United States Hegemony and the New Economics of Defense

Liberal theory asserts that the need for cost-effective, technologically advanced weapons requires the United States to acquiesce to increasing defense globalization even as this restrains U.S. power. Realist logic dictates that the United States should resist defense liberalization to retain its self-sufficiency. This is a false choice; the United States encourages defense globalization in order to extend its international political influence. This paper proposes an alternate theory of technological hegemony that explains the U.S. policy of massive R&D investment in both the late Cold War and the current era of American preponderance. Modern weapons' complexity and economies of scale tend to produce monopolies, and the value chain for the production of these monopolistic goods is dominated by the systems integration techniques of prime contracting firms. In turn these prime contractors remain largely enthralled by U.S. market power. The United States gains international influence by controlling the distribution of these weapons. Put simply, technology with international political effects is likely to have international political origins.     

Command of the Sea with Chinese Characteristics

As globalization accelerates, U.S. foreign policy makers have become less convinced of the influence geopolitics and power politics have on international affairs. They now risk losing touch with rising competitors like China that continue to view the international system in geopolitical terms. Chinese geopolitical strategists have great influence with the country's defense policy makers, who are focusing increasingly on the need for China to establish command of the seas—a goal that threatens conflict between it and the United States throughout Asia. In order to prevent a return to a world dominated by aggressive, geopolitically driven actors, the United States cannot afford to assume that China shares its worldview and that geopolitics has disappeared from international relations.     

日本国防工业金融支持模式透视

日本的国防产业在亚洲乃至整个世界都是比较发达的.在日本国防工业的快速发展中,产业政策发挥了重大作用.在产业政策的工具体系中,金融是极其重要的工具之一,是政府集中社会资源贯彻产业政策的重要手段.战后,日本的产业政策的内容和目标不断调整变化,金融支持的方式和重点也随之进行调整,但政府主导始终是其金融支持机制的主要特征.这突出地表现为政府对市场金融活动的较多干预和政策金融对民间资金的诱导,以支持军工产业发展.日本军事工业金融支持模式及其特点,对我国军工产业发展有所启示.     

The “Japan Card” in the United States Rapprochement with China, 1969–1972

United States rapprochement with China should be re-examined by taking into consideration the American negotiating approach towards Beijing regarding the role of Japan, the United States' major Asian ally and China's long-term rival in East Asia. Whilst announcing the Nixon Doctrine, which increased pressure on Japan to strengthen its defense and regional responsibilities, Nixon and Kissinger used the so-called “Japan Card,” Japan's possible military resurgence and China's long-term fear of it, as a tacit negotiating tool to justify to Chinese leaders the continued United States military presence in East Asia. This article examines the impact of the United States rapprochement with China on the American negotiating process with Chinese leaders for the continuation of the United States–Japan Security Treaty and to what extent it changed China's policy toward American relations with Japan.     

90年代国际产业竞争对日本经济的影响

20世纪80年代末90年代初,随着冷战的结束,贸易自由化、全球化蓬勃发展,各国纷纷加强国家干预,努力提高本国产业的国际竞争力。美国政府采取扶植战略性产业、"国家出口战略"等政策措施,使美国产业的国际竞争力明显提高。欧洲工业经过革新,在传统工业和新型工业上再次位居世界前列。随着东亚产业竞争优势的出现,日本不但在传统产业而且在高技术产业上面临东亚等新型工业化国家的激烈竞争。因此,90年代美欧以及东亚产业竞争力的提高,导致日本产业竞争力相对下降,对外出口增长缓慢,日本国内出现产能过剩,从而加剧了日本经济的衰退。     

安倍治下的日本对华政策:从战略制衡到战术避险

日本的对华外交深受国际体系和中美日三角关系的影响。由于中美两个大国在全球层面的战略竞争加剧,以2017年为分水岭,第二次安倍内阁领导下的日本的整体对华外交政策经历了从"战略制衡"向"战术避险"方向的转变。在2017年以前,日本为了联美对华实施"战略制衡",在外交方面,以"印太战略"孤立中国;在安全方面,加强岛屿防卫能力和强化日美同盟;在经济方面,大力支持"跨太平洋伙伴关系协定"和对"一带一路"倡议持冷淡态度。在2017年以后,在中美关系的不确定性增大的情况下,安倍领导下的日本对华实施"战术避险"。在外交方面,加强印太战略的开放性、领导人互访和对华自制;在安全方面,继续强化国防上的内部制衡;在经济方面,有条件地认同"一带一路"倡议并对华展开第三方市场合作。展望未来,令和时代的日本将是一个拥有部分战略自主的中等强国,在日美同盟框架下维持与中国有距离的交往,力图在瞬息万变的国际政治角力中实现日本国家利益的最大化。     

Evaluating US defense posture in light of great power competition

This article seeks a debate on the future of the US defense posture in the Great Power Competition. It contains a robust list of defense initiatives to consider in improving the US defense posture. Since the United States is no longer in combat operations in CENTCOM, now is the time to focus on changing the US defense posture and program to meet the challenges of the emerging security environment. The article details where the United States stands and major changes that should be made, emphasizing both conventional and strategic nuclear forces.The US Navy’s fleet and end strength has been constrained for far too long and must be expanded to meet the geopolitical requirements of the Great Power Competition. The US Navy’s size deeply declined as a byproduct of the Cold War’s end and Department of Defense post-Cold War force design planning. The lesson learned here is simple and straightforward: navies can be reduced quickly but cannot be rebuilt quickly. The industrial, construction, and labor issues associated with shipbuilding require multi-year construction schedules, effective labor force management and dedicated, long-range management and executive planning.     

