Local Government and Governance in Norway: Stretched Accountability in Network Politics

This article is concerned with the democratic quality of network governance in a local context; in particular, the interplay between traditional local government and the emerging network structures. What forms of interplay can be observed between traditional local government and emerging network structures? Of particular interest in this respect is the role of local councillors. As elected representatives, councillors embody the special commitment of authorities towards the public. However, involvement in networks implies a danger of capture, and if network decisions are not open to public scrutiny, democratic control is difficult to achieve even if local councillors are represented. This article therefore discusses networks and accountability: In what ways and to what degree are networks held accountable? Empirically, it explores three local policy networks, all involving the city of Kristiansand. One group of networks – neighbourhood networks – is internally initiated and maintained by the municipality of Kristiansand. Another network is an intermunicipal collaboration involving Kristiansand and five surrounding municipalities. The third network is an example of a public‐private partnership that includes the municipality of Kristiansand, as well as several other actors. The case studies show that the actual presence of local government representatives in networks is not enough to ensure accountability. Lines of popular accountability are stretched, either because the networks are deemed irrelevant by the city councillors, or because networks develop decision‐making styles that shield them from external political control, or because local councillors deliberately deprive themselves of influence over important policy fields.     

Ordering Stakeholder Relationships and Citizen Participation: Evidence from the Community Development Block Grant Program

Local administrative professionals typically are accountable to multiple stakeholders, including other governmental units, special interests in the business and nonprofit sectors, and citizens. How are these accountability relationships ordered? What is the position of citizens in that hierarchy, particularly the influence of citizen participation? Focusing on patterns of hearing participation and citizen impact on budgeting decisions for the Community Development Block Grant program, this statistical analysis employs ordered probit regression. The authors find that communities in which grant administrators feel most accountable to citizens for grant performance have higher degrees of citizen participation in hearings and higher levels of perceived citizen impact on budgetary processes. This relationship holds even in the presence of simultaneity between bureaucratic accountability to citizens and citizen participation. The findings point to the importance of instilling a public service ethic among government employees that places a high value on engaging as well as listening to citizens.     

Program Budgeting and Accountability in Local Government

Much has been written about program budgeting and its relevance to improved efficiency and effectiveness. However, there is little discussion about the relationship between the use of program budgeting and accountability. While, organisations using program budgeting focus on the issues of performance, the accountability of management to an elected body, such as a local council has been given little attention. In this article three questions are posed: (1) Is the performance information available to enable councillors to form a judgment about management's performance?; (2) Is management involved in determining issues of policy, such as objectives, programs and performance measurement?; and (3) Are councillors confronted by a greater volume of budgetary documentation but with no increase in time to consider it? The results show that program budgeting does not always enhance accountability in local government.     

'Managing for Outcomes': Accountability and Thrust

Central agencies in New Zealand are now defining public management performance to include both the quality of a manager's 'account' of output-outcome links and the manager's record of delivering efficient outputs. This article: (1) argues that the hard edge of accountability for deliverables must be dulled somewhat in order to pursue outcomes more vigorously; (2) shows how managers can use evaluation tools known as theories-in-action or logic models to give accounts of policy and management thrust; (3) proposes preliminary performance criteria for outcomes-focused management; and (4) attempts to sketch a new 'managing for outcomes' accountability bargain. The conclusions apply broadly to any jurisdiction interested in holding managers accountable for outcomes-focused management.     

The Demand Side of Performance Measurement: Explaining Councillors' Utilization of Performance Information in Policymaking

ABSTRACT

The article's starting point is that the persuasiveness of arguments for and against performance information's usefulness for elected representatives in government is limited by a lack of empirical evidence. Based on survey data from Norwegian local government, the article identifies factors that condition the extent to which councillors search for performance information when faced with decision dilemmas. One such factor is within-polity rank; frontbenchers are more inclined than backbenchers to search for performance information. A second factor is education; the best educated councillors are least inclined to search for performance information. A third factor is political experience; inexperienced councillors are most inclined to search for performance information. Theoretical and practical implications of these and other findings are discussed.     

