Employee mobility,spin‐outs,and knowledge spill‐in: How incumbent firms can learn from new ventures

Research summary: We consider conditions in which incumbent firms are particularly poised to benefit from knowledge spilling in from new ventures that employ individuals previously employed by the focal incumbent firm. We distinguish between inventors who leave their incumbent employers to found spin‐outs and those who become non‐founding employees of existing new ventures. Using a sample of new ventures and incumbent firms in the U.S. information technology (IT) sector, we find that incumbents are more likely to benefit from patented knowledge that spills in from their spin‐outs than from new ventures that employ non‐founding inventors formerly employed by the respective incumbent. Any advantage that parent firms have in reaping such knowledge quickly dissipates, however, when these parents have a history of misappropriating the intellectual property of others. Managerial summary: It has long been acknowledged that new ventures can acquire valuable knowledge from their larger and more established counterparts by hiring away their talented employees. We consider the possibility of a reverse flow of knowledge where established firms learn from those new ventures that have poached employees from them. We find that established information technology (IT) firms are more likely to learn and build on the technology of their spin‐outs (i.e., new ventures founded by their former inventors) than from new ventures that simply employ non‐founding inventors formerly employed by the respective IT firm. Any advantage that these IT firms had in reaping technical know‐how from their spin‐outs quickly dissipated, however, when they had a history of misappropriating the intellectual property of others. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Does business planning facilitate the development of new ventures?

Many prior researchers have criticized business planning, arguing that it interferes with the efforts of firm founders to undertake more valuable actions to develop their fledgling enterprises. In this paper, we challenge this negative view of business planning, arguing that business planning is an important precursor to action in new ventures. By helping firm founders to make decisions, to balance resource supply and demand, and to turn abstract goals into concrete operational steps, business planning reduces the likelihood of venture disbanding and accelerates product development and venture organizing activity. Empirically, we examine 223 new ventures initiated in the first 9 months of 1998 by a random sample of Swedish firm founders and provide support for our hypotheses. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Blocked But Not Tackled: Who Founds New Firms When Rivals Dissolve?

Research summary: This article examines the role of competitive shocks in creating opportunities for new firm foundings. I argue that the sudden dissolution of rival firms may release resources that create opportunities for firm formation, particularly among employees facing impediments to capturing value in their current organizations. Analyzing microdata from the legal services industry, I use unexpected deaths of solo‐practicing attorneys as quasi‐exogenous sources of rival dissolution. Results indicate that these shocks increase the odds of founding by about 30%, with stronger effects among attorneys with weaker social connections or higher competition for promotion. The article thus highlights the role that founders play in reallocating dissolved rivals' resources while demonstrating that founding may be an important outlet for “blocked” employees to capture value from opportunities. Managerial summary: This article finds that the shutdown and dissolution of a rival organization may spur employees to found new firms. As a consequence, managers may find it valuable to pay attention to employees' turnover intentions following the dissolution of a rival. Findings suggest that employees who are having trouble advancing in the firm may be the most likely to found a new organization when a rival dissolves, so managers may want to focus retention efforts on these individuals. To the extent that managers wish to capture customers, employees, and other resources that were formerly attached to a dissolved rival, managers may wish to be aware that they could be in competition with their own employees for these resources and opportunities. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Shared and shared alike? Founders' prior shared experience and performance of newly founded banks

