Trade-offs between macroeconomic and financial stability objectives

Ten years after the 2008-09 global financial crisis, most advanced economies have recovered and global economic growth has taken hold. However, partly due to accommodative financial conditions, financial risks are on the rise while inflation remains subdued. This revives the debate on the role of monetary policy in containing financial risks. This paper provides a framework to investigate trade-offs between macroeconomic and financial stability when the central bank has a financial stability objective. Relying on a New Keynesian model with an endogenous financial bubble, our simulations suggest that a central bank attempting to “lean against the wind” may face trade-offs between inflation/output stability and financial stability. We therefore argue that the interest rate should be used for achieving traditional macroeconomic goals, and a second, macroprudential instrument should complement the policy rate to tackle financial risk accumulation.     

Financial imbalances and gradualism

In the last years, in the major OECD economies, while inflation has become lower and more stable, episodes of financial instability and large cycles in asset prices have shown up with (often) non-negligible effects on economic activity. These facts should call for a larger concern with financial imbalances by the central bank. Adapting the model by Caplin and Leahy (1996)—where a central bank, which is uncertain about the state of the economy and its reaction to policy, seeks an optimal search strategy to influence private agents' responses—by substituting the central bank's price stability objective with a financial stability one, we find that the monetary authority should follow a less aggressive policy than the one suggested by the original model. However, initial conditions play a crucial role in determining the degree of gradualism by the policy maker with the policy becoming more and more aggressive as the initial interest rate shrinks.     

Financial shocks,financial stability,and optimal Taylor rules

We assess the performance of optimal Taylor-type interest rate rules, with and without reaction to financial variables, in stabilizing an economy following financial shocks. The analysis is conducted in a DSGE model with loan and bond markets, each featuring financial frictions. This allows for a wide set of financial shocks and transmission mechanisms and can be calibrated to match the bond-to-bank finance ratio featured in the US financial system. Overall, we find that monetary policy that reacts to credit growth, a form of the so-called “leaning against the wind”, improves the ability of the central bank to achieve its mandate in the wake of financial shocks. The specific policy implications depend partly on the origin and the persistence of the financial shock, but overall not on the assignment of a mandate for financial stability in the central bank’s objective function.     

Monetary policy with heterogeneous households and imperfect risk-sharing

This paper considers a sticky-price model with heterogeneous households and financial frictions. Financial frictions lead to imperfect risk-sharing among households with idiosyncratic labor incomes. I study implications of imperfect risk-sharing for optimal monetary policy by documenting its impacts on the monetary transmission mechanism, the inflation–output tradeoff faced by the central bank, the policy objective function, and the resulting targeting rule. The main finding is that while the central bank continues to have the conventional dual mandate — the output gap and inflation stabilization — it should place a greater weight on the later as the degree of financial frictions increases because price stability provides the additional benefit of reducing undesired consumption dispersion.     

货币政策立场与银行风险承担——基于中国银行业的实证研究(2000—2010)

本文基于中国2000—2010年间的经济金融数据,应用动态面板系统广义矩法,考察我国货币政策立场对银行风险承担的影响。结果显示,货币政策立场显著影响银行风险承担,且受市场结构及商业银行资产负债表特征的影响。这说明从金融稳定的视角来看,货币政策并非中性,我国应将货币政策纳入宏观审慎监管框架,加强其与金融监管政策的协调配合,以促进经济金融稳定。     

财政、货币政策作用空间的历史变迁及其启示——基于中国财政、货币政策实践

财政政策发挥调控功能以国家财政拥有一定财力为基础,货币政策发挥调控功能以商业银行体系对中央银行的资金依赖为前提。失却此基础和前提,财政政策和货币政策调控功能就会大打折扣甚或完全丧失调控功能。新中国财政政策与货币政策作用空间的变迁经历了三个阶段,与之相适应,财政政策与货币政策调控功能分别经历了“强、弱、强”和“弱、强、弱”三种状态。经验表明,财政政策与货币政策作用空间的变迁与经济体制、国民经济运行格局息息相关。财政政策和货币政策要真正发挥宏观调控功能必须改善其赖以发挥作用的经济运行环境并加强两者之间的协调。     

存款利率弹性的实证分析

近年来,由于国际金融危机的影响,各国中央银行纷纷降低存款利率来刺激本国经济。我国经济稳定快速复苏,中央银行通过提高存款利率来抑制国内出现的通货膨胀、物价上涨和泡沫经济的现象。但是存款利率对宏观经济环境和市场经济会产生多大作用,微观经济主体对存款利率反应程度如何,以及我国存款利率弹性的现状等等,都影响着利率政策的效果。因此,文章从存款利率弹性实证分析入手,得出存款利率弹性低的结论,进而针对宏观和微观两个方面探索出提高存款利率弹性的路径方法。     