English Councillors and Mayoral Governance: Developing a New Dynamic for Political Accountability

Much has been written about the arrival of directly elected mayors into the English political landscape. The responses of the councillors serving on those councils to the arrival of elected mayors, has by comparison, been neglected. Yet, the construction, by councillors of a new role as the guarantor of local political accountability within mayoral councils, requires councillors to develop new patterns of political behaviour which challenge long‐held assumptions about the role of the councillor as a political representative. The paper reports the findings of research conducted amongst councillors on England's mayoral authorities, which explored how councillors have responded to the arrival of an elected mayor and what mayoral government means for our understanding of the role of the councillor within English local government.     

Do Managers Face a Performance Trade-Off? Correlations Between Production and Process Performance

The existence of multiple goals in public organizations inevitably raises the concern that managers face performance trade-offs. In particular, scholars have expressed the fear that public managers, in order to secure high production performance, are forced to sacrifice performance on goals like equity, accountability, and procedural justice. However, our knowledge of whether such trade-offs exist is scarce. Using an administrative 10-year panel data set of Danish public schools and principals, this article analyzes trade-offs between production performance (measured by student performance and student pass rate) and process performance (measured by equity, accountability, and procedural justice). Results show no evidence of trade-offs. In contrast, principals who succeed in raising student performance generally also succeed in securing high pass rates, high equity, high accountability, and high procedural justice. These results suggest that managers who are able to secure high performance on one dimension of performance will likely also be high-performing on other performance dimensions.     

EXPECTATIONS AND CAPACITY OF PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT IN NGOs IN THE DEVELOPMENT CONTEXT

There are many obstacles to promoting learning as an outcome of performance measurement in non‐governmental organizations (NGO) social service providers, especially in less developed countries. Building upon a conceptualization of accountability as a multifaceted set of relationships through which funders, or principals, and non‐profit providers, or agents, jointly shape organizational learning, and performance, this study expands our understanding of how accountability mechanisms affect learning within service providers. This paper explores the role that funders play in shaping performance measurement, or monitoring, practices within NGOs serving disadvantaged children in developing countries. We examined the experience of service providers in Egypt and Colombia to assess how the barriers to use of performance data and learning may be addressed. We conducted interviews using the same protocols with program managers in six non‐profit providers in each country that provide services to children, and we also interviewed major donors in the arena of children's services in the USA. We probed the NGO managers' experiences with performance measurement to identify obstacles and potential solutions to improve the use of the data to promote learning. Our findings support previous research about the potential for upward accountability mechanisms to influence internal learning. We suggest that funders should be held accountable for how the incentives and disincentives they provide to grantees affect their internal learning about how to improve their services. This notion of ‘reverse accountability’ means that funders need to be strategic and intentional when they design reporting mechanisms that affect the learning behaviours within their grantees. In line with our call for reverse accountability, we offer a model demonstrating our notion of the two‐way flow of accountability and we offer recommendations to help improve the performance reporting environment for NGOs who are addressing complex problems with less than adequate capacity. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Promoting Accountability in Municipalities

Local government financial reporting reforms in Australia in the late 1980s and early 1990s were promoted on the basis of usefulness for decision making and for enhanced accountability purposes. Persistent criticisms of these reforms continue to be made, including those made by councillors and other ratepayers who often appear to find such information to be too narrow, too complex and often bewildering. A case is made for rethinking the present mentality, requirements and practices, especially with respect to the contrived recognition of ‘community assets’. Instead, an emphasis is placed on advancing broad‐scope accountability and meaningful financial reporting. To this end, the disclosure of a set of factual, reliable and interpretable indicators is proposed to enable a broader, more functional notion of accountability to be applied in Australian local government within prevailing social and organisational contexts. This contribution seeks to present a series of views, questions and proposals that are strictly concerned with ‘promoting accountability in municipalities’ (PAM).     