Research summary: Pre‐entry industry experience is a central construct in the founding team literature. Research on prior shared experience (PSE) emphasizes that founding teams face challenges integrating and acting on independent experiences, so PSE should be beneficial for new venture performance. Existing studies, however, typically study PSE in blunt terms, expecting that more is better. Instrumental variable analyses of a unique sample of 344 commercial banks founded in four U.S. states between 1996 and 2006 showed that industry‐specific PSE may be more or less beneficial, depending on several founding team characteristics. Our findings provide nuance and caution to the narrative that PSE is always beneficial. Under some circumstances, firms with founding team PSE may be no better off than those without founding team PSE, suggesting more research is necessary to understand when and why founding team experience matters to new firms. Managerial summary: Pre‐entry experience of founding teams affects new firm performance, but is hard for founders to leverage separately gained experience. Knowledge moves more readily if sets of managers leave together to start a new firm. But, it may be simplistic to conclude that prior shared experience (PSE) is always good, or better than the sum of independent experiences. In a set of banks founded in four U.S. states between 1996 and 2006, we find that PSE is not necessarily a direct pathway to better bank performance. Characteristics of the PSE, such as the part of industry the former and new banks operate in, can lower its benefit. We also found that the benefits of PSE erode as the entire founding team develops shared history after startup. Our findings have implications for entrepreneurs, investors, and policy‐makers. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Toward a social fitness perspective on contract design: Contract legitimacy and influence strategy

The effectiveness of contracts in terms of cooperative efficiency and relational outcomes in interorganizational relationships has become critical in today's volatile markets. However, extant research on the effect of contracts on trust has found inconsistent results, possibility because of its overwhelming focus on an economic fitness perspective at the expense of a social fitness perspective. Drawing insights from institutional theory, we focus on legitimacy building in interfirm contract design, investigate how contract legitimacies (i.e., regulative, normative, and cognitive) influence the effectiveness of interfirm contract design, and further explore the moderating effects of influence strategies that are applied in the process of contract implementation. Using longitudinal field survey data and archival data, this study finds that the three types of contract legitimacy play different roles in influencing compliance and trust and that noncoercive influence strategies can improve the effectiveness of regulative and normative legitimacy better than coercive influence strategies on trust. The findings offer new theoretical and managerial insights into the role of institutional environments in the effectiveness of contract design in manufacturer–distributor relationships.     

Ordered to Innovate: A Longitudinal Examination of the Early Periods of a New Product Development Process Implementation in a Manufacturing Firm

Firms can generate rather long‐lasting growth spurts through continuous innovation. Moreover, literature suggests that, when growing organically, firm performance is enhanced through a revenue expansion emphasis encompassing new‐to‐the‐world or new‐to‐the‐firm physical goods or service augmentations. This organic approach usually outperforms cost‐reduction programs, which often yield minor improvements to existing products; or an emphasis on simultaneous revenue expansion and cost reduction. While this finding has the major implication that firms should focus and generate more radical new products for long‐term success, there is need for research that investigates how firms should implement the strategy change to organic growth via innovation. The authors present a case study, which suggests that in the short run, it might be better to commence a revenue expansion strategy by focusing on incremental new product development (NPD) efforts, rather than focusing too much on new‐to‐the‐world or new‐to‐the‐firm products. Moreover, analyses of the rich, multimethod data, collected over a two‐and‐a‐half‐year interaction with the focal firm, illustrates that to increase success prospects of an organic innovation strategy, managers should not only engage incrementally innovative new product projects initially, but also ensure proficiency in commercializing the new product with cross‐functional NPD teams. Thus, in early stages of organization transformation, the merits of the organic growth strategy will be swiftly demonstrated, the cross‐functional teaming skills are learned and tested, and the new strategy becomes institutionalized. While somewhat contradictory to other studies on this topic, this more evolutionary exploration provides a new perspective for organizational change, especially when a firm is ordered to innovate. In conclusion, the insights gleaned in this study shed light on the journey from stagnating firm to a successful serial innovator via formalized NPD process implementation.     

