The Effects of Advertising on Mutual Fund Flows: Results from a New Database

We examine 471,000 mutual fund company advertisements from 1997 to 2003 to study advertising's effect on fund inflows. We find advertising is generally ineffective in attracting inflows but was more effective during the bear market despite smaller advertising expenditures during this time. The top 10 advertisers in our sample were most successful in capturing inflows. These companies generated inflows with mutual fund ads; other companies succeeded when advertising their other products and their brand image. Within a fund family, advertising affects the flagship fund differently than the other funds. Sample firms appeared unable to choose correctly between print and TV ads.     

The Dark Side of International Cross‐Listing: Effects on Rival Firms at Home

We analyse the stock price impact of firms' US cross‐listing on home‐market rival firms. Using an empirical event study approach we find negative cumulative average abnormal returns for the rival firms around both the listing and announcement of listing dates. The evidence suggests both positive and negative spillover effects on rival firms, where the dominant effect is that investors see rivals at a relative disadvantage to the cross‐listing firm. As firms cross‐list in the US and commit to the increased disclosure and investor protection associated with the US listing, they are better able to take advantage of growth opportunities relative to their non cross‐listing counterparts, and this results in negative spillover effects on rival firms. Our results are consistent with the idea that firms cross‐list as a means to reduce agency costs of controlling shareholders and thus are able to exploit growth opportunities as they have better access to external finance.     

Does the response of competitors to privatization announcements reflect competitive or industry-wide information effects? International evidence

We examine the stock price reaction of rival firms to the announcement of the privatization of their industry counterparts to infer information about the intra-industry effects of privatization. We find that the rival firms reacted negatively to the privatization announcements, suggesting that the announcement effects reflect competitive rather than positive industry effects. The reaction is stronger for industry counterparts in low economic freedom countries than those in high economic freedom countries. Interestingly, we also find that full privatization announcements generate larger negative abnormal returns for rival firms than partial privatization announcements where the privatized firm gains only partial autonomy from the government. In this regard, we find that, as the proportion of government ownership reduces, subsequent partial privatization announcement elicits stronger market reaction from rival firms. The negative abnormal returns earned by shareholders of rival firms are not due to price pressure and portfolio rebalancing effects resulting from index composition changes. We conclude that the negative effects documented for the rival firms reflect investors' concern about the potential competitive effects resulting from privatization of the state enterprise.     

Intangible Assets and Corporate Signaling

Research and development (R&D) and advertising expenditures often result in patents, technologies and brand names which are difficult to accurately value. Under current generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) these intangible assets are generally not recognized in the financial statements, but instead are expensed in the period that they occur. Prior studies note that the market-to-book ratios of firms with significant levels of R&D and advertising expenditures suggest that investors, at least partially, value these assets. Researchers and practitioners argue that current GAAP, by not recognizing these intangible assets, reduces the usefulness and relevance of accounting reports.We investigate whether companies with significant levels of intangible assets are more likely to emphasize dividend increases and stock repurchases (which are generally perceived as signaling favorable investment opportunities), instead of traditional accounting disclosures, as a means of overcoming adverse selection. Because these assets are difficult to measure, cash distributions may be viewed as a more credible means of signaling firm value to investors. Using analysts' ratings of firms' accounting disclosures, we find that companies with higher levels of R&D and advertising expenditures are less likely to provide extensive accounting disclosures and instead tend to employ dividend and stock repurchase signals. We obtain these results even after controlling for other firm attributes, such as size, stock returns performance, leverage, liquidity and investors' expectations of growth opportunities. We also find that the market reaction to dividend increase and stock repurchase announcements is greater for firms with higher levels of R&D and advertising expenditures, indicating that these announcements are more informative for such firms.     

Cross‐Firm Real Earnings Management

Our analysis is rooted in the notion that stockholders can learn about the fundamental value of any firm from observing the earnings reports of its rivals. We argue that such intraindustry information transfers, which have been broadly documented in the empirical literature, may motivate managers to alter stockholders’ beliefs about the value of their firm not only by manipulating their own earnings report but also by influencing the earnings reports of rival firms. Managers obviously do not have access to the accounting system of peer firms, but they can nevertheless influence the earnings reports of rival firms by distorting real transactions that relate to the product market competition. We demonstrate such managerial behavior, which we refer to as cross‐firm real earnings management, and explore its potential consequences and interrelation with the practice of accounting‐based earnings management within an industry setting with imperfect (nonproprietary) accounting information.     

All‐units discounts as a partial foreclosure device

We investigate the strategic effects of all‐units discounts (AUDs) used by a dominant firm in the presence of a capacity‐constrained rival. Due to the limited capacity of the rival, the dominant firm has a captive portion of the buyer's demand for the single product. As compared to linear pricing, the dominant firm can use AUDs to go beyond its captive portion by tying its captive demand with part of the competitive demand and partially foreclose its small rival. When the rival's capacity level is well below relevant demand, AUDs reduce the buyer's surplus.     

