| 基于博弈论的移动目标最优防御策略研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 李亚龙,陈勤,张旻.基于博弈论的移动目标最优防御策略研究[J].计算机工程与应用,2019,55(19):141-146. |
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| 作者姓名： | 李亚龙 陈勤 张旻 |
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| 作者单位： | 杭州电子科技大学 计算机学院,杭州,310000;杭州电子科技大学 计算机学院,杭州,310000;杭州电子科技大学 计算机学院,杭州,310000 |
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| 基金项目： | 浙江省重点研发计划项目 |
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| 摘 要： | 基于博弈论的网络安全防御大多数使用完全信息静态博弈或不完全信息动态博弈理论建立攻防模型，但完全信息静态博弈使用场合受限，实用性不强，所以使用不完全信息动态博弈建立攻防模型更贴近实际情况，而以往由不完全信息动态博弈建立的攻防模型认为观测到的攻击策略为真实攻击策略则没有考虑观测到的攻击策略很可能会出现误差。为此，引入最小风险的贝叶斯决策的思想，将防御系统对攻击策略发生误判、错判时，采取的防御策略对系统带来的风险考虑在内，建立了基于不完全信息动态博弈的移动目标最优防御策略模型。该策略模型通过分析防御决策风险大小，使防御策略收益量化更加精准、全面，并利用不完全信息动态博弈的精炼贝叶斯均衡选取最优防御策略。通过实例进行分析，验证了模型的有效性。
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| 关 键 词： | 移动目标防御 最优策略 不完全信息动态博弈 精炼贝叶斯均衡 |
Research on Optimal Defense Strategy of Moving Targets Based on Game Theory |
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| LI Yalong,CHEN Qin,ZHANG Min.Research on Optimal Defense Strategy of Moving Targets Based on Game Theory[J].Computer Engineering and Applications,2019,55(19):141-146. |
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| Authors: | LI Yalong CHEN Qin ZHANG Min |
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| Affiliation: | School of Computer Science, Hangzhou Dianzi University, Hangzhou 310000, China |
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| Abstract: | At present, most of the network security defenses based on game theory use the full information static game or the incomplete information dynamic game theory to establish the offensive and defensive model. However, the use of the full information static game is limited and its practicality is not strong. Therefore, using the incomplete information dynamic game to establish the offensive and defensive model is closer to the actual situation, but the attack and defense model established by the incomplete information dynamic game in the past believes that the observed attack strategy is true, which in fact is likely to have errors. The attack strategy without considering the observed attack strategy is likely to have errors. To this end, this paper introduces the idea of Bayesian decision making with minimum risk. When the defense system misjudges the attack strategy, the risks brought to the system arising from the adopted defense strategy will be taken into account. Then, this paper establishes the game’s moving target optimal defense strategy model based on incomplete information dynamic game. By analyzing the risk of the defense decision, this model makes the defense strategy revenue more accurate and comprehensive. It uses the refined Bayesian equilibrium of the incomplete information dynamic game to select the optimal defense strategy. Finally, an example is analyzed to verify the validity of the model. |
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| Keywords: | moving target defense optimal strategy incomplete information dynamic game perfect Bayesian equilibrium |
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