| 全过程咨询模式下 EPC 项目主体合作博弈研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 王秀秀,王颖林,吴能森.全过程咨询模式下 EPC 项目主体合作博弈研究[J].工程管理学报,2022,36(5):19-024. |
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| 作者姓名： | 王秀秀 王颖林 吴能森 |
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| 作者单位： | 福建农林大学 交通与土木工程学院 |
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| 摘 要： | 基于前景理论，构建业主、全过程咨询方、EPC 企业三方演化博弈模型，分析三方演化博弈系统的稳定点，对影响三方策略选择的要素进行模拟仿真，并分析博弈均衡点的稳定性。结果表明:合作成本与损失规避程度是制约三方合作的影响因素；风险态度系数、不合作时的项目收益损失值及合作的额外收益是促进三方合作的影响因素；三方合作收益分享系数与不合作损失分享系数对三方合作的促进作用存在某一阈值。据此提出政府制定相关激励政策，加强全过程咨询和工程总承包的工程教育及人力资源开发，合理使用BIM 技术、建立有效透明的沟通平台和协调机制等措施及建议，旨在提高三方合作概率，提升项目绩效。
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| 关 键 词： | 全过程咨询 EPC 演化博弈 前景理论 仿真分析 |
Research on the Cooperation Game of EPC Project SubjectUnder the Whole Process Consulting Mode |
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| WANG Xiu-xiu,WANG Ying-lin,WU Neng-sen.Research on the Cooperation Game of EPC Project SubjectUnder the Whole Process Consulting Mode[J].Journal of Engineering Management,2022,36(5):19-024. |
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| Authors: | WANG Xiu-xiu WANG Ying-lin WU Neng-sen |
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| Affiliation: | College of Transportation and Civil Engineering，Fujian Agriculture and Forestry University |
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| Abstract: | A third-party evolutionary game model considering the construction unit，the entire process consultant，and the EPCenterprise is built to examine the stability of the third-party evolutionary game system，simulate the variables influencing theselection strategy of the third party，and examine the stability of the equilibrium point of the game. There is a threshold for promotingthe benefit-sharing coefficient and the loss-sharing coefficient in triangular cooperation. The cost of cooperation and the degree ofloss avoidance restrict triangular cooperation. The risk attitude coefficient，the loss value of project income in case ofnoncooperation，and the additional income of cooperation are the factors that promote triangular cooperation. Accordingly，relatedsuggestions are put forward: the government creates incentive policies，strengthens engineering education and human resourcedevelopment of the entire consultation and EPC process，makes wise use of BIM technology，establishes an efficient and transparentcommunication platform，determines the profit and loss sharing coefficient through communication and coordination，and canincrease the likelihood of tripartite cooperation through the actions above. |
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| Keywords: | whole process consultation EPC evolutionary game prospect theory simulation analysis |
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