共查询到19条相似文献，搜索用时 53 毫秒
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国际原子能机构(IAEA)在国际放射防护委员会(ICRP)第103号建议书的基础上,完成了《国际电离辐射防护与辐射源安全基本标准》(IBSS)的修订并于2014年发布,原来的实践与干预体系改变为现在的计划照射、应急照射和现存照射三种照射情况。关于应急照射情况的要求主要有:根据与源有关的辐射危险的性质和规模制定应急计划、应急程序和应急安排;参考水平用于应急照射情况下的防护和安全最优化;政府须确保建立和维护一个综合并协调的应急管理体系;对于公众照射,政府须确保在规划阶段制定防护策略并使其正当化和最优化;政府须制定关于管理、控制和记录应急人员在紧急情况下所受剂量的计划。IAEA保护人类和环境安全标准GSR第七部分《核与辐射应急准备和响应安全标准》是基于原安全标准丛书GS-R-2(2002)和IBSS修订发布的,本文给出了在要求、术语、概念等方面的变化。我国现行标准《电离辐射防护与辐射源安全基本标准》等效采用了1996版IBSS,在参考水平、公众应急防护行动准则、应急工作人员的受照控制等方面都与新IBSS不同,应及时开展研究并修订我国标准。 相似文献
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本文简明扼要地介绍了国际放射防护委员会(ICRP)第82号出版物的主要内容,列出了持续照射情况下公众辐射防护相关的ICRP的定量建议,给出了持续照射情况下考虑干预的程序图。 相似文献
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关于公众慢性辐射照射的决策:国际放射防护委员会的新建议 总被引：1，自引：0，他引：1
AbelJ.Gonzalez 《辐射防护》2002,22(2):100-107
1 引言本文概述国际放射防护委员会 ( ICRP)新发表的一份报告中 [1] 提出的建议。该报告可能对处理公众受较低水平电离辐射 (简称辐射 )持续慢性照射 (该报告所称的长期照射 )这一难题的决策人员有深远影响。该报告题为 :“在持续辐射照射情况下公众的防护——委员会辐射防护体系应用于由天然源和长寿命放射性残存物引起的可控制辐射”,报告已经该委员会在其于1 999年 9月在俄罗斯圣彼德堡举行的最后一次会议上核准。这份报告是由该委员会根据 I-CRP第 4委员会的建议设立的特设专家组编写的 ,并经第 4委员会在其于 1 999年 3月在美国 K… 相似文献
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根据国际原子能机构(IAEA)关于核电厂应急照射情况下干预的相关导则的修订,从防护行动、干预水平、操作干预水平和场外应急区域4个方面对我国现行的相关标准进行讨论,找出我国核电厂应急照射情况下干预存在的不足,对我国核电厂应急照射情况下干预的相关工作提出建议。 相似文献
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简要介绍了核设施在事故情况下,不同事故阶段应采用的防护措施,分析了各种防护措施在实施过程中可能遇到的困难、存在的风险以及所需付出的代价,提供了为保护公众快速合理地选择有效防护的一些方法,为应急干预行动最优化提供参考。 相似文献
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核事故和辐射事故的应急干预水平和应急防护措施决策问题 总被引：3，自引：1，他引：2
本文介绍了ＩＣＲＰ和ＩＡＥＡ最新推荐的应急干预原则和干预水平,讨论了各个国家和场址根据自己的具体情况确定自己的干预水平的必要性,并以日本为例用人力资本法估算了干预水平,最后讨论了应急防护措施决策的问题,给出了一般的决策方框图。 相似文献
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核事故情况下场外早期应急防护措施的决策分析 总被引：1，自引：0，他引：1
本文分析和阐述了与核事故情况下场外早期应急防护措施决策的重要问题，例如干预原则对决策的意义及决策分析，并简要介绍了早期应急防护措施的决策模式以及目前国际上这在领域的有关研究。 相似文献
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本文介绍了核电事故下进行计划干予的基本原则,事故阶段的划分和防护措施等问题。还讨论了适合于我国国情的防护措施。 相似文献
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《Radioprotection》2023,58(1):49-53
Facing the inflation of the number of irradiating radiological examinations, particularly in Computed Tomography (CT), several countries in the world have resorted to diagnostic reference levels (DRLs), below which dosimetric values must be kept or else corrective actions will be infligated. In Morocco, in the absence of national diagnostic reference levels, we proposed to evaluate the professional practice in CT by recording the radiation doses values delivered to adult patients and comparing the 75th percentile values of the dosimetric indicators (CTDIvol and DLP) per acquisition to the international published values of DRLs, in order to judge the need for optimization of CT examination protocols. The 75th percentile values in terms of CTDIvol for head, chest, abdomen-pelvis, chest-abdomen-pelvis, and lumbar examinations were respectively 57.7, 11.1, 11.3, 11.6 and 20 mGy. In terms of DLP, the 75th percentile values were 1250.4, 392.2, 517.1, 833.27 and 707.37 mGy.cm, for the mentioned type of examinations. These results prompt us to make corrections to the used protocols and to ensure a more rigorous follow-up of the radiation protection principles with particular attention to the principle of dose optimization in order to establish a good practice in CT.https://doi.org/10.1051/radiopro/2022039 相似文献
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M. Hakme;C. Rizk;Z. Francis;G. Fares 《Radioprotection》2023,58(2):113-121
