Modeling the impact of uncertainty in emissions trading markets with bankable permits

The various forms of uncertainty that firms may face in bankable emission permit trading markets will affect firms’ decision making as well as their market performance. This research explores the effect of increased uncertainty over future input costs and output prices on the temporal distribution of emission. In a dynamic programming setting, the permit price is a convex function of stochastic prices of coal and electricity. Increased uncertainty about future market conditions increases the expected permit price and causes a risk neutral firm to reduce ex ante emissions in order to smooth out marginal abatement costs over time. Finally, safety valves, both low-side and high-side, are suggested to reduce the impact of uncertainty in bankable emission trading markets.     

Enforcement and price controls in emissions trading

This paper examines how enforcement affects the structure and performance of emissions trading programs with price controls under uncertainty about firms' abatement costs. The analysis highlights how an enforcement strategy can cause abatement-cost risk to be transmitted to enforcement costs via the price of permits. When this occurs, accommodating the effect of abatement-cost risk with an optimal policy results in higher expected emissions and lower expected permit price than their second-best optimal values. However, it is possible to design an enforcement strategy that shields enforcement costs from abatement-cost risk by tying sanctions directly to permit prices. This enforcement strategy stabilizes enforcement effort, the optimal permit supply and price controls are independent of enforcement costs, and the policy produces the second-best optimal outcome.     

Do lower electricity storage costs reduce greenhouse gas emissions?

In the electricity sector, innovation in large-scale storage is anticipated to reduce costs and improve performance. The effect on greenhouse gas emissions of lower storage costs depends on the interactions between storage and the entire grid. The literature has disagreed on the role of storage in reducing emissions. In this paper we present a stylized model, which suggests that the effect of storage costs on emissions depends on the supply responsiveness of both fossil and renewable generators. Under common conditions in the United States, lower storage costs are more likely to reduce emissions when wind investment responds to equilibrium electricity prices and when solar investment does not. Simulations of a computational model of grid investment and operation confirm these intuitions. Moreover, because of its effect on coal and natural gas–fired supply responsiveness, introducing a carbon dioxide emissions price may increase the likelihood that lower storage costs reduce emissions.     

Interactive pollutants and joint abatement costs: Achieving water quality standards with effluent charges

This paper extends earlier work on the standards and prices approach to pollution control by considering simultaneously spatial considerations, interactive pollutants, and joint abatement costs. The form of environmental constraints appropriate to water pollution problems is discussed in detail and the implications for the standards and prices approach to water pollution control are assessed. The presence of interactive pollutants and joint abatement costs is shown to have important implications for both the theoretical properties and the implementation of the standards and prices approach.     

Carbon trading across sources and periods constrained by the Marrakesh Accords

We examine the potential effects on permit prices and abatement costs of four compliance rules governing emissions trade across sources and periods in the Kyoto Protocol: The banking rule that allows excess permits to be used later; the restoration rate rule that penalizes borrowing; the commitment period reserve rule that limits sales; and finally, the suspension rule that restricts borrowing and sales. Our framework is a two-period model where parties may be out of compliance in the Kyoto period, but are assumed to comply at a later time. Under varying assumptions about market power and US participation, we find that the rules may have pronounced effects on individual costs, but overall efficiency is not severely affected.     

Tying enforcement to prices in emissions markets: An experimental evaluation

We present results from laboratory emissions permit markets designed to investigate the transmission of abatement cost risk to firms' compliance behavior and regulatory enforcement strategies. With a fixed expected marginal penalty, abatement cost shocks produced significant violations and emissions volatility as predicted. Tying the monitoring probability to average permit prices effectively eliminated noncompliance, but transmitted abatement cost risk to monitoring effort. Tying the penalty to average prices reduced violations, but did not eliminate them. Some individuals in these treatments sold permits at low prices, presumably in an attempt to weaken enforcement. While tying sanctions directly to prevailing permit prices has theoretical and practical advantages over tying monitoring to prices, our results suggest that tying sanctions to prices may not be as effective as predicted without additional modifications.     

The optimal pricing of pollution when enforcement is costly

We consider the pricing of a uniformly mixed pollutant with a model of optimal, possibly firm-specific, emissions taxes and their enforcement under incomplete information about firms’ abatement costs, enforcement costs, and pollution damage. We argue that optimality requires an enforcement strategy that induces full compliance by every firm, except possibly when a regulator can base the probabilities of detecting individual violations on observable correlates of violators’ actual emissions. Moreover, optimality requires discriminatory taxes, except when a regulator is unable to use observable firm-level characteristics to gain some information about the variation in firms’ abatement costs or monitoring costs.     

Robust technology policy against emission leakage: The case of upstream subsidies

Asymmetric regulation of a global pollutant between countries can alter the competitiveness of industries and lead to emissions leakage, which hampers countries’ welfare. In order to limit leakage, governments consider supporting domestic trade-exposed firms by subsidizing their investments in abatement technology. The suppliers of such technologies tend to be less than perfectly competitive, particularly when both emissions regulations and advanced technologies are new. In this context of twin market failures, we consider the relative effects and desirability of subsidies for abatement technology. We find a more robust recommendation for upstream subsidies than for downstream subsidies. Downstream subsidies tend to increase global abatement technology prices, reduce pollution abatement abroad and increase emission leakage. On the contrary, upstream subsidies reduce abatement technology prices, and hence also emissions leakage.     

