwanted disturbances and perturbation. This article employs a Bayesian network format to build a resilience model. The application of the model is tested on hydrocarbon‐release scenarios during an offloading operation in a remote and harsh environment. The model identifies requirements for robust recovery and adaptability during an unplanned scenario related to a hydrocarbon release. This study attempts to relate the resilience capacity of a system to the system's absorptive, adaptive, and restorative capacities. These factors influence predisaster and postdisaster strategies that can be mapped to enhance the resilience of the system.     

On the Complex Quantification of Risk: Systems‐Based Perspective on Terrorism

This article highlights the complexity of the quantification of the multidimensional risk function, develops five systems‐based premises on quantifying the risk of terrorism to a threatened system, and advocates the quantification of vulnerability and resilience through the states of the system. The five premises are: (i) There exists interdependence between a specific threat to a system by terrorist networks and the states of the targeted system, as represented through the system's vulnerability, resilience, and criticality‐impact. (ii) A specific threat, its probability, its timing, the states of the targeted system, and the probability of consequences can be interdependent. (iii) The two questions in the risk assessment process: “What is the likelihood?” and “What are the consequences?” can be interdependent. (iv) Risk management policy options can reduce both the likelihood of a threat to a targeted system and the associated likelihood of consequences by changing the states (including both vulnerability and resilience) of the system. (v) The quantification of risk to a vulnerable system from a specific threat must be built on a systemic and repeatable modeling process, by recognizing that the states of the system constitute an essential step to construct quantitative metrics of the consequences based on intelligence gathering, expert evidence, and other qualitative information. The fact that the states of all systems are functions of time (among other variables) makes the time frame pivotal in each component of the process of risk assessment, management, and communication. Thus, risk to a system, caused by an initiating event (e.g., a threat) is a multidimensional function of the specific threat, its probability and time frame, the states of the system (representing vulnerability and resilience), and the probabilistic multidimensional consequences.     

Assessing Engineering Resilience for Systems with Multiple Performance Measures

Recently, efforts to model and assess a system's resilience to disruptions due to environmental and adversarial threats have increased substantially. Researchers have investigated resilience in many disciplines, including sociology, psychology, computer networks, and engineering systems, to name a few. When assessing engineering system resilience, the resilience assessment typically considers a single performance measure, a disruption, a loss of performance, the time required to recover, or a combination of these elements. We define and use a resilient engineered system definition that separates system resilience into platform and mission resilience. Most complex systems have multiple performance measures; this research proposes using multiple objective decision analysis to assess system resilience for systems with multiple performance measures using two distinct methods. The first method quantifies platform resilience and includes resilience and other “ilities” directly in the value hierarchy, while the second method quantifies mission resilience and uses the “ilities” in the calculation of the expected mission performance for every performance measure in the value hierarchy. We illustrate the mission resilience method using a transportation systems‐of‐systems network with varying levels of resilience due to the level of connectivity and autonomy of the vehicles and platform resilience by using a notional military example. Our analysis found that it is necessary to quantify performance in context with specific mission(s) and scenario(s) under specific threat(s) and then use modeling and simulation to help determine the resilience of a system for a given set of conditions. The example demonstrates how incorporating system mission resilience can improve performance for some performance measures while negatively affecting others.     

On Some Recent Definitions and Analysis Frameworks for Risk,Vulnerability, and Resilience

Recently, considerable attention has been paid to a systems‐based approach to risk, vulnerability, and resilience analysis. It is argued that risk, vulnerability, and resilience are inherently and fundamentally functions of the states of the system and its environment. Vulnerability is defined as the manifestation of the inherent states of the system that can be subjected to a natural hazard or be exploited to adversely affect that system, whereas resilience is defined as the ability of the system to withstand a major disruption within acceptable degradation parameters and to recover within an acceptable time, and composite costs, and risks. Risk, on the other hand, is probability based, defined by the probability and severity of adverse effects (i.e., the consequences). In this article, we look more closely into this approach. It is observed that the key concepts are inconsistent in the sense that the uncertainty (probability) dimension is included for the risk definition but not for vulnerability and resilience. In the article, we question the rationale for this inconsistency. The suggested approach is compared with an alternative framework that provides a logically defined structure for risk, vulnerability, and resilience, where all three concepts are incorporating the uncertainty (probability) dimension.     