Exploring advertising as an antecedent to brand experience dimensions: an experimental study

The objective of the study is to investigate the impact of advertising on brand experience dimensions for an existing bank and a financial technology (Fintech) brand. A 2?×?2 between-subject experimental study was conducted that analyzed the antecedents of brand experience dimensions and compared them between an existing bank and a fintech brand. The study confirmed the main effect of advertising on all brand experience dimensions. The brand experience scores for the fintech brand were higher than that of the existing bank brand, and significant differences were observed for sensory, emotional, and behavioral brand experience dimensions. The study confirms the influence of advertising on both existing bank and fimtech brand. While most of the previous studies are based on survey research, the present study provides deep probing using experimental study. It seeks to understand the antecedent to brand experience in the context of an emerging country.     

Executive Compensation, Strategic Competition, and Relative Performance Evaluation: Theory and Evidence

We examine compensation contracts for managers in imperfectly competitive product markets. We show that strategic interactions among firms can explain the lack of relative performance-based incentives in which compensation decreases with rival firm performance. The need to soften product market competition generates an optimal compensation contract that places a positive weight on both own and rival performance. Firms in more competitive industries place greater weight on rival firm performance relative to own firm performance. We find empirical evidence of a positive sensitivity of compensation to rival firm performance that is increasing in the degree of competition in the industry.     

What happens in acquisitions?: Evidence from brand ownership changes and advertising investment

We study advertising at the brand level in a sample of corporate acquisitions. New owners display an elevated propensity to sharply cut advertising in acquired brands. This behavior is most pronounced in private equity transactions. When a buyer's existing brands overlap with the acquired brands, aggregate advertising spending on the merged portfolio of brands tends to shift downward. Sharp advertising cuts are more likely to be observed when the old owner of the assets was investing at an elevated level and when the new owner has displayed past restraint in their investment spending activities. Combined buyer and seller abnormal returns are more positive in deals characterized by post-acquisition cuts in advertising, suggesting that these cuts often represent efficiency-enhancing cost savings.     

Estimating network economies in retail chains: a revealed preference approach

We measure the effects of chain economies, business stealing, and heterogeneous firms’ comparative advantages in the discount retail industry. Traditional entry models are ill suited for this high‐dimensional problem of strategic interaction. Building upon recently developed profit inequality techniques, our model admits any number of potential rivals and stores per location, an endogenous distribution network, and unobserved (to the econometrician) location attributes that may cause firms to cluster their stores. In an application, we find that Wal‐Mart benefits most from local chain economies, whereas Target shows a greater ability to respond to rival competition. Kmart exhibits neither of these strengths. We explore these results with counterfactual simulations highlighting these offsetting effects and find that local chain economies play an important role in securing Wal‐Mart's industry leader status.     

Nonlinear pricing and exclusion: I. buyer opportunism

We study the exclusionary properties of nonlinear price‐quantity schedules in an Aghion‐Bolton style model with elastic demand and product differentiation. We distinguish three regimes, depending on whether and how the price charged by the dominant firm depends on the quantity purchased from the rival firm. We find that the supply of rival good is distorted downward. Moreover, given the quantity supplied from the rival, the buyer may opportunistically purchase inefficiently many units from the dominant firm to pocket quantity rebates. We show that the possibility for the buyer to dispose of unconsumed units attenuates the opportunism problem and limits the exclusionary effects of nonlinear pricing.     

VALUATION OF EVENT‐CONTINGENT OPTIONS

I study a new class of investment options, event‐contingent options. These are options to invest and divest in projects that are dependent on other projects of the same firm or that are conditioned by projects of other firms in its value chain. I construct payoff functions and derive closed‐form solutions for the value of options to invest contingent on investment (OICI), options to invest contingent on divestment (OICD), options to divest contingent on divestment (ODCD), and options to divest contingent on investment (ODCI). I also derive analytical comparative statics for these option valuation equations and examine their implications on the firm's wealth. I offer examples of event‐contingent options in a global context.     

Regulatory competition and rules/principles‐based regulation

This paper analyses how regulatory competition affects principles‐based and rules‐based systems of regulation. Competition between regulators creates the possibility of regulatory arbitrage that generates a race to the bottom by regulators that is socially harmful. We derive the welfare effects of such competition and the regulatory response to these effects, in particular, regulatory harmonisation. We find, however, that regulators can adopt harmful regulatory harmonisation. These effects can make coordination efforts in developing global regulation socially desirable. We demonstrate, moreover, that corporate lobbying is not always harmful: it can both encourage and discourage socially desirable regulation.     

Peer effects in corporate advertisement expenditure: Evidence from China

This study investigates whether industry peers affect focal firms’ advertising expenditure decisions and further explores the mechanisms and economic consequences of such effects. We find that peer firms have a significantly positive influence on the focal firm’s advertising expenditure. The results hold after a series of robustness tests. Additionally, the peer effects in advertising expenditure are more salient in industries with intense competition; and when economic policy uncertainty and demand uncertainty is higher. Interestingly, our results show that followers mimic the advertising expenditure of industry leaders, while leaders also react to followers’ advertising expenditure. We also find that the peer effects in advertising expenditure improve firms’ sales and market value. Our study contributes to a better understanding of peer effects on corporate decisions.     