This study aims to propose national diagnostic reference levels (DRLs) for computed tomography (CT) scans performed on adult patients based on clinical indication (CI), patient gender and size and the use of contrast in Lebanon. The volume CT dose index (CTDIvol), size-specific dose estimate (SSDE) and dose length product (DLP) were collected between July 2017 and May 2022 from 14 Lebanese hospitals. The data were collected from at least 20 patients for 15 common group of CIs (GCIs) in the head, thorax, abdomen (AB), abdomen-pelvis (ABP) and thorax-abdomen-pelvis (TABP) regions. National DRLs were calculated for each GCIs, patient gender and size and depending on the use of contrast as the third quartile of the CT units’ median values of CTDIvol, SSDE and DLP. The proposed national DRLs in term of CTDIvol (DLP) were 65, 15, 9, 9 and 13 mGy (1104, 483, 520, 442 and 611 mGy.cm), respectively, for Head/Hemorrhage, ABP/Appendicitis, AB/Abdominal pain, Thorax/Covid-19 and TABP/Trauma. The proposed national DRLs were higher than those from the literature pointing up the need for a dose optimization strategy to protect the patient from the harmful effects of radiation.https://doi.org/10.1051/radiopro/2023013 相似文献
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S. Saint-Pierre 《Radioprotection》2013,48(5):S37-S41
Over the last few decades, the steady progress achieved in reducing planned exposures of both workers and the public has been admirable in the nuclear sector. However, the disproportionate focus on tiny public exposures and radioactive discharges associated with normal operations came at a high price, and the quasi-denial of a risk of major accident and related weaknesses in emergency preparedness and response came at even higher price. Fukushima has unfortunately taught us that radiological protection (RP) for emergency and post-emergency can be much more than a simple evacuation that lasts 24 to 48 hours with people safely returning to their homes shortly afterward. On optimization of emergency and post-emergency exposures, the only “show in town” in terms of international RP policies improvements has been the issuance of the ICRP’s new general recommendations. However, no matter how genuine these improvements were, they have not been “road tested” to the practical reality of severe accidents. Post-Fukushima, there is a compelling case to review the practical adequacy of key RP notions such as optimization, evacuation, sheltering, reference levels for workers and the public, and to amend these notions with a view to make the international RP system more useful in the event of a severe accident. In pursuing further improvements to the international RP system, it should be clearly borne in mind that the system is generally based on protection against the risk of cancer and hereditary diseases. The system also protects against deterministic non-cancer effects on tissues and organs. In seeking refinements of such protection notions, we invite ICRP to pay increased attention to the fact that a continued balance must be struck between beneficial activities which cause exposures, and protection. The global nuclear industry is committed to help overcoming the above key RP issues as part of the RP community’s upcoming international deliberations towards a more efficient international RP system.https://doi.org/10.1051/radiopro/20139906 相似文献
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T. Boal;P.A. Colgan;R. Czarwinski 《Radioprotection》2013,48(5):S27-S33
An interim edition of the IAEA Safety Requirements document: “Radiation Protection and Safety of Radiation Sources: International Basic Safety Standards” (BSS) was published in November 2011. The revision of the BSS was coordinated by a BSS Secretariat consisting of representatives of the IAEA, FAO, EC, ILO, UNEP, PAHO, WHO and NEA/OECD. The BSS takes into account the Fundamental Safety Principles, the findings of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation and the 2007 recommendations of the International Commission of Radiological Protection (ICRP) and other applicable ICRP statements and publications. This paper provides an overview of the revised BSS, including requirements on preparedness for a nuclear or radiological emergency and to remediation of areas contaminated by residual radioactive material following a nuclear or radiological emergency.https://doi.org/10.1051/radiopro/20139904 相似文献