THE DESIGN AND USE OF PERFORMANCE INFORMATION IN INDONESIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS UNDER DIVERGING STAKEHOLDER PRESSURES

Public sector managers in less developed countries are confronted with opposing forces. A lack of sufficient resources along with a tradition of corruption are obstacles for developing and using performance measurement systems. However, recent public sector reforms in less developed countries, including decentralisation and anti‐corruption programmes, stimulate the development and use of such systems. On the basis of a framework, which distinguishes different types of stakeholders, each with particular performance interests, we analyse how public sector managers are coping with the two opposing forces, given the relative power positions and the interests of their stakeholders. On the basis of four cases studies of local government agencies in Bali (Indonesia), we found that with respect to the annual performance reports, managers in these agencies focus more on fulfilling the formal requirements regarding the format of these reports and on their timely submission than on their contents, which are all symptoms of a symbolic rather than functional use of performance information. However, the reports include information on inputs that is linked to similar information in short‐term reports, which the managers use in a functional manner. These managers show a kind of juggling behaviour, in the sense that they partially try to serve conflicting performance interests. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Performance Measurement in Italian and Spanish Local Governments: Comparative Policy Analysis

NPM reforms have become a global trend and performance management systems are considered suitable to enhance the decision-making process and accountability. The aim of the paper is to carry out a comparative study on the adoption of performance measurement tools in Italian and Spanish (medium-sized and large) local governments. It seeks to find out how widespread these tools are and how their usefulness is perceived. The results show differences between the two countries and that the presence of professional managers – experienced with performance measurement tools – positively affects the adoption of these tools. Moreover, performance measurement tools are perceived as a support for accountability purposes.     

Auditing as a tool of government accountability? Exploring divergent causal mechanisms through three Honduran cases

Audits of government entities offer a potential tool to hold public officials to account and to improve the functioning of public administration; however, empirical studies of audit impacts show mixed results. This is largely due to the diversity of audit regimes with different goals and accountability mechanisms, which yield different causal chains. In this study, I compare three distinct audit regimes with distinct casual mechanisms in Honduras. I find that backward-looking audits, which aim to hold officials accountable for past behavior or performance, require effective horizontal accountability mechanisms to investigate and prosecute cases. Forward-looking audits, which aim to hold officials accountable for future behavior or performance, require independent accountability mechanisms, a systematic follow-up methodology, public dissemination, and pressure from the media and civil society. Complementary initiatives that build on audit recommended reforms are found to strengthen these weaknesses in the causal mechanism linking audits to outcomes.     

Accountability and Coalitions: Evidence from a Negotiation Experiment

This article tests the effect of accountability on negotiation outcomes in a face‐to‐face classroom experiment. Student participants were asked to form coalitions in groups of three. In the treatment condition, negotiators were held accountable by a personal forum during the formation of the coalition. In the control condition, negotiators were not held accountable. Results show that accountability leads to lower group performance in coalition negotiations. Accountability also reduced the willingness of negotiators to include all negotiators in a “grand coalition.” Rather, accountable negotiators reached agreement with a subset of negotiators. Accountability increased the odds of reaching no agreement. These findings challenge the idea of increased performance as a result of public accountability in the context of coalition negotiations.     

Accountability‐by‐Proxy in Transnational Non‐State Governance

Transnational non‐state governance arrangements (NGAs) are increasingly common in areas such as labor standards and environmental sustainability, often presenting themselves as innovative means through which the lives of marginalized communities in developing countries can be improved. Yet in some cases, the policy interventions adopted by the managers of these NGAs appear not to be welcomed by their supposed beneficiaries. This article accounts for this predicament by examining the effects of different configurations of accountability within NGAs promoting labor rights. Most labor‐rights NGAs incorporate “proxy accountability” arrangements, in which consumers and activists hold decision makers accountable “on behalf” of the putative beneficiaries of the NGAs: workers and affected communities in poorer countries. The article shows how and why different combinations of proxy versus beneficiary accountability influence the choice of policy instruments used by NGAs, and applies the argument to three prominent non‐state initiatives in the domain of labor standards.     

Hyperaccountability: Economic voting in Central and Eastern Europe

Are citizens in the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe able to hold politicians accountable at elections? The inheritance of communism—disengaged citizens, economic flux, and inchoate party systems—might be expected to weaken accountability. Looking at the results of 34 elections in 10 Central and Eastern European countries, this paper finds instead a phenomenon that it calls hyperaccountability. Incumbents are held accountable for economic performance—particularly for unemployment—but this accountability distinguishes not between vote losses and gains, but between large and small losses. This result is significant in several respects. The evidence for economic voting restores some faith in the ability of voters to control their representatives in new democracies. The consistency of punishment in the region, however, may mitigate some of the benefits of economic voting. If incumbents know they will lose, then they may decide to enrich themselves when in power rather than produce good policies.     

