供应链中的信息共享与合作

企业间的合作对于提升供应链绩效日益重要,而信息共享是合作协调的重要基础之一。对信息共享进行了分类,提出信息共享方式;从存储论角度证明了共享库存信息对降低供应链成本的作用,以及从仿真上验证了在共享库存信息供应链中可以利用（s,S)策略降低供应链成本。     

Trust-embedded coordination in supply chain information sharing

This paper studies supply chain coordination with trust-embedded cost-sharing contract. In a two-tier supply chain, a retailer (she) and a supplier (he) make their private demand forecasting individually. The retailer places soft-orders, which are costless, non-verifiable and cancellable before shipping, to the supplier. After that, the supplier relies on the retailer’s ordering information to update his demand evaluation and prepare his capacity. How much the supplier relies on the retailer’s ordering information is specified by trust, which is a kind of psychological feeling and affected by multiple factors. When the supplier does not fully trust the retailer, he tends to prepare a conservative capacity to avoid over-production. To coordinate the supply chain, a two-stage coordination process is proposed. At the first stage, the supplier and retailer negotiate a cost-sharing rule to bind soft-orders. At the second stage, the retailer places a soft-order and decides whether or not to bind it referring to the cost-sharing rule. After that, the supplier determines his optimal production capacity. We show that the retailer and supplier value trust differently in the experimental studies. We also find that there is a threshold of negotiation power for the supply chain partners which means the supplier’s/retailer’s expected profit drops down if his/her negotiation power exceeds certain thresholds. The experimental studies also show that the proposed the two-stage coordination is effective.     

供应链中的信息共享及其共享模式

以基于第三方物流的供应链为背景，对比分析了在没有和引入第三方物流两种情况下供应链运作中信息共享的作用，设计了基于第三方物流的供应链运作的4个信息共享区，分析了4个区域的信息共享需求，设计了3种共享信息模式，分析了5种结构，从共享信息的访问比较了各种模式的特点，并给出了实例。     

单生产商和多零售商间的协调机制

通过2个阶段分析了制造商和零售商之间的博弈关系,建立了一个制造商和多个零售商组成的协调机制。给出非合作博弈和合作博弈两种情形下供应链各个成员的利润、零售商的订购量和制造商的批发价等指标的变化情况,并通过一个分配方案对因协调带来的利润进行了合理分配。用一个数值算例,进一步说明此协调机制使供应链的总体期望利润比不协调时增加,而且利润分配方案的实施使供应链成员的利润都得到改善。     

基于供应链中不确定性的生产计划研究

针对供应链管理环境下企业信息的多源性、多态性和不确定性导致企业制定生产计划复杂性和难度的增加,本文以全球供应链为研究背景,分析供应链环境下生产计划信息不确定性的主要根源,从不同角度阐述了供应链信息不确定性对生产计划的影响,指出如何通过信息共享机制与弱化信息不确定性等提高生产计划动态响应性的方法.     

随机需求下绿色农产品三级供应链协调

考虑市场随机需求、产品绿色度、绿色研发成本等因素,研究绿色农产品三级供应链协调问题。首先,构建了不同决策模式下供应链成员的利润模型,发现合作可提高供应链整体收益,随后构建\"收益共享−成本共担\"混合契约对绿色农产品供应链进行协调。研究结论表明:混合契约能够降低绿色农产品售价,提高绿色度,增加绿色农产品市场需求;合理比例的收益共享和成本共担可使各个绿色供应链成员达到共赢。最后通过算例分析验证了契约模型的正确性。     

信息不对称下多供应商与单零售商的退货策略

研究由多个提供互补组件的供应商和一个组装商组成的报童型供应链中,零售商将需求信息私有化时,供应商如何制定克服信息不对称的退货策略,使得零售商订货量和信息对称情况下供应链最优订货量相等.假设需求分高需求和低需求两种状态,供应商在需求状态未知的情况下给出针对不同需求状态的两个子契约,使得零售商按照实际需求状态而确定相应订货量.首先分析集权型供应链中整个供应链的最优订货量,再分析分权型供应链中零售商的订货决策,进一步分析信息不对称情况下供应商间的博弈及批发价和回收价契约参数的确定方法.通过算例,说明激励零售商按照真实需求状态选择子契约的合理性,供应商制定的退货策略可以克服信息不对称.     

Coordinating a trust-embedded two-tier supply chain by options with multiple transaction periods

Trust widely works in supply chain practices and deeply affects supply chain decisions. Full trust in transactions and inaccurate demand forecasts are most likely to lead to biased decisions and low supply chain performances. Therefore, we propose a trust updating model to quantify decision-maker’s trust. The model presents the variation of trust over time and is helpful to evaluate decision-maker’s trust level in each transaction. In the model, a coordination mechanism with contract is designed to mitigate each supply chain partner’s ordering risk. Optimal order strategies of both manufactures and retailers in a supply chain under a bidirectional option contract are analysed in this paper. We find the manufacturer’s optimal production quantity is positively affected by penalty price in the contract and its bounds are given by simulation analysis. Our findings in this paper indicate that the proposed coordination mechanism with bidirectional option contract is profitable to all supply chain partners in long-term transactions. Meanwhile, the coordination mechanism helps the supply chain partners to catch up with marketing fluctuations and enhances the supply chain trust and partnerships. Finally, some simulation experiments are employed to obtain more observations.     