Perspective: Economic Conditions,Entrepreneurship, First‐Product Development,and New Venture Success*

Entrepreneurial ventures have a significant impact on new job creation and economic growth, but existing evidence indicates that most entrepreneurial ventures fail. This paper reports key insights from VENSURV, a new database that tracks the success and failure of ventures founded since 1998. Based on an analysis of 539 new ventures founded during the years 1991–2001, the following conclusions are reached. First, consistent with prior research, less than half of the 539 ventures survived more than two years. Second, economic downturns lead to higher failure rates for new ventures. Third, new venture success is highly correlated with first‐product success. Fourth, first‐product success is enhanced when those products are introduced into markets with emerging market needs but with established industry standards. Finally, first‐product and venture performance are significantly higher for products based on ideas that came from the founders. In addition, the most successful first products are based on ideas that reflect both technology development and an analysis of customer needs.     

Strategizing as networking for new ventures

Strategizing as networking has become a powerful theme particularly in the IMP tradition. This paper focuses on new ventures and how these develop through the relationships formed by them. Strategizing through network development concerns how the firm perceives its network of interconnected relationships and how it interacts with other actors in relation to these perceptions. The aim of the paper is to identify patterns in the network development of new ventures and in how their strategizing relates to this development. The paper is based on a longitudinal case study of three new ventures. The case study captures the firms' ‘stories’ of how the networks of relationships have developed since their start. Based on the case illustrations we identify three patterns of how the new ventures strategize in their networking and how they network in their strategizing. These patterns concern: (1) exploration and exploitation of similarities, (2) knowledge sharing among customers, and (3) developing relationships with mediating partners. All three rely on interaction with counterparts that provide access to external resources which is of particular importance for new ventures.     

Market Information Acquisition,Use, and New Venture Performance*

A substantial body of existing research has linked firm performance to the acquisition and use of customer, competitor, and other market information. This paper examines the impact on new venture performance of formal processes for market information collection and use. This study hypothesizes that new venture performance will be an increasing function of both market information and use. Two moderator hypotheses are also tested. In particular, it is expected that the impact of formal market information processes will be greater in market‐driven new ventures than in technology‐driven new ventures. These hypotheses were tested using data collected from 222 Chinese new ventures. The empirical analysis confirms the positive role of formal processes in new venture performance. However, the analysis does not support the moderator hypotheses. This study finds that (1) formal processes for information acquisition are equally important in technology‐driven and market‐driven firms and (2) formal processes for information use have a greater impact on new venture performance in technology‐driven firms than in market‐driven firms.     

The role of incubators in overcoming technology ventures’ resource gaps at different development stages

Although incubation is considered important for overcoming resource challenges in technology ventures’ early life, there is a doubt about its relevance in later development stages, when the initial idea is commercialized and the venture tries to grow. Building on the resource‐based view of the firm and on a stage‐based perspective of venture development, this study argues that the resource gaps facing technology ventures differ between different development stages, and that the support provided by incubators therefore needs to be adapted to the venture’s development stage. We study the interaction between the iMinds incubator, located in Flanders, and eight technology ventures in its portfolio. In the Conception and Development stage, we observe resource gaps in terms of technical knowledge and access to end users, which the incubator addresses by offering direct technical support and access to its research and end user network. The subsequent Commercialization stage is dominated by business knowledge gaps, which the incubator amends through direct coaching and trainings. In the Growth stage, ventures typically lack the necessary team members, market players, and follow‐up financiers to grow their firm. The incubator addresses these resource gaps by providing access to its network. In all development stages, the incubator’s internal knowledge base, networking capabilities, and matching focus/selectivity are crucial in order for ventures to benefit from the incubator’s support. Our study suggests that these underlying capabilities can either be developed organically, or through the merger of different research institutes. Moreover, it points to the importance of local embeddedness for the geographical extension of these capabilities. These findings contribute to the literature on incubation and on venture development. They have important implications for policy makers, incubation managers, and entrepreneurs seeking incubation support.     

