| 大型公共项目投资决策中公众参与行为的激励演化博弈研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 吴璇,刘景矿,庞永师.大型公共项目投资决策中公众参与行为的激励演化博弈研究[J].工程管理学报,2020,34(6):83-088. |
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| 作者姓名： | 吴璇 刘景矿 庞永师 |
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| 作者单位： | 广州大学 管理学院 |
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| 基金项目： | 广东省哲学社会科学规划项目 |
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| 摘 要： | 为解决我国当前大型公共项目投资决策工作中公众群体参与不足、政府决策忽视公众利益等问题，借助演化博弈理论，将政府、公众和企业置于同一个分析框架中，建立三方主体非对称性演化博弈系统动力学模型，分析各主体演化稳定策略，并对其演化路径及影响机理进行数值仿真分析。研究表明，大型公共项目投资决策过程是多方利益主体相互影响、相互关联、相互掣肘的社会行为，政府、公众和企业三方博弈群体最后将达成“不激励、参与、努力”的稳定状态，公众参与行为激励机制的构建必须重视多方主体协作，采取措施增加公众参与行为收益，降低参与行为成本。
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| 关 键 词： | 大型公共项目 公众参与 演化博弈 系统动力学 |
A Study on the Incentive Mechanism of Public Participation Behavior in theLarge-scale Public Projects Investment Decision Based on System Evolutionary Game Model |
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| WU Xuan,LIU Jing-kuang,PANG Yong-shi.A Study on the Incentive Mechanism of Public Participation Behavior in theLarge-scale Public Projects Investment Decision Based on System Evolutionary Game Model[J].Journal of Engineering Management,2020,34(6):83-088. |
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| Authors: | WU Xuan LIU Jing-kuang PANG Yong-shi |
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| Affiliation: | School of Management，Guangzhou University |
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| Abstract: | In order to solve the problems of insufficient participation of public groups in the current large-scale public project investment decision-making work and the government’s neglect of public interests，this paper uses evolutionary game theory to put the government，the public and enterprises in the same analysis framework and establish a three-party asymmetry evolutionary game system dynamics model. The model analyzes the evolutionary stabilization strategies of each subject and conducts numerical simulation analysis on its evolution path and influence mechanism. Research shows that the investment decision-making process of large-scale public projects is a social behavior in which multiple stakeholders influence，interrelate，and restrain each other. The three-party game group of the government，the public，and the enterprise will eventually reach a stable state of "no incentive，participation，and effort". The construction of the incentive mechanism of the public participation behavior must pay attention to the cooperation of multiple parties and take measures to increase the benefits of public participation and reduce the cost of participation. |
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| Keywords: | large-scale public projects public participation evolutionary game system dynamics |
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