基于公共知识的电子市场定价算法

研究了电子市场定价博弈中公共知识的作用,通过简单地改变市场需求函数和市场分配函数,使卖方Agent获得了多Agent作用下的不断改变着的环境知识,而不再是关于市场需求的个体知识。仿真实验表明,通过获得关于市场需求的公共知识,卖方Agent可以协调彼此的价格行为,在合作还是竞争问题上表现出更长远的群体智能行为,从而提高了市场配置资源的有效性。     

Determinants of the future level of use of electronic marketplaces: The case of Canadian firms

Based on the literature dealing with the diffusion of innovation and with information systems, and building on the emerging concepts in electronic commerce (e-commerce), this paper aims at assessing the influence of various factors on firms’ future level of use of electronic marketplaces (e-marketplaces). This theoretical model is tested on data collected from 1,200 senior managers in Canadian firms. Findings indicate that a firm’s past experience in e-commerce, as well as the factors relating to its business relationships ultimately affect its future use of e-marketplaces. Results of TOBIT regressions also show that the complexity of sophisticated e-commerce implementations is negatively correlated with the future level of use of e-marketplaces, and that consultants and other experts play an essential role in encouraging and facilitating the use of this new type of electronic platform. Finally, our survey data demonstrate that the relative influence of some determinants differs according to the firms’ size. Pierre Hadaya is an assistant professor of MIS at the Faculté d’administration of the Université de Sherbrooke (Canada). He holds a Ph.D. in Management of Technology from the école Polytechnique de Montréal. His research interests lie at the intersection of information technology management, business strategy and interorganizational design.     

The concept of and search for the fair distribution in cooperative games

Well-known conflict equilibria are used to formulate the concept of fair distribution, and a technique is proposed to find it in an arbitrary cooperative game. Any cooperative game is shown to have only one fair distribution, which can always be found from the formulas of conflict equilibrium theory. The study was carried out in line with the OITVS RAN program (Project No. 1-3) and was sponsored by the Russian Foundation for Basic Research (Project No. 06-01-00821). Translated from Kibernetika i Sistemnyi Analiz, No. 6, pp. 131–141, November–December 2008.     

Price-based interference avoidance game in the Gaussian interference channel

This paper considers a distributed interference avoidance problem employing frequency assignment in the Gaussian interference channel(IC).We divide the common channel into several sub-channels and each user chooses one sub-channel for transmission in such a way that the total interference in the IC is minimum.This mechanism named interference avoidance in this paper can be modeled as a competitive game model.And a completely autonomous distributed iterative algorithm called distributed interference avoidance algorithm(DIA)is adopted to achieve the Nash equilibrium(NE)of the game.Due to the self-optimum,the DIA is a sub-optimal algorithm.Therefore,through introducing an optimal compensation(or price)into the competitive game model,we successfully develop a compensation-based game model to approximate the optimal interference avoidance problem.Moreover,an optimal algorithm called iterative optimal interference avoidance algorithm(IOIA)is proposed to reach the optimality of the interference avoidance scheme.We analyze the implementation complexity of the proposed algorithm which is only O(N),with N standing for the number of users in the IC.We also give the proof on the convergence of the proposed algorithm.The performance upper bound and lower bound are derived for the IOIA algorithm.The simulation results show that the IOIA does reach the optimality under the condition of interference avoidance mechanism.     

An empirical test to measure the effectiveness of online advertising in online marketplaces using a hierarchical Bayes model

Online marketplace, taken the form of “open market” where a very large number of buyers and sellers participate, has occupied a rapid increasing position in e-commerce, which resulting in sellers’ increasing investment on online advertising. Hence, there is a growing need to identify the effectiveness of online advertising in the online marketplaces such as eBay.com. However, it is problematic to directly apply the existing online advertising effect models for click-through data of online marketplaces. Therefore, there is a need for developing a model to estimate the effectiveness of online advertising in online marketplace considering its characteristics. In this paper, we develop an analytical Bayesian approach to modeling click-though data by employing the Poisson-gamma distribution. Our results have implications for online advertising effect measurement, and may help guide advertisers in decision-making.     

供需链管理中合同定量研究及其发展

描述了供需合同在供需链分布决策中所起的作用，分析了几种常用合同策略的激励机制及相互关系．从合同策略形式、供需链结构建模、市场需求建模、采购供应过程建模、信息建模5个方面对供需合同问题的研究进展作了总结．最后分析了当前该领域存在的不足，指出了今后可能的研究方向．     

The introduction strategy of the emerging online marketplace considering risk attitude and channel power

With the development of online retailing, traditional online platforms have begun to offer a novel online marketplace format that brings many advantages but also gives rise to problems such as operational risks and changes in channel power. This paper studies whether the e-tailer and manufacturer can reach a consensus on introducing the marketplace channel and obtains the following insights. First, the manufacturer always prefers to introduce the online marketplace in the model where she acts as the leader. The e-tailer has the same preference for the online marketplace when he moves later or simultaneously with the manufacturer. Second, as the participants become more risk-averse, the manufacturer and e-tailer would be less willing to introduce the online marketplace, and it would be more difficult to realize the equilibrium strategy under all power structure models. Third, by combining the cross-effect of the attitude towards risks and the power structure, we find that when the participants prefer risks and the e-tailer has strong channel power, it would be much easier for the two parties to reach a consensus about introducing the online marketplace.     