First Product Success: A Mediated Moderating Model of Resources,Founding Team Startup Experience,and Product‐Positioning Strategy

The success of the first product is of paramount importance for the future development of the new venture. Developing and launching a first product in the Chinese market is even more challenging than in a well‐developed market economy because of weak enforcement of intellectual property laws, a general consumer distrust of new products developed by Chinese firms, and the immediate threat of copycat. This article develops a mediated moderating model to examine first product success in Chinese new ventures, in which product‐positioning strategy (conceptualized as the degree of product differentiation) mediates the impacts of marketing resources, technical resources, and founding team startup experience on product success (conceptualized as timing of product launch and product market and financial performance). Furthermore, we argue that founding team startup experience moderates the impact of marketing and technical resources on building strong product‐positioning strategy. We test our conceptual model using a sample of 909 new products developed by 909 Chinese new ventures in a two‐step selection model. The empirical results provide important insight for new ventures' first product development. Product differentiation does not mediate the impact of marketing resource on product success; but it fully mediates the impact of technical resources on timing of product launch and partially mediates the impact of technical resources on product performance. Marketing resources have significant direct positive effects on both product performance and timing of product launch. Surprisingly, the impacts of marketing resources on product differentiation and product performance are negatively, not positively, moderated by founding team experience. When the founding team has nine years or less startup experience, an increase in marketing resources leads to a significant increase in product differentiation; and when the founding team has more than nine years of startup experience, an increase in marketing resources will not lead to an increase in product differentiation. The impact of marketing resources on product performance is smaller for founding teams with more prior startup experience than those with less prior startup experience. The impacts of technical resources are not moderated by founding team startup experience. Technical resources positively affect product market and financial performance directly as well as through its positive impacts on product differentiation. However, technical resources can negatively affect timing of the product launch because developing a highly differentiated produce can potentially delay the launch of the product. Therefore, new ventures have to be mindful in managing the available resources to succeed in the first product development.     

Innovative versus incremental new business services: Different keys for achieving success

In companies where new product development plays an important strategic role, managers necessarily contend with a portfolio of projects that range from high technology, new‐to‐the‐world, innovations to relatively simple improvements, adaptations, line extensions, or imitations of competitive offerings. Recent studies indicate that achieving successful outcomes for projects that differ radically in terms of innovativeness requires that firms adjust their NPD practices in line with the type of new product project they are developing. Based on a large‐scale survey of managers knowledgeable about new product development in their firm, this study focuses on new business‐to‐business service projects in an attempt to gain insights about the influence of product innovativeness on the factors that are linked to new service success and failure. The research results indicate that there are a small number of “global” success factors which appear to govern the outcome of new service ventures, regardless of their degree of newness. These include: ensuring an excellent customer/need fit, involving expert front line personnel in creating the new service and in helping customers appreciate its distinctiveness and benefits, and implementing a formal and planned launch program for the new service offering. Several other factors, however, were found to play a more distinctive role in the outcome of new service ventures, depending on how really new or innovative the new service was. For low innovativeness new business services, the results suggest that managers can enhance performance by: leveraging the firm's unique competencies, experiences and reputation through the introduction of new services that have a strong corporate fit; installing a formal “stage‐gate” new service development system, particularly at the front‐end and during the design stage of the development process; and ensuring that efforts to differentiate services from competitive or past offerings do not lead to high cost or unnecessarily complex service offerings. For new‐to‐the‐world business services, the primary distinguishing feature impacting performance is the corporate culture of the firm: one that encourages entrepreneurship and creativity, and that actively involves senior managers in the role of visionary and mentor for new service development. In addition, good market potential and marketing tactics that offset the intangibility of “really new” service concepts appear to have a positive performance effect.     