Decision‐Making Analytics Using Plural Resilience Parameters for Adaptive Management of Complex Systems

It is critical for complex systems to effectively recover, adapt, and reorganize after system disruptions. Common approaches for evaluating system resilience typically study single measures of performance at one time, such as with a single resilience curve. However, multiple measures of performance are needed for complex systems that involve many components, functions, and noncommensurate valuations of performance. Hence, this article presents a framework for: (1) modeling resilience for complex systems with competing measures of performance, and (2) modeling decision making for investing in these systems using multiple stakeholder perspectives and multicriteria decision analysis. This resilience framework, which is described and demonstrated in this article via a real‐world case study, will be of interest to managers of complex systems, such as supply chains and large‐scale infrastructure networks.     

Sequential Hazards Resilience of Interdependent Infrastructure System: A Case Study of Greater Toronto Area Energy Infrastructure System

Coupled infrastructure systems and complicated multihazards result in a high level of complexity and make it difficult to assess and improve the infrastructure system resilience. With a case study of the Greater Toronto Area energy system (including electric, gas, and oil transmission networks), an approach to analysis of multihazard resilience of an interdependent infrastructure system is presented in the article. Integrating network theory, spatial and numerical analysis methods, the new approach deals with the complicated multihazard relations and complex infrastructure interdependencies as spatiotemporal impacts on infrastructure systems in order to assess the dynamic system resilience. The results confirm that the effects of sequential hazards on resilience of infrastructure (network) are more complicated than the sum of single hazards. The resilience depends on the magnitude of the hazards, their spatiotemporal relationship and dynamic combined impacts, and infrastructure interdependencies. The article presents a comparison between physical and functional resilience of an electric transmission network, and finds functional resilience is always higher than physical resilience. The multiple hazards resilience evaluation approach is applicable to any type of infrastructure and hazard and it can contribute to the improvement of infrastructure planning, design, and maintenance decision making.     

Inherent Costs and Interdependent Impacts of Infrastructure Network Resilience

Recent studies in system resilience have proposed metrics to understand the ability of systems to recover from a disruptive event, often offering a qualitative treatment of resilience. This work provides a quantitative treatment of resilience and focuses specifically on measuring resilience in infrastructure networks. Inherent cost metrics are introduced: loss of service cost and total network restoration cost. Further, “costs” of network resilience are often shared across multiple infrastructures and industries that rely upon those networks, particularly when such networks become inoperable in the face of disruptive events. As such, this work integrates the quantitative resilience approach with a model describing the regional, multi‐industry impacts of a disruptive event to measure the interdependent impacts of network resilience. The approaches discussed in this article are deployed in a case study of an inland waterway transportation network, the Mississippi River Navigation System.     

On the Complex Definition of Risk: A Systems-Based Approach

The premise of this article is that risk to a system, as well as its vulnerability and resilience, can be understood, defined, and quantified most effectively through a systems-based philosophical and methodological approach, and by recognizing the central role of the system states in this process. A universally agreed-upon definition of risk has been difficult to develop; one reason is that the concept is multidimensional and nuanced. It requires an understanding that risk to a system is inherently and fundamentally a function of the initiating event, the states of the system and of its environment, and the time frame. In defining risk, this article posits that: (a) the performance capabilities of a system are a function of its state vector; (b) a system's vulnerability and resilience vectors are each a function of the input (e.g., initiating event), its time of occurrence, and the states of the system; (c) the consequences are a function of the specificity and time of the event, the vector of the states, the vulnerability, and the resilience of the system; (d) the states of a system are time-dependent and commonly fraught with variability uncertainties and knowledge uncertainties; and (e) risk is a measure of the probability and severity of consequences. The above implies that modeling must evaluate consequences for each risk scenario as functions of the threat (initiating event), the vulnerability and resilience of the system, and the time of the event. This fundamentally complex modeling and analysis process cannot be performed correctly and effectively without relying on the states of the system being studied.     