Gauging the Effects of Social Accountability on Services,Governance, and Citizen Empowerment

Engaging citizens in holding public officials and service providers accountable, referred to as social accountability, is a popular remedy for public sector performance weaknesses, figuring prominently in many international donor‐funded projects and leading to widespread replication. However, the contextual factors that influence the successful transfer of social accountability are debated. Demand‐side factors (civil society and citizens) are overemphasized in much of the literature. Yet supply‐side factors (state structures and processes) and the nature of state–society relations are also important. This article examines four projects in developing countries to explore how these contextual factors influenced social accountability aims and outcomes. The salience of supply factors in enabling social accountability for service delivery and government performance stands out, particularly the degree of decentralization and the availability of space for citizen engagement. The capacity and motivation of citizens to occupy the available space, aggregate and voice their concerns, and participate with state actors in assessing service delivery performance and problems are critical.     

The impact of compulsory voting on inequality and the quality of the vote

Abstract

Democratic elections imply that the electorate holds incumbents accountable for past performance, and that voters select the party that is closest to their own political preferences. Previous research shows that both elements require political sophistication. A number of countries throughout the world have a system of compulsory voting, and this legal obligation boosts levels of voter turnout. Under such rules, citizens with low levels of sophistication in particular are thought to turn out to vote in higher numbers. Is it the case that the quality of the vote is reduced when these less sophisticated voters are compelled to vote? This article investigates this claim by examining the effect of compulsory voting on accountability and proximity voting. The results show that compulsory voting reduces stratification based on knowledge and level of education, and proximity voting, but it does not have an effect on economic accountability. The article concludes with some suggestions on how systems of compulsory voting might mitigate the strength of political sophistication in determining the quality of the vote decision process.     

Multi-level governance in the EU and EU democracy: Democratic legitimacy,democratic accountability and transparency of the European offices of the English local authorities in Brussels

This paper seeks to examine the role and functions of the representative offices of English local authorities in Brussels by considering the democratic legitimacy (i.e. linkage to elected councillors or mayors), accountability and transparency of the office’s activities. The study demonstrates that the offices differ in their governance arrangements and funding, which has a direct impact on the approach to democratic legitimacy and accountability, noting that those offices which rely most heavily on direct funding from a single authority or a combined authority have the closest links to the authorities concerned. The transparency of the offices varies considerably, with clear distinctions between offices that are creatures of contract or where offices are an emanation of the authority concerned. The pattern here is less dependent on the pattern of funding of the office and depends more on the availability of resources and the approach adopted by the office itself.     

The Other Type of Performance Information: Nonroutine Feedback,Its Relevance and Use

The literature on performance information use explains how public managers deal with mainly quantitative data that are systematically collected and formally reported. This article argues that such a narrow understanding is incomplete, as it excludes all kinds of nonroutine performance information, including verbal, ad hoc, and qualitative feedback. To understand how responsive public managers are to performance feedback, alternative sources of performance information need to be taken into account. A literature review suggests considering two important sources of nonroutine feedback: organizational insiders and relevant external stakeholders. Using survey data from German local government, this article shows that public managers prefer to use nonroutine feedback over routine data from performance reports. Furthermore, a regression analysis indicates that different sources of performance information require different determinants to trigger their use. This finding is essential because it suggests that explanations of performance information use can covary with the information source studied.     

THE POWER OF THE PURSE AND BUDGETARY ACCOUNTABILITY: EXPERIENCES FROM SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENTS IN CHINA

Accountability is the cornerstone of fiscal administration. This research studies the relationship between accountability and the sharing of budgetary power. We found that the accountability in China is supported by the superior of bureaucratic power, instead of the comprehensiveness of various accountability components. The implication is that the accountability is facilitated in terms of emphasising to whom government officials are accountable within the chain of command, reducing goal conflicts and improving strategic goal attainment. However, it is hindered at the same time in terms of lacking evaluations perceived to be impartial, limited room for democratic accountability, over‐implementation of policies at all costs, and weak comprehensive awareness of ‘accountable for what’ (as long as it is a policy direction from the top). The structure of the power of the purse both enables and limits the tone and terrain of budget accountability in particular and government accountability in general. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.