Power,National Security and Transparency: Judicial Decision Making and Social Architecture in the Federal Courts

Even in a democratic society, the need for transparency must be balanced with an important countervailing interest: the occasional, legitimate need for government secrecy. This article, based on an examination of opinions in federal cases dealing with national security and transparency, explores how judges identified the main legal issues presented by a case and the legal factors or mode of legal interpretation used to reach or justify their conclusions. The article concludes that many of these opinions are as much about judges’ attempts to balance the judicial branch's power with the powers of the executive and legislative branches as they are about national security and transparency. Furthermore, the article contends these opinions have created an “architecture of power” that determines how national security information is controlled. The final section also suggests that judges should be mindful of the original architecture of power established by the Constitution and the First Amendment when writing their opinions.     

Understanding the Judicial Role in Addressing Gender Bias: A View from the Eighth Circuit Federal Court System

The role of trial judges in the litigation process is frequently debated. Are judges to be dispassionate adjudicators, disengaged referees in a sport in which attorneys compete? Or are they charged with a more active role in promoting the substance, form, and process of justice? In the present paper, we explore the judicial role in addressing gender bias in federal litigation, using data gathered for the Eighth Circuit Gender Fairness Task Force. The federal judges of this circuit were surveyed about their experiences, observations, and opinions of gender-biased conduct. Results indicated that although judges viewed judicial intervention as an appropriate response to gender bias, they had little personal experience with intervention in such a situation. Fur thermore, when specific hypothetical scenarios were presented, they generally agreed that the described conduct was inappropriate but offered little consensus regarding the best course of action for an attorney or judge confronted with such behavior. The Eighth Circuit data thus provide the basis for expanded understanding of the conduct at issue, the options for action in response, and the persistent discrepancy in viewpoints on gender bias and the judicial role.     

Judges as Readers,Authors and Dialecticians: Legal Interpretation in the EC<Emphasis Type="Italic">t</Emphasis>HR Cases on Mental Disability

The wording of major human rights texts—constitutions and international treaties—is very similar in those provisions, which guarantee everyone the right to family, privacy, protection against discrimination and arbitrary detention, and the right to access the court. However, judges of lower national courts, constitutional judges and judges of the European Court of Human Rights often read the same or seemingly the same texts differently. This difference in interpretation gives rise not only to disputes about the hierarchy of interpretative authorities, but to more general disputes about limits of judicial construction and validity of legal arguments. How it may happen, that the national courts, which apply constitutional provisions or provisions of national legislative acts, which are seemingly in compliance with the international human rights standards, come to different results with the international judges? Do they employ different interpretative techniques, share different values or develop different legal concepts? Do international judges ‘write’ rather than ‘read’ the text of the Convention? Who is, in Plato’s terms, a name-giver and who has a power to define the ‘correctness’ of names? The answers to these questions from the rhetorical and semiotic perspectives are exemplified by the texts of the judicial decisions on the rights of persons with mental disabilities.     

Trailblazers and Those That Followed: Personal Experiences,Gender, and Judicial Empathy

This article investigates one causal mechanism that may explain why female judges on the federal appellate courts are more likely than men to side with plaintiffs in sex discrimination cases. To test whether personal experiences with inequality are related to empathetic responses to the claims of female plaintiffs, we focus on the first wave of female judges, who attended law school during a time of severe gender inequality. We find that female judges are more likely than their male colleagues to support plaintiffs in sex discrimination cases, but that this difference is seen only in judges who graduated law school between 1954 and 1975 and disappears when more recent law school cohorts of men and women judges are compared. These results suggest that the effect of gender as a trait is tied to the role of formative experiences with discrimination.     

The Effects of Legal and Extralegal Factors on Detention Decisions in US District Courts

The Bail Reform Act of 1984 changed the law dictating release and detention decisions in federal court. Since its passage, few studies have examined judicial decision-making in this context. Legal research enables us to account for the structure and interpretation of federal detention laws and to analyze previously neglected measures of legal factors in our analyses. We use US Sentencing Commission data on a sample of defendants who were sentenced in 2007 (N?=?31,043). We find that legal factors—particularly length of criminal history, having committed a violent or otherwise serious offense, and having committed the offense while under supervision of the criminal justice system—have the strongest relationships with the presentence detention outcome. A defendant’s age, race, and ethnicity have weaker relationships with detention. When we compare defendants who are similarly situated with respect to legal factors, the probability of detention is similar regardless of age, race, and ethnicity.     