供应链设计、供应链整合、信息共享与供应链绩效的关系研究

构建了供应链设计、供应链整合、信息共享及供应链绩效之间关系的理论模型,并以广东省珠三角地区162家制造企业为调查对象,对供应链设计、供应链整合、信息共享及供应链绩效之间的关系进行实证研究。研究结果表明,供应链设计对供应链整合、供应链绩效均有显著的正向影响;供应链设计对信息共享的直接影响并不显著,却会以供应链整合为中介对信息共享产生间接影响;供应链整合对信息共享、供应链绩效有显著的正向影响;而低层次的信息共享对供应链绩效并无显著影响。根据上述实证研究结果,本研究结合中国情境给出了相关管理启示。     

信息不对称下具有损失规避者参与的供应链决策与协调

在市场需求不确定下,假设制造商和零售商之间关于风险态度的信息不对称,研究由单个风险中性制造商和损失规避零售商组成的两级供应链系统.运用Stackelberg博弈分析分散系统下的决策行为,并用收益共享契约来实现集中系统下的供应链协调.研究结果表明,在分散决策系统下,双方风险态度信息的不对称导致供应链效率在“双边际效应”的基础上进一步损失;集中系统下收益共享契约可以消除信息不对称的影响,从而提高损失规避型零售商的最优订购量.算例分析显示,信息共享可以有效提高供应链参与双方的期望效用.     

服务供应链的信息共享机制及绩效研究

文章研究的服务供应链包含一个服务供应商和一个服务集成商信息共享机制问题。服务供应商提供原始服务产品或活动给服务集成商,而服务集成商依次以附加值集成服务出售给客户。在不确定性市场环境下,客户服务需求量带有价格敏感和随机性的特征。在服务供应商和服务集成商之间,探析服务供应链的不同信息传输方式下信息共享机制问题,评估服务供应链的绩效,其结果强调服务业开展信息共享的必要性。     

An approach for estimating the end-of-life product disassembly effort and cost

Disassembly is the process of physically separating a product into its parts or subassembly pieces. The overall economics of the disassembly process, and in particular the cost to disassemble, is still not well understood. In this paper our goal is to introduce a methodology that will support and facilitate the economic analysis of the disassembly activity. We present a multi-factor model to compute the disassembly effort index (DEI) score, which is representative of the total operating cost to disassemble a product. The DEI score can then be compared against the projected market value of the disassembled parts and subassemblies to get an economic measure. To develop the DEI model we surveyed a variety of commercial disassembly facilities. Based on these surveys we propose a multifactor weighted estimation scheme. The seven factors are (i) time, (ii) tools, (iii) fixture, (iv) access, (v) instruct, (vi) hazard, and (vii) force requirements. The DEI scale is defined in the 0 to 100 range. This range is assigned on a weighted basis to each of the seven factors. For each factor, an independent utility scale is formulated, using the assigned range as anchors. Using a conversion scale the DEI score is used to derive an estimate of disassembly cost and the disassembly return on investment. An example is presented.     

Shapley value对信息共享产生收益的分配研究

研究当零售商的销售信息共享时,产生的经济收益及其分配问题.分别考虑了信息共享产生的收益存在和不存在边际效用递减的两种情况.研究发现,不考虑边际效用递减时,供应商得到的收益是参与信息共享联盟零售商数目的正比例函数,每个零售商的收益保持不变;如果考虑递减效用,供应商的收益增加的速度随着参与联盟的零售商数目的增加而递减,每个零售商得到的收益也递减.     

供应链中信息共享的最优范围

从制造商利润最大化的角度,研究了供应链中信息共享的最优范围,给出了最优范围的具体算法。当实施信息共享的费用大于某一定值时,制造商的最优信息共享范围小于n（n为合作伙伴个数）。从社会的角度,为了节约资源,最优的信息共享范围应等于n,即在全部合作伙伴中实现信息共享。因此,政府需采取一定的政策措施,引导制造商在全部合作伙伴中实现信息共享。     

第三方负责回收再制造闭环供应链契约设计

以博弈论为基本研究方法,考查了制造商、销售商和第三方物流服务商构成的Stackelberg再制造闭环供应链中,节点企业为了取得最优利润,如何确定产品的批发价、销售价,废旧产品的回收价和回收转移价等,发现在分散决策(非合作博弈)下系统的利润要低于集中决策(合作博弈)下系统的利润。通过设计收入费用共享契约,增加了产品的销售量和废旧产品的回收量,提高了制造商、销售商、第三方物流服务商的利润和消费者的效用,实现了Stackelberg再制造闭环供应链系统的协调。     

Demand information sharing and channel choice in a dual-channel supply chain with multiple retailers

In this paper, under a dual-channel supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and multiple retailers, we investigate vertical and horizontal information sharing in different channel structures and the manufacturer’s choice on whether or not to keep a direct channel. To this end, we first study the dual-channel structure where uncertain demand is a linear function of price with a generalised-distribution base demand and show that the retailers have incentives to share information horizontally but not vertically, while the manufacturer is better off with vertical information sharing but its expected profit is not affected by horizontal information sharing. We next examine the retail-channel structure and find the basic results remain unchanged. Finally, we provide closed-form internal and external conditions under which the manufacturer can benefit from owning a dual-channel structure. Our study extends the existing literature by combining information sharing and dual-channel choice, introducing channel difference, discussing the impact of channel structure on horizontal and vertical sharing as well as providing interesting managerial insights for channel choice.