中国实行通货膨胀目标制的可行性分析

通货膨胀目标制是一种以保持低而稳定的通货膨胀为首要目标的货币政策框架。本研究参照IMF提出的相关指标,并考虑到中国作为转型国家的经济特征,从中国当前经济运行中控制一般物价水平的必要性、经济结构的完善性、金融市场和银行体系的健全性、中央银行的独立性、货币政策的透明度以及央行准确预测通货膨胀的技术等方面考察了中国实行通货膨胀目标制的可行性,得出中国已经初步具备实施该货币制度的条件。并提出更彻底的制度改革将会确保中国成功实施通货膨胀目标制,从而使得宏观经济运行处于稳定的价格水平因而更有效率。     

货币政策与资产价格泡沫：美国中央银行家的言与行

在2007～2009年国际金融危机爆发之前，美国的中央银行家相信资本市场是有效的．对及时地识别泡沫没有信心，认为中央银行实施紧缩性的货币政策未必能有效抑制投机活动，而逆风向调节资产价格泡沫会严重损害实体经济。因此，他们支持采取传统战略的货币政策。2007年国际金融危机爆发至今，美国的中央银行家对如何干预资产价格波动进行了深刻的反思，对市场的有效性有所质疑，修正了以前的结论，认为中央银行可以识别有些资产价格泡沫。资产价格崩溃的后果非常严重，中央银行需要加强金融监管以抑制资产价格泡沫。     

非均衡博弈、央行的微观独立性与最优金融稳定政策

本文从当前金融稳定理论发展和中国金融稳定操作现实出发,构建了中央银行-金融机构-居民部门的非均衡博弈模型,试图寻找最优金融稳定规则。本文的基本结论如下:第一,在当前的金融稳定政策框架下,中央银行的货币与稳定政策组合存在多重均衡的可能;第二,基于中央银行和金融机构对于流动性的信息的不对称,金融机构具有隐藏信息和游说央行的负面激励;第三,中央银行出于对未来支付体系稳定的考虑,在与金融机构的博弈中处于被动地位,金融稳定和货币政策均因此而丧失独立性;第四,居民不具备真正的博弈参与权,而只是博弈结果的承担者,其结果是承担真实或隐性的通货膨胀税;第五,根据以上博弈分析,建立最优金融稳定政策必须在微观机制和宏观机制上实施重新设计,包括金融稳定政策的“最后”性、中央银行的监督权赋予和保持距离型制度安排、金融稳定内含于货币政策,以及稳定与改革的分离和成本的重新界定。     

Alternative Monetary Targets,Instruments and Future Monetary Policy Frameworks

ABSTRACT

This article expands on the debate of whether merely controlling inflation can be considered a good outcome in terms of monetary policy, discussing proposals for adopting alternative monetary targets (e.g., price level, nominal GDP), alternative instruments (e.g., monetary finance, central bank digital currencies), for enlarging central banks' mandates (e.g., incorporating employment, wages, inequality, environmental objectives) and for the design of future monetary policy frameworks.

We argue that in the coming years, central banks should not simply maintain their pre-2008 standards by de-implementing unconventional monetary policies. Instead, they must take advantage of their past and recent experiences in order to improve, under an evolutionary perspective, future monetary policy and financial stability frameworks. Based on this, measures implemented since the 2008 crisis would have three possible treatments in new frameworks: i) be discarded, due to their predominantly adverse effects; ii) not be regularly implemented, but be used as backstop mechanisms if needed; iii) be incorporated as regular measures of monetary policy/financial stability frameworks. Accordingly, monetary and financial stability authorities will increasingly need to evolve and engage in a continuously adaptive and innovative process in order to face challenges posed by financial markets that are becoming more dynamic, innovative, complex, interconnected and globalised.     

On the Future of Inflation Targeting in East Asia

This article analyzes the problems associated with inflation targeting (IT) regimes in a number of East Asian countries. It scrutinizes the policy conflicts that can arise when a central bank that has adopted a formal inflation target to guide the conduct of monetary policy simultaneously manages the exchange rate and pursues financial stability objectives. To this end, it empirically investigates the importance of exchange rate and terms of trade movements as determinants of inflation rates across East Asian economies and discusses the role of central banks in guarding financial stability and the ways this may conflict with an IT regime. The article argues that IT never really has been a suitable monetary framework for East Asian countries and that it should hence be supplanted by transparent monetary frameworks that explicitly recognize the multiple goals that are being pursued by East Asian central banks.     