Nonmimetic Knowledge and Innovation Performance: Empirical Evidence from Developing Countries

The knowledge‐based view suggests that the innovative performance of a firm is a function of the utilization and recombination of internal and external knowledge. The process of knowledge utilization and recombination to create new products can occur internally, through research and development activities, as well as externally, by making investments in creating links with suppliers, universities, customers, and a wide range of actors in the innovation system. This study focuses on the impact of unique, nonmimetic external knowledge, which is defined as unique technological knowledge that is not tapped by other firms in the new venture's operating environment, on the new venture's innovative performance. The purpose of the research is to investigate whether firms really benefit from utilizing and recombining unique, nonmimetic knowledge in creating innovative products in a developing country context. Drawing on the knowledge‐based view and institutional theory, this study argues that entrepreneurs in their utilization and recombination of unique, nonmimetic knowledge are not always successful at creating new products. The empirical context is drawn from the Enterprise Survey produced by the Investment Climate Group of the World Bank. The findings based on a large sample of new ventures in developing countries reveal a curvilinear relationship with marginal diminishing returns between the degree of unique, nonmimetic knowledge and innovative performance. The results also show significant moderating effects of strategic product planning and economic and regulatory policy uncertainty. Specifically, strategic product planning helps in converting very unique, nonmimetic knowledge into new products. In addition, policy uncertainty can also positively moderate the process of recombining and converting unique, nonmimetic knowledge into new products. This study provides a more complete account of how unique, nonmimetic external knowledge affects innovative performance of new ventures in developing countries.     

New Product Development Practices and Early‐Stage Firms: Two In‐Depth Case Studies

New product development practices (NPD) have been well studied for decades in large, established companies. Implementation of best practices such as predevelopment market planning and cross‐functional teams have been positively correlated with product and project success over a variety of measures. However, for small new ventures, field research into ground‐level adoption of NPD practices is lacking. Because of the risks associated with missteps in new product development and the potential for firm failure, understanding NPD within the new venture context is critical. Through in‐depth case research, this paper investigates two successful physical product‐based early‐stage firms' development processes versus large established firm norms. The research focuses on the start‐up adoption of commonly prescribed management processes to improve NPD, such as cross‐functional teams, use of market planning during innovation development, and the use of structured processes to guide the development team. This research has several theoretical implications. The first finding is that in comparing the innovation processes of these firms to large, established firms, the study found several key differences from the large firm paradigm. These differences in development approach from what is prescribed for large, established firms are driven by necessity from a scarcity of resources. These new firms simply did not have the resources (financial or human) to create multi‐ or cross‐functional teams or organizations in the traditional sense for their first product. Use of virtual resources was pervasive. Founders also played multiple roles concurrently in the organization, as opposed to relying on functional departments so common in large firms. The NPD process used by both firms was informal—much more skeletal than commonly recommended structured processes. The data indicated that these firms put less focus on managing the process and more emphasis on managing their goals (the main driver being getting the first product to market). In addition to little or no written procedures being used, development meetings did not run to specific paper‐based deliverables or defined steps. In terms of market and user insight, these activities were primarily performed inside the core team—using methods that again were distinctive in their approach. What drove a project to completion was relying on team experience or a “learn as you go approach.” Again, the driver for this type of truncated market research approach was a lack of resources and need to increase the project's speed‐to‐market. Both firms in our study were highly successful, from not only an NPD efficiency standpoint but also effectiveness. The second broad finding we draw from this work is that there are lessons to be learned from start‐ups for large, established firms seeking ever‐increasing efficiency. We have found that small empowered teams leading projects substantial in scope can be extremely effective when roles are expanded, decision power is ground‐level, and there is little emphasis on defined processes. This exploratory research highlights the unique aspects of NPD within small early‐stage firms, and highlights areas of further research and management implications for both small new ventures and large established firms seeking to increase NPD efficiency and effectiveness.     