Stochastic Counterfactual Risk Analysis for the Vulnerability Assessment of Cyber‐Physical Attacks on Electricity Distribution Infrastructure Networks

In December 2015, a cyber‐physical attack took place on the Ukrainian electricity distribution network. This is regarded as one of the first cyber‐physical attacks on electricity infrastructure to have led to a substantial power outage and is illustrative of the increasing vulnerability of Critical National Infrastructure to this type of malicious activity. Few data points, coupled with the rapid emergence of cyber phenomena, has held back the development of resilience analytics of cyber‐physical attacks, relative to many other threats. We propose to overcome data limitations by applying stochastic counterfactual risk analysis as part of a new vulnerability assessment framework. The method is developed in the context of the direct and indirect socioeconomic impacts of a Ukrainian‐style cyber‐physical attack taking place on the electricity distribution network serving London and its surrounding regions. A key finding is that if decision‐makers wish to mitigate major population disruptions, then they must invest resources more‐or‐less equally across all substations, to prevent the scaling of a cyber‐physical attack. However, there are some substations associated with higher economic value due to their support of other Critical National Infrastructures assets, which justifies the allocation of additional cyber security investment to reduce the chance of cascading failure. Further cyber‐physical vulnerability research must address the tradeoffs inherent in a system made up of multiple institutions with different strategic risk mitigation objectives and metrics of value, such as governments, infrastructure operators, and commercial consumers of infrastructure services.     

Understanding Community Resilience from a PRA Perspective Using Binary Decision Diagrams

Probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) is a useful tool to assess complex interconnected systems. This article leverages the capabilities of PRA tools developed for industrial and nuclear risk analysis in community resilience evaluations by modeling the food security of a community in terms of its built environment as an integrated system. To this end, we model the performance of Gilroy, CA, a moderate‐size town, with regard to disruptions in its food supply caused by a severe earthquake. The food retailers of Gilroy, along with the electrical power network, water network elements, and bridges are considered as components of a system. Fault and event trees are constructed to model the requirements for continuous food supply to community residents and are analyzed efficiently using binary decision diagrams (BDDs). The study also identifies shortcomings in approximate classical system analysis methods in assessing community resilience. Importance factors are utilized to rank the importance of various factors to the overall risk of food insecurity. Finally, the study considers the impact of various sources of uncertainties in the hazard modeling and performance of infrastructure on food security measures. The methodology can be applicable for any existing critical infrastructure system and has potential extensions to other hazards.     

Selecting Indicators for Assessing Community Sustainable Resilience

Communities are complex systems subject to a variety of hazards that can result in significant disruption to critical functions. Community resilience assessment is rapidly gaining popularity as a means to help communities better prepare for, respond to, and recover from disruption. Sustainable resilience, a recently developed concept, requires communities to assess system‐wide capability to maintain desired performance levels while simultaneously evaluating impacts to resilience due to changes in hazards and vulnerability over extended periods of time. To enable assessment of community sustainable resilience, we review current literature, consolidate available indicators and metrics, and develop a classification scheme and organizational structure to aid in identification, selection, and application of indicators within a dynamic assessment framework. A nonduplicative set of community sustainable resilience indicators and metrics is provided that can be tailored to a community's needs, thereby enhancing the ability to operationalize the assessment process.     

Designing survivable resilient networks: A stochastic hybrid genetic algorithm approach

As high-speed networks have proliferated across the globe, their topologies have become sparser due to the increased reliability of components and cost considerations. Reliability has been a traditional goal within network design optimization. An alternative design consideration, network resilience, has not been studied or incorporated into network designs nearly as much. The authors propose a methodology for the difficult estimation of traffic efficiency (TE), a measure of network resilience, and a hybrid genetic algorithm to design networks using this measure.     