Has-Been,Wannabe, or Leader: Europe’s Role in the World After the 2003 European Security Strategy

In December 2003, the European Union presented its “security strategy”, endorsed by all member states, to provide guidance for Europe’s common foreign security and defense policy. In substance, this document is not an expression of a growing strategic rift between Europe and the United States. One of the purposes it serves, however, is defining Europe’s own, separate “identity”. It reflects the increasing awareness that Europeans need to employ their power more effectively in the service of international peace and security, as much as politically possible. Disagreements on key issues remain in Europe, however, and the practical implications of the security strategy still need to be worked out.     

The Pivot in Perspective: American Naval Power,Then and Now

The article examines the reorientation of the defense policy of the United States, initiated during the Bush and Obama Administrations, toward giving increased priority to the Asia Pacific region. It begins with the historical perspective of the development of American naval power in the twentieth century. The world wars, in which Europe represented the primary theater of conflict, had the effect of shifting a greater share of American military assets toward the Euro-Atlantic theatre, while the onset of the Cold War after 1945 required the United States to develop a navy of truly global strategic reach in which Atlantic and Pacific commitments were kept in balance. With the diminished concern for European security since the end of the Cold War and the emergence of the People's Republic of China as a strategic competitor in the Asia Pacific region, the United States is required in an age of defense austerity to refocus attention again to the Pacific.     

Statecraft and Migration: A Research Note on American Strategies to Use Immigration in Foreign Policy from the Founding Era through the Early Twenty-First Century

How has the United States used migration as part of its statecraft and foreign policy? This question is significant because migration is an important contemporary transnational policy area for the United States; and because a state’s foreign-immigration policy nexus remains an under-explored vantage point for examining diplomatic and international history. This review article answers the question and lays conceptual and empirical ground in the area by examining the historical record and extant research to show that American leaders from the country’s founding through the early twenty-first century have used migration as an instrument of statecraft by primarily attempting to reach three foreign policy objectives: pleasing, harming, and bargaining with states. For each of these categories, the analysis explicates relationships between statecraft and migration for the United States, identifies policy instruments used by American leaders to influence migration for diplomatic and foreign policy objectives, and presents historical cases of American migration policies designed for foreign policy goals. The conclusion provides the research and policy implications of its findings.     

Post–Conflict Global Governance: The Case of Microfinance Enterprise Networks in Bosnia and Herzegovina

The article examines the institutional infrastructure that supports the foreign aid flows in the mcrocredit sector in postconflict Bosnia and Herzegovina. It documents the mobilization of transnational networks between different international agencies in the course of the policy formulation and implementation, and elicits the effects that certain network attributes exert on the policy choices made by individual organizations. How and why do international governmental and nongovernmental organizations, with at times conflicting goals, join forces in such networks? More important, whose goals are eventually implemented, and under what conditions? Whose goals are diluted in the process of network mobilization? What are the policy implications of such "battles" for the postconflict reconstruction? The article seeks some answers to these questions, demonstrating how transnational networks intermediate between the organizational goals and the final policy outcomes that result from such a network–based mode of global governance in postconflict regions.     

Pre-emption,Deterrence, and Self-Defence: A Legal and Historical Assessment

The policy of the United States, outlined in the 2002 National Security Strategy, whereby the US claims a right under international law to engage in pre-emptive use of force to prevent a rogue state's development of nuclear weapons, or any weapons of mass destruction (WMD), is unnecessary and therefore unlawful under customary international law of self-defence. This conclusion is reached through a comprehensive and intensive assessment of the normative reactions of politically effective actors to China's development of nuclear weapons during a two-year period between the Cuban Missile Crisis and China's first test in October 1964. While pre-emptive use of force against China, a rogue state, was considered by both the United States and most likely by the Soviet Union, neither used force to prevent it developing nuclear weapons. Since a policy of pre-emptive use of force was unnecessary for either state's self-defence, it would have been unlawful under customary international law. Given that the current strategic scenario of states vis-à-vis rogue states is the same under most circumstances, notwithstanding the existence of international terrorist networks, the article concludes that the proposed claim of the United States is, prima facie, unnecessary to its self-defence, and therefore unlawful under customary international law of self-defence. It shifts the burden of proof to policymakers claiming that all rogue states can be lawfully prevented through pre-emptive use of force from acquiring nuclear weapons, to establish that a particular state cannot be deterred from the use of nuclear weapons. Though the preventive war claim of the US National Security Strategy 2002 may turn out to be an effective strategic bluff in limiting WMD proliferation, the wisdom of the threat should not be confused with the illogic of preventive war.     