Information spillovers around seasoned equity offerings

We examine information spillovers in the context of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). Rival firms react significantly positively (0.26%) to primary SEO announcements, indicative of a competitive effect, but negatively (− 0.35%) to secondary share announcements, which is evidence of a contagion effect. Consistent with the view that primary equity offerings signal favorable industry prospects because firms presumably issue new shares to invest in profitable projects, we find that the rival response is positively related to analysts' EPS growth forecasts. However, when insiders are selling their shares through a secondary offer, this may suggest overvaluation and thus negatively impacts rival firms. Consistent with this view, we find when VCs sell through a secondary offerings, rivals experience a more significant negative reaction. We find rival firms are more likely to follow their peers and conduct a primary SEO if the market reacts favorably to their peer's SEO announcement. Finally, rival firms outperform secondary share issuers of equity, but not primary share issuers. Collectively, the findings support the view that insiders take advantage of windows of opportunity when they sell their own shares, but not when they raise capital for investing purposes.     

Canonical Term‐Structure Models with Observable Factors and the Dynamics of Bond Risk Premia

We derive a canonical representation for the no‐arbitrage discrete‐time term structure models with both observable and unobservable state variables, popularized by Ang and Piazzesi (2003) . We conduct a specification analysis based on this canonical representation and we analyze how alternative parameterizations affect estimated risk premia, impulse response functions, and variance decompositions. We find a trade‐off between the need to obtain parsimonious parameterizations and the ability of the models to match observed patterns of variation in risk premia. We also find that more richly parameterized models uncover a greater influence of macroeconomic fundamentals on the long‐end of the yield curve.     

Random matrix ensembles of time-lagged correlation matrices: derivation of eigenvalue spectra and analysis of financial time-series

We derive the exact form of the eigenvalue spectra of correlation matrices derived from a set of time-shifted, finite Brownian random walks (time-series). These matrices can be seen as real, asymmetric random matrices where the time-shift superimposes some structure. We demonstrate that, for large matrices, the associated eigenvalue spectrum is circular symmetric in the complex plane. This fact allows us to exactly compute the eigenvalue density via an inverse Abel-transform of the density of the symmetrized problem. We demonstrate the validity of this approach numerically. Theoretical findings are then compared with eigenvalue densities obtained from actual high-frequency (5 min) data of the S&P 500 and the observed deviations are discussed. We identify various non-trivial, non-random patterns and find asymmetric dependencies associated with eigenvalues departing strongly from the Gaussian prediction in the imaginary part. For the same time-series, with the market contribution removed, we observe strong clustering of stocks into causal sectors. We finally comment on the stability of the observed patterns.     

The use of advertising activities to meet earnings benchmarks: evidence from monthly data

Using a unique database of monthly media advertising spending, we examine whether managers engage in real earnings management to meet quarterly financial reporting benchmarks. We extend prior literature by (1) separately analyzing advertising activities, allowing us to explore the possibility that managers could reduce or boost advertising to meet benchmarks; (2) analyzing actual activities as opposed to inferring them from reported expenses, which are also subject to accrual choices; (3) investigating the timing, within a quarter, of altered advertising spending; and (4) examining quarterly earnings benchmarks. We find that managers, on average, reduce advertising spending to avoid losses and earnings decreases. However, we also report that firms in the late stages of their life cycle increase advertising to meet earnings benchmarks. Finally, we find some evidence that firms increase advertising in the third month of a fiscal quarter and in the fourth quarter to beat prior year’s earnings.     

A description of farmland investor expectations

We consider how best to characterize agricultural real estate market participants' expectation formation mechanism. The expectation formation mechanism links current agricultural policies to asset prices and tells us how current policies change expectations for future transfers. We examine behavior of real estate prices and returns using the present value model. We derive estimable equations incorporating two rival expectation formation mechanisms: rational and adaptive expectations. Assuming rational expectations, the present value model yields parameter estimates that imply the model should be rejected. Instead of rejecting the present value model while maintaining the rational expectations hypothesis, we let the data reveal which expectations hypothesis best fits the data. When we assume the rival hypothesis, the model yields parameter estimates that conform to adaptive expectations.     

Nonlinear pricing and exclusion:II. Must‐stock products

Dominant firms often are unavoidable trading partners. Buyers may consider switching a fraction of their requirements to rival products, but that fraction is highly uncertain in rapidly evolving industries. Nonlinear pricing serves to adjust the competitive pressure placed on rival firms, depending on the joint distribution of the buyer willingness to pay for the rival's good and the share of contestable demand. Concave price‐quantity schedules erect barriers to entry. Convex parts in schedules introduce barriers to expansion. Dominant firms use all‐units discounts to create high entry barriers for rival firms with intermediate levels of contestable demand.