A Factor Analysis Approach Toward Reconciling Community Vulnerability and Resilience Indices for Natural Hazards

The concepts of vulnerability and resilience help explain why natural hazards of similar type and magnitude can have disparate impacts on varying communities. Numerous frameworks have been developed to measure these concepts, but a clear and consistent method of comparing them is lacking. Here, we develop a data-driven approach for reconciling a popular class of frameworks known as vulnerability and resilience indices. In particular, we conduct an exploratory factor analysis on a comprehensive set of variables from established indices measuring community vulnerability and resilience at the U.S. county level. The resulting factor model suggests that 50 of the 130 analyzed variables effectively load onto five dimensions: wealth, poverty, agencies per capita, elderly populations, and non–English-speaking populations. Additionally, the factor structure establishes an objective and intuitive schema for relating the constituent elements of vulnerability and resilience indices, in turn affording researchers a flexible yet robust baseline for validating and expanding upon current approaches.     

Individual learning as a driver of changes in community vulnerability under repeated hurricanes and changing climate

The risks from singular natural hazards such as a hurricane have been extensively investigated in the literature. However, little is understood about how individual and collective responses to repeated hazards change communities and impact their preparation for future events. Individual mitigation actions may drive how a community's resilience evolves under repeated hazards. In this paper, we investigate the effect that learning by homeowners can have on household mitigation decisions and on how this influences a region's vulnerability to natural hazards over time, using hurricanes along the east coast of the United States as our case study. To do this, we build an agent-based model (ABM) to simulate homeowners’ adaptation to repeated hurricanes and how this affects the vulnerability of the regional housing stock. Through a case study, we explore how different initial beliefs about the hurricane hazard and how the memory of recent hurricanes could change a community's vulnerability both under current and potential future hurricane scenarios under climate change. In some future hurricane environments, different initial beliefs can result in large differences in the region's long-term vulnerability to hurricanes. We find that when some homeowners mitigate soon after a hurricane—when their memory of the event is the strongest—it can help to substantially decrease the vulnerability of a community.     

Using Graph Models to Analyze the Vulnerability of Electric Power Networks

In this article, we model electric power delivery networks as graphs, and conduct studies of two power transmission grids, i.e., the Nordic and the western states (U.S.) transmission grid. We calculate values of topological (structural) characteristics of the networks and compare their error and attack tolerance (structural vulnerability), i.e., their performance when vertices are removed, with two frequently used theoretical reference networks (the Erdös‐Rényi random graph and the Barabási‐Albert scale‐free network). Further, we perform a structural vulnerability analysis of a fictitious electric power network with simple structure. In this analysis, different strategies to decrease the vulnerability of the system are evaluated. Finally, we present a discussion on the practical applicability of graph modeling.     

含有连续型随机参数的回收物流网络优化设计

考虑到设计参数的不确定性,建立了单一产品、有处理能力约束的回收物流网络优化设计的二阶段随机规划模型.该模型借助于抽样技术给出了连续型随机参数的有限离散数值,利用混合遗传算法计算并比较了不同网络的建设和运营费用,从而避免了网络设施数量和随机向量维数对模型求解效率的影响.为得到稳健的回收物流网络,利用大样本对计算获得的可行网络进行了评价.考虑到样本随机性的影响,给出了基于随机模型的回收物流网络优化设计步骤.另外,通过算例说明了随机模型的有效性,证实了确定性模型近似处理随机规划问题的不适用性.     

