| 重大工程两类监理模式合谋防范研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 程书萍,旻 邱聿,陈楚楚.重大工程两类监理模式合谋防范研究[J].工程管理学报,2017,0(6):165-170. |
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| 作者姓名： | 程书萍 旻 邱聿 陈楚楚 |
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| 作者单位： | 南京大学 工程管理学院 |
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| 摘 要： | 工程监理制是提高工程质量的关键路径。我国工程实践中形成了“大业主，小监理”和“小业主，大监理”两种模式，两类监理模式形成不同的委托代理关系和合谋情形。针对两类监理模式，基于演化博弈论构建合谋情形下的政府、业主、承包商和监理博弈模型，通过计算实验得到合谋主体最优合谋概率和政府最优监管概率，据此设计相应的合谋防范机制，即“大业主，小监理”模式下，政府引入第三方审查机构降低业主的道德风险；“小业主，大监理”模式下，政府通过构建监理市场声誉体系约束监理合谋行为。
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| 关 键 词： | 演化博弈 重大工程 监理模式 合谋防范 |
Conspiracy Prevention in Two Different Types ofSupervision Modes of Mega Infrastructure Projects |
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| CHENG Shu-ping,QIU Yu-min,CHEN Chu-chu.Conspiracy Prevention in Two Different Types ofSupervision Modes of Mega Infrastructure Projects[J].Journal of Engineering Management,2017,0(6):165-170. |
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| Authors: | CHENG Shu-ping QIU Yu-min CHEN Chu-chu |
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| Affiliation: | School of Management and Engineering，Nanjing University |
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| Abstract: | The supervision system is an important path to improve the quality of mega infrastructure projects. In china，twodifferent types of supervision modes exist in the construction practice，namely “big owner，small supervisor” and “small owner，bigsupervisor”. These two modes form different types of principal-agent relationship and collusion conditions in practice. Based on theevolutionary game theory，this paper constructs a game model for the government，owner，contractors and supervisor in case ofdifferent conspiracy situations，and calculates the optimal probability of conspiracy and the optimal supervision probability ofgovernment. Subsequently, this paper proposes a corresponding conspiracy prevention mechanisms for different situations. Theresults show that the government should introduce a third-party review agency to reduce the moral hazard of owner under the modeof “big owner，small supervisor” and construct the reputation system to restrain the collusion of supervisor under the mode of “smallowner，big supervisor”. |
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| Keywords: | evolutionary game theory mega infrastructure projects supervision mode conspiracy prevention |
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