Strategic bidding in continuous double auctions

In this paper, we describe a novel bidding strategy that autonomous trading agents can use to participate in Continuous Double Auctions (CDAs). Our strategy is based on both short and long-term learning that allows such agents to adapt their bidding behaviour to be efficient in a wide variety of environments. For the short-term learning, the agent updates the aggressiveness of its bidding behaviour (more aggressive means it will trade off profit to improve its chance of transacting, less aggressive that it targets more profitable transactions and is willing to trade off its chance of transacting to achieve them) based on market information observed after any bid or ask appears in the market. The long-term learning then determines how this aggressiveness factor influences an agent's choice of which bids or asks to submit in the market, and is based on market information observed after every transaction (successfully matched bid and ask). The principal motivation for the short-term learning is to enable the agent to immediately respond to market fluctuations, while for the long-term learning it is to adapt to broader trends in the way in which the market demand and supply changes over time. We benchmark our strategy against the current state of the art (ZIP and GDX) and show that it outperforms these benchmarks in both static and dynamic environments. This is true both when the population is homogeneous (where the increase in efficiency is up to 5.2%) and heterogeneous (in which case there is a 0.85 probability of our strategy being adopted in a two-population evolutionary game theoretic analysis).     

Institution-based trust in interorganizational exchange relationships: the role of online B2B marketplaces on trust formation

Given the uncertainty of online transactions, the digital economy encourages the creation of institutional structures that assure online interorganizational exchange relationships. This research examines how institution-based trust develops in online B2B marketplaces to facilitate interorganizational trust (buyers' trust in sellers). Building upon the notion of institutional trust [Zucker,1986], this study proposes how specific institution-based structures help engender interorganizational trust and indirectly influence transaction success in B2B marketplaces. Five specific institution-based mechanisms are proposed—perceived monitoring, perceived legal bonds, perceived accreditation, perceived feedback, and perceived cooperative norms. To assess the influence of the proposed two dimensions of interorganizational trust—credibility and benevolence—in buyer–seller relationships, three trust outcomes are examined—satisfaction, perceived risk, and continuity. The proposed model is tested on data from 102 organizational buyers in an online B2B marketplace. The results support the proposed model, delineating the relationship between institution-based trust and interorganizational trust. The study provides evidence on how specific institutional mechanisms build trust in online B2B marketplaces, stressing the ability of institution-based trust to build a trustworthy trading environment in the digital economy. The paper discusses the theoretical and managerial implications of this study and proposes several suggestions for future research.     

The bright side of emotional extremity: Evidence from tipping in live streaming platform

Live streaming has enabled viewers to interact with broadcasters and peer viewers, as well as tip the broadcaster based on their emotional state. While most tips are small, a minority of viewers tip extremely large. To uncover such unique tipping patterns, we draw on the emotion literature and competitive arousal theory to examine how viewers’ emotional extremity affects tipping behavior and how broadcaster's emotional response moderates the baseline effect. This study contributes to the emerging live streaming literature by revealing the differential effects of emotional extremity on tipping amount and frequency and provides practical implications for broadcasters and platforms to steer tipping behavior.     

多射频无线网络中多信道分配方法的研究

针对多射频多信道无线网络信道分配中用户收益不均衡和网络资源利用率低的问题,给出了一种基于博弈论的信道分配策略,该策略在考虑信道分配有效性、公平性的同时,基于不完美信息博弈,给出了一种使网络负载更均衡的算法,并通过实验仿真验证了算法的鲁棒性和有效性。     

一种异构多接口多信道无线网络的信道分配算法

多接口多信道技术是无线网络环境中减少链路干扰、提高网络吞吐量的有效途径,但如何合理有效地进行信道分配已成为多接口多信道无线网络所面临的主要问题之一.针对自私的网络节点,本文使用非合作博弈对异构条件下多接口节点的信道分配问题进行建模分析,其纳什均衡解为解决该问题所需的稳定的信道分配方案.本文首先讨论纳什均衡的存在条件并提出实现纳什均衡的分布式算法.此外,考虑到实际网络中节点仅能感知局部信道信息以及接口工作信道受限等因素,本文进一步改进算法并通过仿真实验对其收敛性进行证明.     