货币政策对金融生态的影响机理及实证检验——基于上市商业银行面板数据的分析

传统的货币理论忽视了货币政策对银行风险承担及金融生态的影响,文章从商业银行的微观视角出发研究了货币政策对金融生态的影响机理。理论层面,金融生态与货币政策制度供给、传导机制和有效性相互关联,货币政策则通过资产价格或估值机制、收入及现金流机制、追求收益机制、杠杆调整机制、道德风险机制和风险转移机制影响商业银行的风险承担;实证层面,构建了货币政策影响商业银行信贷投放和风险承担的数理模型,选取国有和股份制两类共12家上市商业银行2008-2013年的面板数据进行固定效应模型实证检验。结果表明,宽松货币政策导致商业银行的信贷投放规模增加、风险承担意愿增强,有利于优化金融生态,反之则反是;国有商业银行对货币政策变化更敏感,而股份制商业银行对金融生态更敏感。因此,在我国宏观经济管理中,需要货币政策与宏观审慎政策相互协调配合。     

Asymmetric effects of uncertainty shocks: Normal times and financial disruptions are different

We examine whether the response of the euro area economy to uncertainty shocks depends on financial conditions. We find strong evidence that uncertainty shocks have much more powerful effects on key macroeconomic variables in episodes marked by financial distress than in normal times. We also document that the recovery of economic activity following an adverse uncertainty shock is state dependent: it is gradual in normal times, but displays a more accelerated rebound when the shock hits during financial distress, reflecting monetary accommodation provided by the central bank. These findings are based on a non-linear data-driven model that accounts for regime switching and time-varying volatility. Our findings imply that whether financial markets are calm or distressed matters when it comes to the appropriate policy responses to uncertainty shocks.     

Inflation targeting and financial stability in emerging markets

This paper aims at investigating whether emerging market inflation targeters are more financially vulnerable than their non-targeting counterparts. It further assesses the extent to which targeting central banks are less responsive to financial imbalances, compared to those implementing alternative policy strategies. Based on a sample of 26 emerging countries, including 13 targeters, the analysis suggests that monetary policy in targeting countries is relatively more sensitive to financial risks. However, despite stronger central banks’ responses to financial imbalances, the financial sector appears to be more fragile for targeters. Our conclusion therefore challenges the view that central banks, through their policy interest rates, can guarantee the stability of the financial system. It rather suggests that the control of inflation should remain the primary monetary policy objective, while a (macro)prudential authority would be in charge of the financial stability objective.     

中国金融状况指数对货币政策传导作用研究

文章利用VECM模型构建了我国的金融状况指数,并对我国通货膨胀进行预测检验,发现包含资产价格信息的金融状况指数能够在当前金融市场频繁波动、资产价格急剧变化的市场条件下,对通货膨胀做出及时、有效的预测.这表明资产对经济的作用日益增强,中央银行在实施货币政策时,必须考虑到资产价格对货币政策的传导影响.然而,当利用金融状况指数对货币政策的资产传递渠道进行分析时,却发现货币政策传导过程中资产价格对产出的影响不大.因此,在实施货币政策时,可以关注资产价格变化时通货膨胀的影响,但由于资产价格在传导过程反应不足,目前还暂不能将资产价格作为货币政策的实际操作指标.     

中央银行独立性与货币、金融稳定政策协调

当今,金融危机给经济发展带来了极大的危害,为此,金融稳定是当务之急.审视中国的金融现状,我们必须加强金融体系各组成部分内部及其相互之问的有效风险配置、资源配置等核心功能,将中央银行独立性、货币稳定政策及金融稳定政策纳入统一框架之下,有效协调货币、金融稳定政策,提高金融机构风险管理水平.     

Inflation contract,central bank transparency and model uncertainty

Using a New-Keynesian model subject to misspecifications, we examine how the robust monetary policy could be modified by a linear inflation contract when a central bank is opaque about its preference for model robustness. It is shown that a central bank must limit this preference and opacity about it to ensure the dynamic stability of the economy. An optimal inflation contract with a zero penalty rate provides no incentive for a central bank to be opaque. The latter must rebalance the benefit of avoiding very bad outcomes in worst case scenarios and the economic costs due to higher macroeconomic volatility.     

Long-run scarring effects of meltdowns in a small-scale nonlinear quadratic model

We build a small-scale nonlinear quadratic (NLQ) model in which credit feedback and regime switches in the output gap affect the adjustment path of the economy towards a steady state. The central bank solves a finite-horizon decision problem where the policy rate also can be zero or negative. We estimate this model by nonlinear seemingly unrelated regression method (NLSUR) and using the parameters to explore policy scenarios. The latter projects long-run dynamics after a large demand contraction leading to scarring effects on the economy. We point out three main results. First, while scars are dominant when the central bank follows a standard Taylor rule, unconventional monetary policy (UMP) – such as Quantitative Easing – mitigates the output decline in both the short and the long run. Second, a zero natural interest rate curtails the central bank’s ability to adjust the economy and mitigate scars. Third, financial constraints leave the deepest scars even if UMP is active.