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A. Besançon;F. Bochud 《Radioprotection》2011,46(3):359-371
The Institute of Radiation Physics (IRA) is attached to the Department of Medical Radiology at the Vaud University Hospital Center (CHUV) in Lausanne. The Institute’s main tasks are strongly linked to the medical activities of the Department: radiotherapy, radiodiagnostics, interventional radiology and nuclear medicine. The Institute also works in the fields of operational radiation protection, radiation metrology and radioecology. In the case of an accident involving radioactive materials, the emergency services are able to call on the assistance of radiation protection specialists. In order to avoid having to create and maintain a specific structure, both burdensome and rarely needed, Switzerland decided to unite all existing emergency services for such events. Thus, the IRA was invited to participate in this network. The challenge is therefore to integrate a university structure, used to academic collaborations and the scientific approach, to an interventional organization accustomed to strict policies, a military-style command structure and \"drilled\" procedures. The IRA’s solution entails mobilizing existing resources and the expertise developed through professional experience. The main asset of this solution is that it involves the participation of committed collaborators who remain in a familiar environment, and are able to use proven materials and mastered procedures, even if the atmosphere of an accident situation differs greatly from regular laboratory routines. However, this solution requires both a commitment to education and training in emergency situations, and a commitment in terms of discipline by each collaborator in order to be integrated into a response plan supervised by an operational command center. 相似文献
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R. Mustonen 《Radioprotection》2013,48(5):S85-S92
In Finland, Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) is the competent authority and the national warning point with respect to bilateral and international agreements. STUK has drafted proposals for new guides for intervention levels in different phases of an emergency to be adopted by the Ministry of Interior (MoI) in Finland. These guides are written separately for early phase and intermediate phase of a radiological emergency. STUK selected 20 mSv effective residual dose from all exposure pathways during the first year of an emergency as the reference level. This overall goal has been supplemented with the following general guidance; if a projected dose without protective measures is during the first year: (1) higher than 10 mSv, it is necessary to perform protective measures; radiation expose is dominant in decision making, (2) 1–10 mSv, protective measures are usually justified but other factors effect decision making, (3) below 1 mSv, the protective measures may be carried out especially if they are easily feasible; other factors are dominant in decision making. More specific criteria are given for separate countermeasures as a projected dose in a certain time period or as an operational intervention level (OIL) in a quantity which can be directly measured (external dose rate, magnitude of surface contamination, concentration level) or as a trigger (such as plant conditions). This paper presents the main intervention levels and criteria to be used in a radiological emergency for members of the public.https://doi.org/10.1051/radiopro/20139913 相似文献