俄罗斯北极资源开发政策的新框架

俄罗斯为实现北极利益最大化,以扇形原则、先占原则和自然延伸原则为法律依据主张对北极资源行使主权控制。扇形原则因缺乏国际法论据而受到国际社会的反对,但俄罗斯基于国家利益需要不会放弃扇形原则的主张,并以自然延伸原则巩固对北极资源的控制权,这种权利是经济属性的主权权利并受到国际法的严格限制,只能依据科学证明来争取北极大陆架资源拥有权。同时,俄罗斯积极采用共同开发政策对北极资源进行权利控制,通过与相关国家签订临时协议拥有对北极争议区自然资源的开采权,这些对非北冰洋国家和《海洋法公约》将产生重大影响。国际社会有必要对俄罗斯北极资源开发政策高度重视,通过现有法律途径承担起维护人类共同继承财产的责任。     

日本新版《防卫计划大纲》评析

2010年12月17日，日本安全保障会议和内阁会议批准并颁布了（2011年度以后的防卫计划大纲》（以下简称“新大纲”）和（2011至2015年度中期防卫力量建设计划》。新大纲反映出日本新的安全战略、防卫思想、防卫政策，以及防卫力量的发展方向等，是今后5—10年日本自卫队建设的指导方针。由于新大纲是日本民主党执政后首次主导修订的有关国防建设的纲领性文件，因此更引起人们的广泛关注。     

Why the U.S. Military Budget is ‘Foolish and Sustainable’

What defense budget the United States should have and what defense budget it can afford are separate questions. The debate raging in Washington about Pentagon spending ignores the distinction. Doves insist that we need a more modest military strategy because the current one is wasteful and economically unsustainable. Hawks say that the current approach is sensible and affordable. This article takes a third path, arguing that U.S. military policy is likely to remain extravagant because it is sustainable. We adopted our current strategy—which amounts to trying to run the world with the American military—because we could, not because it was wisest. Wealth and safety make the consequences of bad defense policy abstract for most U.S. taxpayers. So we buy defense like rich people shop, ignoring the balance of costs and benefits. We conflate ideological ambition with what is required for our safety. Unfortunately, the current political demand for austerity and fewer wars will only temporarily restrain our military spending and the ambitions it underwrites.     

Working with the European Union

The past year saw growing uncertainty about the future of the European Union. Whether it becomes weaker or stronger, and whether it acts as a global partner or competitor, the United States cannot afford to ignore the eu. By understanding the different eu decision-making processes for defense, foreign policy, counterterrorism, and economic issues, the United States can do a better job of advancing its interests in Europe.     

Feedback loops in a world of complexity: a cybernetic approach at the interface of foreign policy analysis and international relations theory

Feedback in foreign policy occurs when a state's foreign policy affects the international context of that state and those changes in context subsequently impact on the state's future foreign policy decisions. In this way, feedback loops can develop, which may become self-reinforcing and in which foreign policy and international context continuously affect each other. Even though such processes are ubiquitous especially in a globalized world, they have hitherto received little systematic attention. We introduce cybernetics as a perspective that puts such feedback effects at the centre of attention and provides an accessible sequential framework for analysing them. Such a cybernetic analysis not only demonstrates the significance of feedback processes in foreign policies but also speaks to several recent debates in international relations theory and foreign policy analysis. In particular, it highlights processes of learning and change, of non-linearity and indeterminacy, and enables the researcher to integrate insights from structure- and agency-based approaches. We outline the merits of a cybernetic analysis by discussing the effects of feedback in the United States' War on Terror.     

《中导条约》与全球战略稳定论析

《中导条约》是冷战期间美苏达成的一项重要军控条约,是全球战略稳定的支柱之一。2019年8月,美俄相继退约,引发国际社会极大关注。人们担心,条约退场将冲击全球战略稳定,刺激军备竞赛,影响欧亚安全形势,削弱国际军控体系。中国是美国退约重要借口之一,条约作废势必深刻影响中国外部安全环境。《中导条约》从诞生、发展到消亡,有着深刻的国际、国内和个人三个层面的演变动因,归根结底起决定性作用的是国际格局变迁。20世纪80年代,苏美攻守异势促成了《中导条约》的诞生;进入21世纪后,北约对俄的挤压以及中导技术扩散促使俄罗斯抛出条约全球化倡议;近年来,美国霸权地位相对衰落促其选择退约。但美俄两国政治形势变化及领导人更迭也深刻影响了条约的“生、住、变、灭”的时机和方式。戈尔巴乔夫的“新思维”改革与当时高涨的核裁军运动为签署《中导条约》提供了特殊的政治、社会背景。特朗普政府奉行“美国优先”理念,频频废约“退群”,《中导条约》随之沦为牺牲品。在不同历史时期,陆基中导在全球战略稳定中所起的作用不同。在20世纪60年代初,它是美苏中央威慑的支柱。在20世纪70~80年代,它是影响延伸威慑的重要因素。进入21世纪后,它成为俄罗斯对付美国导弹防御的斗争手段。当前,陆基中导在跨域威慑中扮演日益重要的角色。大国中导博弈正卷土重来,但它必将带有与以往不同的诸多新特点。