Incentives and prices in an emissions trading scheme with updating

Emissions trading schemes where allocations are based on updated baseline emissions give firms less incentive to reduce emissions for a given quota (or allowance) price. Nevertheless, according to Böhringer and Lange [On the design of optimal grandfathering schemes for emission allowances, Europ. Econ. Rev. 49 (2005) 2041–2055], such allocation schemes are cost-effective if the system is closed and allocation rules are identical across firms. In this paper, we show that the cost-effective solution may be infeasible if marginal abatement costs grow too fast. Moreover, if a price cap or banking/borrowing is introduced, the abatement profile is no longer the same as in the case with an auction (or lump-sum allocation). In addition, we show that with allocation based on updated emissions, the quota price will always exceed marginal abatement costs, possibly misguiding policy makers and investors about abatement costs. Numerical simulations indicate that the quota price most likely will be several times higher than marginal abatement costs, unless a significant share of allowances is auctioned.     

Market design in cap and trade programs: Permit validity and compliance timing

Cap and trade programs have considerable heterogeneity in permit validity and compliance timing. For example, permits have different validities across time (e.g., banking, borrowing, and seasons) and space (e.g., zonal restrictions), and compliance timing can be annual, in overlapping cycles, or in multi-year periods. We discuss nine prominent cap and trade programs along these dimensions and construct a general model of permit validity and compliance timing. We derive sufficient conditions under which abatement is invariant to compliance timing, i.e., compliance timing cannot smooth abatement cost shocks. Under these conditions, (i) expected compliance costs are invariant, (ii) the variance of compliance costs increases with the delayed compliance, (iii) equilibrium prices may not be unique, and (iv) the delayed compliance equilibrium may rely on “degenerate” prices not determined by marginal abatement costs. We demonstrate the model's broad applicability by illustrating different types of temporal permit validity.     

Pollution Taxes and Pollution Abatement in an Oligopoly Supergame

This paper investigates the effects of an emissions tax on the incentives for oligopolists to acquire alternative pollution abatement technologies. The analysis is conducted in terms of a repeated game and it is demonstrated that there are circumstances in which the firms may reject the option of acquiring the pollution abatement equipment, even when this lowers their production costs.     

Renewable electricity policies,heterogeneity, and cost effectiveness

Renewable electricity policies promote investment in renewable electricity generators and have become increasingly common around the world. Because of intermittency and the composition of other generators in the power system, the value of certain renewable – particularly wind and solar – varies across locations and technologies. This paper investigates the implications of this heterogeneity for the cost effectiveness of renewable electricity policies. A simple model of the power system shows that renewable electricity policies cause different investment mixes. Policies also differ according to their effect on electricity prices, and both factors cause the cost effectiveness to vary across policies. We use a detailed, long-run planning model that accounts for intermittency on an hourly basis to compare the cost effectiveness for a range of policies and alternative parameter assumptions. The differences in cost effectiveness are economically significant, where broader policies, such as an emissions price, outperform renewable electricity policies.     

Incentives to diffuse advanced abatement technology under environmental liability law

Polluting firms with advanced abatement technology at their disposal have incentives or disincentives to share this technology with other polluting firms. The ‘direction’ and extent of those incentives depends on the liability rule applicable and the way technical change impacts marginal abatement costs. We establish that incentives for diffusion are socially optimal under strict liability and socially suboptimal under negligence if technical change lowers marginal abatement costs for all levels of abatement. Negligence may, however, induce better diffusion incentives than strict liability if technical change decreases (increases) marginal abatement costs for low (high) levels of abatement.     

An “effluent” charge approach to aircraft noise abatement

This paper is concerned with the control of aircraft noise. Some brief remarks are made on the relationship of aircraft noise problems to the theoretical approaches to externalities. We note in particular that an effluent charge is the most practical way to deal with the problem. A linear programming technique is used to find the bundle of noise-reducing options that minimizes the cost of achieving noise reduction goals, given an upper limit on service reduction. A rate-of-return criterion is imposed on the l.p. solution. Shadow prices are used to generate charges on the airlines. This provides a stimulus for abatement without dictating actual methods. Implicit in the cost parameters are prices of aircraft fuel. We assess the attractiveness of the abatement options with increasing fuel prices. The mechanics of the actual implementation of the charge in the airline industry is examined. We conclude that the institution of a plan such as the one proposed here will provide control of aircraft noise in a socially efficient manner.     

Do energy prices influence investment in energy efficiency? Evidence from energy star appliances

I examine whether electricity prices influence the likelihood that consumers purchase high efficiency appliances by using state-year panel data on electricity prices and the proportion of sales of new appliances that involve high efficiency “Energy Star” models. I find no evidence that electricity prices affect the propensity for consumers to choose high efficiency appliances. Point estimates are extremely small and precisely estimated. The findings suggest that price-based energy policies may be limited in the extent to which they increase investment in residential energy efficiency, which has been considered one of the lowest cost opportunities for reducing carbon emissions.     