Reliability evaluation of a multicast over coded packet networks

Network coding is a generalization of conventional routing methods that allows a network node to code information flows before forwarding them. While it has been theoretically proved that network coding can achieve maximum network throughput, theoretical results usually do not consider the stochastic nature in information processing and transmission, especially when the capacity of each arc becomes stochastic due to failure, attacks, or maintenance. Hence, the reliability measurement of network coding becomes an important issue to evaluate the performance of the network under various system settings. In this paper, we present analytical expressions to measure the reliability of multicast communications in coded networks, where network coding is most promising. We define the probability that a multicast rate can be transmitted through a coded packet network under a total transmission cost constraint as the reliability metric. To do this, we first introduce an exact mathematical formulation to construct multicast connections over coded packet networks under a limited transmission cost. We then propose an algorithm based on minimal paths to calculate the reliability measurement of multicast connections and analyze the complexity of the algorithm. Our results show that the reliability of multicast routing with network coding improved significantly compared to the case of multicast routing without network coding.     

Probabilistic Multiple Hazard Resilience Model of an Interdependent Infrastructure System

Multiple hazard resilience is of significant practical value because most regions of the world are subject to multiple natural and technological hazards. An analysis and assessment approach for multiple hazard spatiotemporal resilience of interdependent infrastructure systems is developed using network theory and a numerical analysis. First, we define multiple hazard resilience and present a quantitative probabilistic metric based on the expansion of a single hazard deterministic resilience model. Second, we define a multiple hazard relationship analysis model with a focus on the impact of hazards on an infrastructure. Subsequently, a relationship matrix is constructed with temporal and spatial dimensions. Further, a general method for the evaluation of direct impacts on an individual infrastructure under multiple hazards is proposed. Third, we present an analysis of indirect multiple hazard impacts on interdependent infrastructures and a joint restoration model of an infrastructure system. Finally, a simplified two‐layer interdependent infrastructure network is used as a case study for illustrating the proposed methodology. The results show that temporal and spatial relationships of multiple hazards significantly influence system resilience. Moreover, the interdependence among infrastructures further magnifies the impact on resilience value. The main contribution of the article is a new multiple hazard resilience evaluation approach that is capable of integrating the impacts of multiple hazard interactions, interdependence of network components (layers), and restoration strategy.     

Determining the optimal double-component assignment for a stochastic computer network

This study determines the optimal double-component assignment based on the system reliability criterion for a computer system, in which the computer system is represented as a network with a set of links and a set of vertices. The double-component assignment is to assign a set of transmission lines (resp. facilities) to the links (resp. vertices) of the network, in which each transmission line (resp. facility) has multiple states due to maintenance or failure. Thus, the computer system according to any double-component assignment is called a stochastic computer network. The system reliability is the probability that the specific units of data are successfully transmitted through the stochastic computer network. An optimization algorithm which integrates the genetic algorithm, minimal paths, and Recursive Sum of Disjoint Products is utilized to find the optimal double-component assignment with maximal system reliability. Several computer networks are utilized to demonstrate the efficiency of the proposed algorithm compared with other algorithms. By solving this problem, data can be more reliably transmitted and thus the organization operation is executed more smoothly.     

Quantifying Community Resilience Using Hierarchical Bayesian Kernel Methods: A Case Study on Recovery from Power Outages

The ability to accurately measure recovery rate of infrastructure systems and communities impacted by disasters is vital to ensure effective response and resource allocation before, during, and after a disruption. However, a challenge in quantifying such measures resides in the lack of data as community recovery information is seldom recorded. To provide accurate community recovery measures, a hierarchical Bayesian kernel model (HBKM) is developed to predict the recovery rate of communities experiencing power outages during storms. The performance of the proposed method is evaluated using cross‐validation and compared with two models, the hierarchical Bayesian regression model and the Poisson generalized linear model. A case study focusing on the recovery of communities in Shelby County, Tennessee after severe storms between 2007 and 2017 is presented to illustrate the proposed approach. The predictive accuracy of the models is evaluated using the log‐likelihood and root mean squared error. The HBKM yields on average the highest out‐of‐sample predictive accuracy. This approach can help assess the recoverability of a community when data are scarce and inform decision making in the aftermath of a disaster. An illustrative example is presented demonstrating how accurate measures of community resilience can help reduce the cost of infrastructure restoration.