How Do Interaction Activities among Customers and between Customers and Firms Influence Market Performance and Continuous Product Innovation? An Empirical Investigation of the Mobile Application Market

Mobile application markets (MAMs) significantly differ from other existing marketplaces at least in two aspects. First, customers (app users) and firms (app providers) frequently interact with each other in real time, which is not common in the conventional marketplaces. Second, many app providers incorporate customers’ opinions or suggestions into their software upgrades, representing one of the most unique and interesting aspects of MAMs. Therefore, it has become critical to understand the impact of interaction activities not only among customers, but also between customers and firms on the market performances of new products in MAMs. One of the most significant issues firms face is whether firms reflect on customers’ postpurchase interaction activities, and the next interesting question is how firms respond to them. This study explores the effects of customer‐to‐customer (C2C), customer‐to‐firm, and firm‐to‐customer interaction activities on market performance. In addition, this study investigates how communication activities influence a firm's tendency to pursue continuous product innovation through research and development (R&D). Using data obtained from a major MAM, T store, three models that are respectively related to product sales, product lifetime, and a firm's R&D activity for product upgrades, are applied to empirically test hypotheses concerning the effects of interaction activities. In our analyses of market performance, a hierarchical log regression model with 10,840 weekly transactions data set related to product sales (model A) and 291 aggregate transactions related to product lifetime (model B) is used. Results indicate that C2C and customer‐to‐firm communication activities have a positive impact on sales, but little relationship with product lifetime. However, a firm's continuous product R&D has a positive impact on both sales and lifetime performance. Our analysis of a firm's R&D (model C) shows that C2C and customer–firm communication increases a firm's R&D activity. Taken together, these results have important implications for customer–firm interactions, market performance, and R&D strategies.     

Which Tangible and Intangible Assets Matter for Innovation Speed in Start‐Ups?*

The launch of the first product is an important event for start‐ups, because it takes the new venture closer to growth, profitability, and financial independence. The new product development (NPD) literature mainly focuses its attention on NPD processes in large firms. In this article insights on the antecedents on innovation speed in large firms are combined with resource‐based theory and insights from the entrepreneurship literature to develop hypotheses concerning the antecedents of innovation speed in start‐ups. In particular, tangible assets such as starting capital and the stage of product development at founding and intangible assets such as team tenure, experience of founders, and collaborations with third parties are considered as important antecedents for innovation speed in start‐ups. A unique data set on research‐based start‐ups (RBSUs) was collected, and event‐history analyses were used to test the hypotheses. The rich qualitative data on the individual companies are used to explain the statistical findings. This article shows that RBSUs differ significantly in their starting conditions. The impact of starting conditions on innovation speed differs between software and other companies. Although intuition suggests that start‐ups that are further in the product development cycle at founding launch their first product faster, our data indicate that software firms starting with a beta version experience slower product launch. The amount of initial financing has no significant effect on innovation speed. Next, it is shown that team tenure and experience of founders leads to faster product launch. Contrary to expectations, alliances with other firms do not significantly affect innovation speed, and collaborations with universities are associated with longer development times.     

The effects of opportunities and founder experience on new firm performance

Much prior research in entrepreneurship has focused on the role of the founder's knowledge in affecting new firm performance. Yet, little is known about how and why the entrepreneurial opportunity itself shapes outcomes in this arena. We begin filling in this critical gap in the literature by examining how the riskiness of the opportunity not only affects start‐up performance, but also conditions the relevance of the founder's distinct knowledge endowments. Analyses of a sample of 451 new firms show that the riskier the opportunity, the greater the performance of the start‐up, above and beyond founder characteristics. Moreover, the value of founder knowledge is relative to the type of opportunity exploited: high‐risk opportunities favor founders with managerial experience, whereas low‐risk opportunities favor founders with industry experience. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Benefits of Aesthetic Design as an Element of New Service Development*