Is the Expert Admissibility Game Fixed?: Judicial Gatekeeping of Fire and Arson Evidence

Anecdotal evidence claims that in criminal cases, trial judges admit the prosecution's expert witnesses more readily than the defendants', and in civil cases the reverse is true; judges exclude plaintiffs' experts more often than civil defendants' experts. This occurs despite the fact that, with few exceptions, the same rules of admissibility apply to all parties and, in most jurisdictions, across criminal and civil cases. This article empirically tests this differential by reviewing judicial decisions to admit or exclude evidence holding the type of expert testimony constant, fire and arson evidence, across criminal and civil cases in the United States. The study examines the admissibility of fire and arson investigation experts in criminal and civil cases across all legal parties in fifty‐seven federal and state opinions in the United States. The findings offer empirical support of a bias in criminal cases and in civil cases which present expert witnesses at trial, and is less pronounced, but still evident, on appeal. Specifically, the role of the party that offers the evidence has a profound effect on whether arson evidence is admitted, even when factors around the judge's political affiliation, attorney experience, expert qualifications, and rules of evidence are taken into account.     

What's Law Got to Do with It? Judicial Behavioralists Test the “Legal Model” of Judicial Decision Making

[Behavioral research has] the potential to engender serious confusion over judicial decision making. Even worse, [it] may mislead the unsuspecting … into thinking that judges are lawless in their decision making, influenced more by personal ideology than legal principles…. I have no doubt that careful statistical analysis, cautiously interpreted, may conceivably shed some light on judicial decision making. But serious scholars seeking to analyze the work of the courts cannot simply ignore the internal experiences of judges as irrelevant or disingenuously expressed. (Edwards 1998, 1337-38)
[E]ven if Chief Judge Edwards is accurately reporting his perceptions, one must worry about whether those perceptions are in fact an accurate portrayal of the work of his court…. [W]hen leaders tell the public that their institutions function well and that the views of potential critics should be disregarded, skepticism and empirical testing are appropriate. (Revesz 1999, 845)     

What judges maximize:toward an economic psychology of the judicial utility function

Posner proposes that federal appellate judges' income from judicial work and moonlighting is maximized within the constraint of time spent on leisure: he argues that judges' voting behavior be conceptualized as consumption, and that judges avoid the hard work and hassle involved in writing opinions. I propose that the terms entering the judicial utility function be simplified to judicial and non-judicial income, and consumption, some of which is enjoyed during leisure time but a proportion of which is enjoyed in working time (voting, reputation, avoidance of criticism, etc.) Moreover, the extent to which a judge experiences judicial work as laborious and hassling depends upon his cognitive style: adaptors and innovators are expected to conceptualize and experience the detailed work of opinion writing in different ways and thus to have distinct preferences for competing sources of utility. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Under the quasi-judicial state: H-1B employment rights in an era of judicial retrenchment

Foreign workers holding H-1B visas gained recourse to federal employment rights under the Immigration & Nationality Act (INA) for the very first time when Congress passed the Immigration Act of 1990 (IMMACT90). This paper examines H-1B employment rights enforcement under the INA as it has intersected with broader features of the American legal system: what political scientists call judicial retrenchment and the quasi-judicial state. I first show how H-1B rights, already limited by the domestic politics that shaped the IMMACT, became subject to judicial retrenchment when the federal courts confined H-1B disputes under the INA to the quasi-judicial state at the Department of Labor (DOL). I then use published data on DOL investigation outcomes, published and unpublished administrative case records, and judicial cases reviewing agency action to examine the extent to which and how H-1B workers can use the quasi-judicial state to solve workplace problems. My empirical findings contribute to a new understanding of the relationship between rights retrenchment, the judiciary, and the rise of alternatives to court in immigration and employment law and point to possible fine-grained changes for future immigration reform.     

完善我国行政复议工作人员制度的思考——以美国联邦行政法法官制度为例

我国现行行政复议工作人员管理制度存在着诸多问题,特别是在选拔、聘任、奖惩以及救济制度中均存在不同程度的限制或影响行政复议活动公正性发挥的现象.美国联邦行政法法官制度中的选拔、聘任、奖惩以及救济采取分散管理权力的方式,以保证行政法法官的独立性.本文分析了美国联邦行政法法官制度的特点,提出了完善我国行政复议工作人员制度建设的具体建议.     

The Limits of Senatorial Courtesy

Because of senatorial courtesy, scholars typically assume that presidents defer to home state senators from their party when selecting judges for the federal courts. We challenge this view, arguing that presidents face structural incentives that encourage them to consult broadly with senators across the partisan and ideological spectrums in choosing nominees. Using new data on the fate of judicial vacancies on the federal district courts between 1947 and 1998, we show how institutional and political forces increase interested senators' leverage in choosing federal judges. Senatorial courtesy, we conclude, has its limits, given presidents' incentives to consult with institutionally empowered senators in selecting nominees.     

Judges as satisficers: a law and economics perspective on judicial liability

If judges are guardians of the law, who is to protect the individual member of society from the occasional corrupt, malicious, or reckless judge? The aim of this paper is to provide an answer to the last part of this question, focusing more heavily on cases of negligently inflicted harm. Departing from Simon’s bounded rationality and influenced by other constructs in behavioral law and economics, we view judges as satisficers who make decisions within real-world constraints, such as imperfect information and uncertainty, cognitive limitations and erroneous information. Judges are limited by the commonly observed barriers to the decision making process. Because their goal is not to optimize but to render opinions that are merely satisfactory, they often act as poor agents of their principals’ interests. In this light, it becomes clearer why judges tend to engage in behavior that is “improper”, especially under the circumstances of the currently overloaded judicial caseloads. We first address the differences in judges’ roles in Anglo-American and Continental legal systems. We then present our simple model for judicial misbehavior based on an understanding of judges as “satisficers”. Next we discuss the particularities of judicial errors and introduce a realistic and viable construct of “inexcusable judicial error”. On this basis we evaluate the impact of various incentive schemes on judicial behavior, focusing on the civil liability of judges. We conclude that civil liability for grave judicial errors is the most adequate remedy.     

