| 车联网中基于攻防博弈的蜜罐防御及传输策略 |
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| 作者姓名： | 易杰 曹腾飞 郜帅 黄建强 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 青海大学计算机技术与应用系，青海 西宁 810016;2. 北京交通大学移动专用网络国家工程研究中心，北京 100044 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金(62101299);青海省自然科学基金(2020-ZJ-943Q) |
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| 摘 要： | 随着车联网的快速发展，服务提供商通过将5G基站型路侧单元（RSU，road side unit）部署在靠近车辆的位置，能够迅速为车辆用户提供缓存服务。然而，由于恶意攻击者的存在，其通过控制基站获取权限使基站变为恶意基站，达到身份伪造攻击的目的，并以恶意基站的名义发送消息干扰车辆与可信基站之间的通信链路，容易造成严重的行车安全问题。提出了车联网中基于攻防博弈的蜜罐防御及传输策略，通过部署蜜罐基站混淆攻击者，从而降低车联网中身份伪造攻击的风险，提高车联网数据传输的可靠性。将车联网场景中可信基站与恶意基站之间的交互问题建模为攻防博弈模型，在此基础上可信基站与蜜罐基站联合作为防守方来抵御恶意攻击。可信基站和恶意基站作为攻防博弈双方选择各自相应的策略，构建双方效益函数模型，并结合车辆时延反馈机制，防守方与恶意基站动态调整各自策略。通过调整蜜罐基站与车辆的交互性和 IP 随机化程度，使防守方的整体效益得到有效提升，并利用混合策略纳什均衡理论得出最优解。大量的仿真实验结果表明，所提出的策略能够在恶意攻击者存在的情况下，提高车联网服务的安全传输性能，对比无蜜罐防御方案，防守方期望效益提升了48.9%，数据传输时延降低了57.1%。
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| 关 键 词： | 车联网 博弈论 蜜罐策略 攻防博弈 |
Honeypot defense and transmission strategy based on offensive and defensive games in vehicular networks |
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| Authors: | Jie YI Tengfei CAO Shuai GAO Jianqiang HUANG |
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| Affiliation: | 1. Department of Computer Technology and Applications, Qinghai University, Xining 810016, China;2. National Engineering Research Center for Mobile Private Networks, Beijing Jiaotong University, Beijing 100044, China |
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| Abstract: | With the rapid development of the Internet of Vehicles, service providers can efficiently provide caching services for vehicle users by deploying 5G base station-type RSUs adjacent to vehicles.However, due to the presence of malicious attackers, the controlled base station is turned to be malicious for the purpose of identity forgery attack.When messages are sent in the name of malicious base stations to interfere with the communication link between vehicles and the trusted base stations, it is easy to cause serious driving safety problems.To solve the above problem, an efficient transmission and honeypot defense strategy was proposed, which was based on the offensive and defensive game in the Internet of Vehicles to reduce the risk of identity forgery attacks and improve the security of data transmission.The interaction between trusted base stations and malicious base stations in the Internet of Vehicles scenario was modeled as an attack-defense game model.On this basis, trusted base stations and honeypot base stations were jointly used as defenders to defend against malicious attacks.Then, the trusted base station and the malicious base station, as the two sides of the offensive and defensive game, chose their respective strategies to construct a model of the benefit function of both sides.Combined with the vehicle delay feedback mechanism, the defender and the malicious base station dynamically adjusted their respective strategies.By adjusting the interaction between the honeypot base station and the vehicle, and also the degree of IP randomization, the overall benefit of the defender was effectively improved.Besides, the optimal solution was obtained by using the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium theory.Simulation experimental results show that the proposed strategy can improve the secure transmission performance of the Internet of Vehicles service in the presence of malicious attackers, and the defender’s expected benefit is improved by 48.9% and the data transmission delay is reduced by 57.1% compared to the no-honeypot defense scheme. |
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| Keywords: | Internet of vehicles game theory honeypot strategy offensive and defensive games |
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