Cost,environmental impact,and resilience of renewable energy under a changing climate: a review

Energy derived from fossil fuels contributes significantly to global climate change, accounting for more than 75% of global greenhouse gas emissions and approximately 90% of all carbon dioxide emissions. Alternative energy from renewable sources must be utilized to decarbonize the energy sector. However, the adverse effects of climate change, such as increasing temperatures, extreme winds, rising sea levels, and decreased precipitation, may impact renewable energies. Here we review renewable energies with a focus on costs, the impact of climate on renewable energies, the impact of renewable energies on the environment, economy, and on decarbonization in different countries. We focus on solar, wind, biomass, hydropower, and geothermal energy. We observe that the price of solar photovoltaic energy has declined from $0.417 in 2010 to $0.048/kilowatt-hour in 2021. Similarly, prices have declined by 68% for onshore wind, 60% for offshore wind, 68% for concentrated solar power, and 14% for biomass energy. Wind energy and hydropower production could decrease by as much as 40% in some regions due to climate change, whereas solar energy appears the least impacted energy source. Climate change can also modify biomass productivity, growth, chemical composition, and soil microbial communities. Hydroelectric power plants are the most damaging to the environment; and solar photovoltaics must be carefully installed to reduce their impact. Wind turbines and biomass power plants have a minimal environmental impact; therefore, they should be implemented extensively. Renewable energy sources could decarbonize 90% of the electricity industry by 2050, drastically reducing carbon emissions, and contributing to climate change mitigation. By establishing the zero carbon emission decarbonization concept, the future of renewable energy is promising, with the potential to replace fossil fuel-derived energy and limit global temperature rise to 1.5 °C by 2050.

     

The optimality and feasibility of uniform air pollution controls

An optimal control problem is developed which minimizes both the social damages of pollution concentrations and the private costs of emission abatement subject to a differential equation relating emissions and concentrations. A specific use of the model is to analyze the optimality and feasibility of uniform controls on emissions and concentrations across an air shed.     

Achieving air pollutant emission reduction targets with minimum abatement costs: An enterprise-level allocation method with constraints of fairness and feasibility

• Quantification of efficiency and fairness of abatement allocation are optimized. • Allocation results are refined to the different abatement measures of enterprises. • Optimized allocation results reduce abatement costs and tap the abatement space. • Abatement suggestions are given to enterprises with different abatement quotas. For achieving air pollutant emission reduction targets, total pollutant amount control is being continuously promoted in China. However, the traditional pattern of pollutant emission reduction allocation regardless of economic cost often results in unreasonable emission reduction pathways, and industrial enterprises as the main implementers have to pay excessively high costs. Therefore, this study adopted economic efficiency as its main consideration, used specific emission reduction measures (ERMs) of industrial enterprises as minimum allocation units, and constructed an enterprise-level pollutant emission reduction allocation (EPERA) model with minimization of the total abatement cost (TAC) as the objective function, and fairness and feasibility as constraints for emission reduction allocation. Taking City M in China as an example, the EPERA model was used to construct a Pareto optimal frontier and obtain the optimal trade-off result. Results showed that under basic and strict emission reduction regulations, the TAC of the optimal trade-off point was reduced by 46.40% and 45.77%, respectively, in comparison with that achieved when only considering fairness, and the Gini coefficient was 0.26 and 0.31, respectively. The abatement target was attained with controllable cost and relatively fair and reasonable allocation. In addition, enterprises allocated different emission reduction quotas under different ERMs had specific characteristics that required targeted optimization of technology and equipment to enable them to achieve optimal emission reduction effects for the same abatement cost.     

Benefits and challenges of streamlined life-cycle assessment for SMEs – findings from case studies on climate change impacts

ABSTRACT

Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) have a substantial role in the economy and job creation, but they are a remarkable source of environmental impacts. SMEs often lack skills and resources to compile environmental impact assessments; Streamlined Life Cycle Analysis (LCA) can provide efficient tools for this. An application of streamlined LCA relying heavily on database data, LCA clinic, was developed and tested on 23 SMEs in Finland. The climate change impacts were mainly caused by the production of raw materials, electricity and heating, whereas packaging and transportation were not influential. A significant amount of emissions were indirect, i.e. caused by production of raw materials. Thus, decreasing emissions from raw material production or selecting raw materials with a smaller environmental load could be a more efficient way to decrease emissions than reducing direct emissions such as those from electricity use. Lack of data in the LCA-databases was considered a challenge. An access to regionally customised datasets is important for the implementation of LCA clinics. Company feedback indicated that LCA clinics were useful in climate-friendly product design and increased environmental awareness, but did not lead to immediate actions to reduce emissions because of inadequate investment capabilities. Company managers had limited possibilities to use the results in marketing as comparative assessments would require a full LCA. Many company managers were willing to pay a fee sufficient to cover the costs of an LCA clinic, but some considered that the costs should be covered by external funding sources.