The role of forgetting in the evolution and learning of language

Lewis signalling games illustrate how language might evolve from random behaviour. The probability of evolving an optimal signalling language is, in part, a function of what learning strategy the agents use. Here we investigate three learning strategies, each of which allows agents to forget old experience. In each case, we find that forgetting increases the probability of evolving an optimal language. It does this by making it less likely that past partial success will continue to reinforce suboptimal practice. The learning strategies considered here show how forgetting past experience can promote learning in the context of games with suboptimal equilibria.     

Omnichannel retailing: The role of situational involvement in facilitating consumer experiences

As omnichannel retailing is still in its infancy, a better understanding of the consumer journey within this context is needed. Utilizing the activity theory, we identified omnichannel platforms, platform synergies, and personalized incentives to influence consumers’ situational involvement for positive consumer experiences in omnichannel retailing. The research used 256 valid responses to reveal that the omnichannel platform, platform synergy, and personalized incentives positively affect situational involvement, which directly affects consumer experiences, and that situational involvement mediates the effects of these factors on consumer experiences. Our findings also empirically confirmed that motivation (personalized incentives) is a precursor to the activity theory.     

环境污染博弈问题的系统动力学模型*

用系统动力学建立环境污染管理问题中政府管理部门与生产排污企业之间的一个混合战略重复博弈模型,考虑信息延迟和环境的污染量净化问题进行模型的仿真。结果表明,环境污染问题中政府管理部门与生产排污企业之间博弈的Nash均衡实际上很难达到稳定,尤其是在考虑信息延迟的情况下。最后提出一种简单可行的双重惩罚策略,既可以促使博弈双方尽快达到Nash均衡,也能有效地改善环境污染问题。     

Optimal advertising decisions for promoting retail and online channels in a dynamic framework

Advertising plays an important role in sales promotion in supply chains. In this paper, advertising decisions for retail and online channels respectively, by retailer and manufacturer will be analyzed. The competition between retailer and manufacturer will be modeled by differential game theory, and feedback Nash equilibrium of the game will be obtained. Some insights are provided by using comparative statics. The obtained results show that compatibility factor of a product with online marketing, difference between manufacturer's online price and wholesale price, effectiveness of advertising, marginal profits, and cost of advertising all have significant effects on the advertising decisions in the equilibrium.     

基于链链竞争的闭环供应链渠道结构选择策略

研究当零售商之间存在价格竞争时,两条竞争闭环供应链的渠道结构选择问题。结果表明：从供应链系统总利润角度出发,当两条链之间竞争强度较小时,中心化渠道结构占优;反之,分散化渠道结构占优。从消费者与环境的角度出发,无论两链之间竞争强度为何值,两条链同时选择中心化渠道结构时最有利。     

Manufacturer warranty service outsourcing strategies in a dual‐channel supply chain

Warranty management for durable products has received increasing attention in recent years. In addition to conventionally keeping warranty in‐house, more manufacturers choose to outsource warranty service to agents. This paper explores outsourcing strategies for manufacturer warranty services in a dual‐channel supply chain by which the demand‐enhancing service can be undertaken by different supply chain parties. We show the results of three alternative outsourcing strategies for manufacturers whereby (a) the retailer undertakes the service, (b) a third party undertakes the service, and (c) both the retailer and a third party undertake the service simultaneously. According to Stackelberg game theory, we build a two‐echelon supply chain model and discuss the corresponding expressions for supply chain members' equilibrium decisions. Additionally, we compare the profits of each supply chain member and derive interesting managerial insights. When the base market size is relatively large, Scenario R helps the manufacturer and the retailer reach a “win‐win” situation.     

The role of intermediaries in electronic marketplaces: developing a contingency model

Abstract. Early research in electronic markets seemed to suggest that e‐ commerce transactions would result in decreased costs for buyers and sellers alike, and would therefore ultimately lead to the elimination of intermediaries from electronic value chains. However, a careful analysis of the structure and functions of electronic marketplaces reveals a different picture. Intermediaries provide many value‐adding functions that cannot be easily substituted or ‘internalized’ through direct supplier–buyer dealings, and hence mediating parties may continue to play a significant role in the e‐commerce world. In this paper we provide an analysis of the potential roles of intermediaries in electronic markets and we articulate a number of hypotheses for the future of intermediation in such markets. Three main scenarios are discussed: the disintermediation scenario, in which market dynamics will favour direct buyer–seller transactions; the reintermediation scenario, in which traditional intermediaries will be forced to differentiate themselves and re‐emerge in the electronic marketplace; and the cybermediation scenario, in which wholly new markets for intermediaries will be created. The analysis suggests that the likelihood of each scenario dominating a given market is primarily dependent on the exact functions that intermediaries play in each case. A detailed discussion of such functions is presented in the paper, together with an analysis of likely outcomes in the form of a contingency model for intermediation in electronic markets.