The goal of this research is to investigate the benefits that may be gained from using aesthetic design in new service development. The research is performed in two phases. In the first phase, case research examining the use of aesthetic design in 16 new service development projects in new technology‐based firms is used to determine the objectives underlying managers' decisions to use aesthetic design in new service development. The results of the case research suggest that the objectives underlying managers' decisions to use aesthetic design in new service development are attracting new customers, creating and fostering a positive image of their firm in their market, retaining existing customers, and doing so at lower cost. In the second phase, the results of the case research are used to generate hypotheses that are tested using longitudinal survey data collected in 98 new technology‐based firms. The findings suggest that by and large the benefits expected by managers are realized. The practitioner implications of this research are that new technology‐based firms that emphasize the use of aesthetic design in new service development can expect to have a greater proportion of sales from new customers, be less dependent on a few large customers, be more successful in entering new markets, have a more favorable firm image, and enjoy higher turnover growth from existing customers and higher profits than comparable firms not using aesthetic design. The data do not provide support for the hypothesis that firms using aesthetic design in new service development will have customers that are less inclined to switch their allegiance to competitors, whereas it does support the hypothesis that firms using aesthetic design will enjoy higher turnover growth from existing customers than others. This could indicate that, although firms cannot expect to retain customer loyalty based on aesthetic design, they can expect to earn greater revenues from customers who do remain loyal if they emphasize aesthetic design.     

The business model in entrepreneurial marketing: A communication perspective on business angels' opportunity interpretation

Entrepreneurial marketing has emerged as a recent perspective within the marketing field, taking the challenges and characteristics of small firms and founding teams into account. Specifically, in the early stages of entrepreneurial marketing, besides potential customers a variety of other stakeholders tend to be in the center of attention. Among these stakeholders, business angels as early-stage investors represent a vital target group. In this paper, we aim to shed light on entrepreneurial marketing in the early phases of new venture creation, in which entrepreneurial firms have an inherent need to market the value of a business opportunity toward potential investors. In particular, we contribute to the literature by introducing the business model as a narrative device for the marketing of early-stage new ventures toward potential business angels. In this regard, the business model is suggested as playing a critical role through making the inherent economic value of a technology explicit. Building on narrative theory, we investigate the role that the business model plays in the decision-making process of 17 business angels. Based on our findings, we propose a model that links the business model to a business angel's interpretation of an investment opportunity and discuss implications for theory and practice.     

Success Factors in New Ventures: A Meta‐analysis*

Technology entrepreneurship is key to economic development. New technology ventures (NTVs) can have positive effects on employment and could rejuvenate industries with disruptive technologies. However, NTVs have a limited survival rate. In our most recent empirical study of 11,259 NTVs established between 1991 and 2000 in the United States, we found that after four years only 36 percent, or 4,062, of companies with more than five full‐time employees, had survived. After five years, the survival rate fell to 21.9 percent, leaving only 2,471 firms still in operation with more than five full‐time employees. Thus, it is important to examine how new technology ventures can better survive. In the academic literature, a number of studies focus on success factors for NTVs. Unfortunately, empirical results are often controversial and fragmented. To get a more integrated picture of what factors lead to the success or failure of new technology ventures, we conducted a meta‐analysis to examine the success factors in NTVs. We culled the academic literature to collect data from existing empirical studies. Using Pearson correlations as effect size statistics, we conducted a meta‐analysis to analyze the findings of 31 studies and identified the 24 most widely researched success factors for NTVs. After correcting for artifacts and sample size effects, we found that among the 24 possible success factors identified in the literature, 8 are homogeneous significant success factors for NTVs (i.e., they are homogeneous positive significant metafactors that are correlated to venture performance): (1) supply chain integration; (2) market scope; (3) firm age; (4) size of founding team; (5) financial resources; (6) founders' marketing experience; (7) founders' industry experience; and (8) existence of patent protection. Of the original 24 success factors, 5 were not significant: (1) founders' research and development (R&D) experience; (2) founders' experience with start‐ups; (3) environmental dynamism; (4) environmental heterogeneity; and (5) competition intensity. The remaining 11 success factors are heterogeneous. For those heterogeneous success factors, we conducted a moderator analysis. Of this set, three appeared to be success factors, and two were failure factors for subgroups within the NTVs' population. To facilitate the development of a body of knowledge in technology entrepreneurship, this study also identifies high‐quality measurement scales for future research. The article concludes with future research directions.