Challenging Civil Contempt: The Limits of Judicial Power in Cases Involving Journalists

Despite their assertion of a First Amendment or common law reporter's privilege in federal courts, journalists continue to face jail sentences and exorbitant fines for refusing to divulge their confidential sources when subpoenaed. Efforts to pass even a limited federal shield law have failed so far. This article offers another avenue to protect journalists—examining the roots of contempt law and policy to highlight limits on the contempt power of judges. It argues that because journalists are part of a group resting on steadfast moral and professional convictions, they may validly argue that confinement and excessive fines are improper sanctions. The article also suggests refinements in shield law proposals and other legislation to clarify the extent of judicial contempt power.     

裁判文书援引学说的基本原理与规则建构

学说的内容实质正当性及其约束法官自由裁量空间的外观进而增强裁判可接受性的功能,是裁判文书援引学说的基本原理,也是建构援引规则的出发点。学说根据其竞争力可以分为通说、主流说、少数说,法官既可以援引通说也可以援引非通说;援引非通说应当成为援引的主流。法官在援引学说时应尽量采用对话技术,尤其是在援引通说时应尽量避免对学说进行大篇幅的“复制与粘贴”;应尽量援引不同体裁的代表性作品以体现学说的数量优势外观。学者姓名承担了标识学术产品的质量担保功能、“商誉”功能与司法修辞功能,学说出处具有定位学者学说发展脉络等功能,援引学说须注明姓名与出处。裁判文书援引学术作品实质上是法官“购买”学术产品的行为,它将刺激处于供给侧的学者主动生产实务所需的产品,继而促成学术与实务的良性互动。最高人民法院可以考虑出台有关裁判文书援引学说的具体规则指引。     

PROFESSIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON COURT-CONNECTED CHILD CUSTODY MEDIATION

This article presents the initial findings of a research project in five judicial settings where there is the provision of child custody mediation within the court. A sample of judges, members of the Bar, and court mediators completed the Professional Study Questionnaire, which examined opinions regarding the efficacy of child custody mediation and requested suggestions for judicial policy and procedure in cases of custody conflicts.     

Constitutional courts as promoters of political centralization: lessons for the European Court of Justice

A cross-section analysis covering up to 42 countries and including the usual control variables shows that central government outlays as a share of general government outlays are significantly larger if the judges of the constitutional or supreme court are independent of the federal government and parliament and if the barriers to constitutional amendment are high. This evidence is consistent with the view that constitutional judges have a vested interest in centralization or that there is self-selection or both. These insights are used to draw lessons for the reform of the European Court of Justice. Self-selection should be reduced by requiring judicial experience—ideally with the highest national courts. The vested interest in centralization could be overcome by adding a subsidiarity court.     

Communicating Dissent in Judicial Opinions: A Comparative,Genre-Based Analysis

To date, there has been surprisingly little research on separate opinions in legal linguistics literature. Scarce attention has been paid to the linguistic and communicative aspects of how judges frame their disagreements. This paper serves as one of the early attempts to examine the institution of votum separatum, or separate opinion, from a comparative, cross-language perspective using a linguistic methodology. The evidence indicates a clear similarity in terms of how separate opinions are integrated within the respective macrostructures of the US SC opinions and the Constitutional Tribunal judgments. This study demonstrates how judges tend to employ highly formulaic expressions to signal their disagreement despite the absence of clear guidelines to communicate such stances. The analysis of their frequent phraseology demonstrates that declaring votum separatum and providing its justification are two different acts, not only legally but also linguistically, especially in terms of their formulaicity. The Polish and American justifications differ in the degree to which the frequent phraseology reveals peculiarities of judicial argumentation in addition to the presence of strong evaluative concerns.

     

The Impact of Judicial Opinion Language on the Transmission of Federal Circuit Court Precedents

Why do some federal circuit court precedents transmit across circuits when others do not? Does judicial opinion language influence which cases are more likely to transmit? Previous research on the transmission of precedents has focused primarily on attributes of the circuits or judges who wrote the decisions, without considering whether opinion language also influences citations. This study hypothesizes that precedents are more likely to transmit to other circuits when judges communicate their importance using features of opinion language such as the legal grounding, the amount of supporting evidence, and the decision to file a per curiam opinion. The results indicate that opinion language does influence the transmission of precedents, which suggests that judges who care about policy and are willing to take affirmative steps to encourage citations can use opinion language to enhance their impact.